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 This project is comprised of three units on the Japanese occupation of Korea. All are 
designed for use in high school social studies classrooms. Unit one covers the period from 1876 
to 1919, including the build-up to annexation and the first decade of Japanese military rule in 
Korea. Unit two covers the period from 1919 to 1931, the cultural rule period marked by 
relatively relaxed and liberal Japanese policies in Korea. Unit three covers the period from 1931 
to 1945, the World War II or Fifteen-Year War era. An overarching compelling question anchors 
each unit, and this unit compelling question is broken down into supporting questions. Each 
lesson centers around a supporting question. Each unit begins with an overview, with the 
template taken from Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014). This overview includes the compelling and 
supporting questions, standards with which the unit aligns, a unit hook or introduction, the main 
learning tasks of each lesson, the sources with which each lesson engages, the summative 
performance assessments, and finally an avenue for student action beyond the classroom. Within 
this document, after each overview the unit introduction or “staging the question” is explained in 
greater detail. Next follows each lesson, with the sources for it included. The summative 
performance assessments and call to action are not explained further than what it is in the 
overview. Within each unit, a key lesson is highlighted. This is the ideal lesson to use from each 
unit, if educators are short on time. This is explained in more detail in the final overview. 
Following the three units is the final overview, a short explanatory paper. After this is the full 








Honors Project Final Overview 
 Multiple problems in the high school social studies education world inform this project. 
The foremost is the chronic absence of substantive East Asian history from high school social 
studies curriculum, especially that which prioritizes East Asian voices. For example, the Korean 
and Vietnam Wars are almost guaranteed attention in an average high school world history 
course. In this case, both countries’ significance extends to their roles as lands in which a 
potential fall to communism threatened democracy worldwide, and the necessity of subsequent 
American interventions is questioned.  Undoubtedly both the Korean and Vietnam wars matter to 
their respective countries’ histories, but other time periods and events exist that warrant equal or 
even more attention and better prioritize East Asian voices. In Korea specifically, the Japanese 
occupation from 1910-1945 is a perfect example and one this project explored. The occupation 
period informs the Korean War, modern Korean nationalism, and ongoing tensions between the 
two nations. Most significantly, the crucial actors in this time period are Korean and Japanese 
people. Western voices are relatively unimportant. Therefore, this project sought first to partially 
solve the chronic absence of substantive East Asian history in high school classrooms by creating 
three units, fit for secondary classroom use, on the Japanese occupation of Korea. The first 
research question guiding this project is: How can the chronic absence of substantive East Asian 
history be solved using developmentally appropriate methods?  
 Second, the need to align Ohio’s definition of civic education with content guides the 
project. The second research question is: How can the Ohio Department of Education’s 
philosophy about civic competence be truly fulfilled in classrooms? Under the philosophy and 
guiding assumptions in the Ohio Learning Standards for Social Studies’ introduction, Ohio 
asserts its goal of social studies education as “civic competence.” It defines this as follows: “the 
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knowledge, intellectual processes, and democratic dispositions required of students to be active 
and engaged participants in public life” (Ohio Department of Education, 2018, p. 3). Later in the 
document, this definition gains nuance: “Civic competence rests on a commitment to democratic 
values, and requires the ability to use knowledge about one’s community, nation, and world…” 
(Ohio Department of Education, 2018, p. 3). Students should be able to “use knowledge about 
one’s…world…” (Ohio Department of Education, 2018, p. 3). The idea that true civic 
competence requires robust awareness and knowledge of global history is implied within this 
statement.  
 Finally, several standards under the Modern World History strand for high school are key 
to this project. The Japanese occupation of Korea may be substantive East Asian history, 
prioritize East Asian voices, and provide opportunities for fulfillment of Ohio’s social studies 
education philosophy. However, without alignment to the standards, it means nothing. 
Fortunately, three content statements under the Modern World History strand deal with 
imperialism. They fall under the topic of imperialism, and are as follows: MWH9-12.9 states, 
“Imperial expansion had political, economic and social roots.” MWH9-12.10 states, 
“Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western values 
and direct political control.” MWH9-12.11 states, “The consequences of imperialism were 
viewed differently by the colonizers and the colonized.” Various aspects of the occupation align 
with all three standards. In high school classes, imperialism is a recurrent topic and the Japanese 
occupation of Korea provides a unique way to teach it. The occupation not only aligns strongly 
with all three imperialism standards, but it also fulfills the Ohio Department of Education’s 
implicit definition of civic competence – that it requires robust understanding of global history. 
Japan is the only modern example of a major non-white imperial power, and Korea was one of 
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its longest-held colonies. It represents a fuller alignment of content and philosophy. The final 
guiding research question is: How can the Japanese occupation of Korea be taught in a manner 
that is appropriate for high school classrooms? 
Background literature 
 To understand the Japanese occupation of Korea, it is useful to begin with the concept of 
degrees or levels of colonization. Historian Mark Caprio (2009) explores this in his book, 
Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945. Caprio explains that on a scale of 
external, internal, and peripheral, the Japanese occupation of Korea best fits the “peripheral” 
definition. Caprio illustrates external colonization through British India. Internal is found in most 
nation-building or the integration of minorities such as newly freed African Americans in post-
Civil War America. In contrast, peripheral colonization is marked by the narrative from the 
colonizer that the colonized may one day be accepted by the colonizer, but only if they civilize 
themselves first (pp. 23-25). After establishing Japanese Korea as an example of peripheral 
colonization, the bulk of Caprio’s book evaluates Japanese attempts to assimilate Koreans as a 
policy approach in each distinctive period of the occupation: 1910-1919, 1919-1931, and 1931-
1945. Caprio ultimately concludes it was unsuccessful due to inconsistencies in rhetoric and 
actual policy. The Japanese government claimed it wanted Koreans to be assimilated, but the 
actual commitment to this policy was weak.  
 One of the most important realms in which Japan could potentially assimilate Koreans 
was education and schools. Pak and Hwang (2011) argue that Japanese policy on Korean schools 
evolved throughout the occupation period to fit Japan’s imperial goals and needs. According to 
Pak and Hwang, schools were the primary Japanese vehicle for eradicating Korean culture and 
assimilating Koreans into Japanese culture. Korean education focused on the reproduction of 
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Japanese colonial values and subservience to the empire. Despite the stated goal of assimilation, 
Pak and Hwang (2011) also argue that Japan was hypocritical as it continued to discriminate 
against Koreans. Japan characterized itself as the “advanced” country that would modernize 
“backward” Koreans; this was meant to convince Koreans that subservience to Japan was in their 
own best interest.  
 Debates on whether the cultural rule period of the occupation was broadly liberal or 
broadly conservative and restrictive also exist in the scholarly literature. Caprio argues that a 
primary goal of the freedoms given to Koreans under cultural rule was to expose them to their 
own culture so they would realize its inferiority in comparison to Japanese culture (p. 112). 
Henry Chung also criticizes the limitations of cultural rule, saying that the changes were shallow 
and oppression of previous decades continued. Prison torture continued, and new freedoms of the 
press came with limitations and ulterior Japanese motives as well (1921, pp. 272-274).  
 Other scholars believe that limited but significant freedoms existed under cultural rule. 
Jun Uchida (2013) claims that in a 1931 push in Seoul for publicly-managed electricity, middle- 
and upper-class residents created a robust public sphere. Notably, movement participants were 
both ethnically Japanese and Korean. Further complicating the strict narrative of an oppressive 
Japan and oppressed Koreans are problems of sexism within the Korean independence 
movement. Kwon (1998) argues that the three founders of Korea’s brief-lived New Women’s 
movement were influenced by Japanese feminism and that their activism was a response to the 
patriarchy found in traditional Confucian culture. After the March First Movement, male 
independence activists pushed for a return to traditional Korean culture to contrast with Japanese 
culture being forced upon them. Kwon points out the problematic nature of this, as the sexist 
Confucianist value of female purity heavily influenced traditional Korean culture and was the 
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basis of Korean patriarchy. The New Women’s movement aimed to end all such values; male 
activists saw this goal as a potential threat to maintaining a collective Korean identity distinct 
from Japanese influence. Before the March First Movement, many had actually supported 
feminism and the New Women’s movement (1998).  
 The final important period of study is the war era from 1931-1945. During this time, 
Korean views and support of Japan varied. Japanese assimilation policy reached its most 
aggressive point, with policies such as mandatory worship at State Shinto shrines, required 
changing of family names to Japanese, and banning the speaking of Korean (Pak and Hwang, 
2011, 391-392). According to Kim (2007), a portion of Koreans began to positively identify with 
the Japanese empire. They envisioned Japan as a stronger “big brother” who could protect the 
weaker “little brother” (Korea) from Western imperialism. Caprio (2009) supports Kim’s 
assertion that a portion of Koreans positively identified with the Japan. Caprio, however, focuses 
on economic opportunities for Koreans found in Manchuria after the Japanese annexation of it as 
a main source of positive Korean identification with Japan. 
 To answer the project’s research questions, education principles and literature need to be 
taken into account. The primary education framework used to unit plan is backward design, as 
outlined by Wiggins and McTighe (2005) in Understanding by Design. Now a cornerstone 
principle in education, Wiggins and McTighe argued in their book that many educators are 
mistaken to design activities and learning experiences without explicit reference to learning goals 
and standards. Instead, educators must purposefully craft learning experiences to move students 
toward the fulfillment of salient learning goals and standards. Wiggins and McTighe believe that 
doing so will create more fruitful learning experiences for students. It also ensures that the value 
and purpose of such experiences are clear to students; if understanding by design is used 
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correctly, students know why the lesson and strategies chosen matter. Within unit planning, the 
principle of backward design is key. All lessons, assessments, and activities must be clearly 
aligned with specific, salient learning standards. 
 A social studies-specific way to approach backward design is the Inquiry Design Model, 
which was published by the C3 Teachers and the National Council for Social Studies. Grant, 
Swan, and Lee (2017) wrote Inquiry Based Practice in Social Studies Education: Understanding 
the Inquiry Design Model. Unit design within this framework begins with a compelling question 
that should represent issues relevant to students’ lives but also ongoing debates in social studies 
disciplines. Also, these compelling questions must be arguable from different viewpoints (pp. 
37-40). Grant, Swan, and Lee (2017) hold that they are a powerful way to frame and organize 
otherwise complex, onerous content. They contend that inquiry is a powerful pedagogy that 
increases student engagement by making content more relevant to them (pp. 35-36). Unit 
overarching compelling questions are supported by lesson supporting questions. In this 
framework, students find answers to supporting and compelling questions in a variety of robust 
social studies sources, making source analysis key. The Inquiry Design Model also calls on 
students to further increase the relevancy of content to their daily lives; students are to end each 
unit by “taking informed action.” Students must apply knowledge gained in the unit to real-world 
problems and take action to solve them (Grant, Swan, and Lee, 2017, p. 65).  
Methods  
 Three units on the Japanese occupation of Korea comprise this project. They are designed 
for use in a high school social studies classroom using the Inquiry Design Model. Each unit 
corresponds to a major time period in the Japanese occupation of Korea. Unit one covers 
approximately 1876 to 1919. This includes the build-up to annexation as well as the first decade 
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of harsh militaristic rule. Unit two covers approximately 1919 to 1931. These twelve years are 
the “cultural rule” period, in which Japan relaxed military rule and took a relatively liberal 
approach to Korean rule. The final unit, unit three, covers the period from 1931 to 1945. This 
was the World War II or Fifteen-Year War era. Japanese expansionism, nationalism, and 
aggressive assimilation policies enforced upon the Koreans characterize it. Each lesson in the 
project centers on analysis of a wide variety of social studies sources.  
 As mentioned above, units designed with the Inquiry Design Model framework include 
the standards, a unit hook, a unit compelling question, three to four supporting questions, a 
summative performance task, and a call to student action (Grant, Swan, and Lee, 2014). The 
project’s first unit centers on the compelling question “Why did Japan annex Korea?” The unit’s 
three supporting questions break this down further. Supporting question one, which corresponds 
with lesson one, is, “What was Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars?” 
This lesson emphasizes Korea’s critical role in Japanese geopolitical security. Supporting 
question two is, “How did Korea advance from a protectorate of Japan to a colony?” Here, the 
different contemporary Korean and Japanese accounts of the 1905-1910 period receive emphasis. 
Finally, the third supporting question is, “How competently was Korea ruled by Japan during the 
first decade?” This lesson focuses on the political, economic, and social aspects of the first 
decade of Japanese rule in Korea. The summative performance tasks consists of two options: an 
argument and an extension. In both, students construct an evidence-based answer to the unit’s 
compelling question. The argument for this unit was a 300-500 word essay and the extension was 
a news clip featuring the student as a newscaster, reporting as if it were 1910 and Japan had just 
annexed Korea. Students take action by posting their responses online to Japanese claims that 
Korea was annexed legally.  
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 The project’s second unit builds directly upon unit one. Unit two covers the “cultural 
rule” period from 1919 to 1931. Its essential question is: “Can freedom exist under an oppressive 
regime?” The first lesson asks, “What was the March First Movement?” The March First 
Movement was, in many ways, a direct response to Japanese militarism during the occupation’s 
first decade. The protests resulted in policy changes from Japan, leading to limited Korean 
freedoms in the press and education. Lesson two, therefore, centers on the question, “Why did 
Japan implement the cultural rule policy (bunka seiji)?” In it, students examine the different 
factors that influenced Japan’s decision to implement cultural rule. Despite the freedoms of 
cultural rule, scholars debate whether the era represented overall liberation or continued 
oppression for Koreans. The third lesson engages students in this debate by asking, “Did freedom 
and oppression coexist under cultural rule?” The unit concludes with the summative assessment; 
the argument asks students to answer the compelling question in 400-700 words while the 
extension asks students to write a letter to the editor from a contemporary ethnic Korean’s point 
of view. Students extend beyond the classroom by filming a YouTube video to spread awareness 
of the March First Movement outside of East Asia.  
 Unfortunately, the cultural rule freedoms failed to last. The Fifteen-Year War, or World 
War II in Asia, represents the most aggressive point of Japanese assimilation and abuse of 
Koreans for wartime use. The unit forms around the compelling question “Does war justify 
extreme measures?” The first lesson supports this with the question, “Why and how did Japan’s 
Korea policy shift with the outbreak of the Fifteen Year War in Asia (World War II in Asia)?” 
This lesson covers how the Manchurian Incident of 1931 shifts Japan’s concept of Korea’s role 
in its growing empire as well as the aggressive assimilation policies of the era: mandatory Shinto 
worship, the name-changing policy, and the banning of the Korean language. The second 
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question asks, “How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the Japanese 
Empire?” A portion of Koreans positively identified with Japan during this time, seeing 
opportunity for themselves if Japan’s empire prospered and grew. The lesson is structured to 
help students work through any cognitive dissonance resulting from this counterintuitive 
concept. Finally, lesson three asks, “Was Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans justified?” 
Out of the entire project, this lesson plan undoubtedly deals with the most upsetting, difficult 
content. Several of the lesson’s featured sources detail the experiences of comfort women - 
women who were forced into sexual slavery for the Imperial Japanese Army. The unit concludes 
with two options for assessment; the argument is a 500-700 word essay responding to the unit 
compelling question and the extension is a short speech responding to the unit compelling 
question. Finally, students take action by proposing a solution to modern comfort women-based 
Korea-Japan tensions. Students are asked to post their proposals online in a blog post format. 
Through their informed action, students engage in a real-world, emotionally charged, and very 
current issue.  
Results 
 The lesson plans that comprise the project form a part of the solution. Three interrelated 
research questions guide this project. The first is, “How can the chronic absence of substantive 
East Asian history be solved using developmentally appropriate methods?” The second is, “How 
can the Ohio Department of Education’s philosophy about civic competence be truly fulfilled in 
classrooms?” The third is, “How can the Japanese occupation of Korea be taught in a manner 
that is appropriate for high school classrooms?” The Inquiry Design Model is a secondary-level 
appropriate way to frame and organize the Japanese occupation of Korea. This resource for 
teachers on the occupation period is one small but significant step toward bringing more 
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substantive East Asian history into high school classrooms and filling the gap. An abundance of 
scholarly literature on the occupation exists; in contrast, unfortunately very few resources on it 
designed for high school use exist. For example, lessons by Ryan (2007) and Sill are available 
for free on the internet, but only cover the build-up to annexation. A brief lesson plan by Miller 
is easily accessible, but far from substantial. Finally, resources exist from Asia for Educators. 
They include excerpts from primary documents and document-based questions (DBQs). 
However, these do not include specific strategies for engaging students in the content. No 
comprehensive resources designed for high school social studies classrooms exist on the 
Japanese occupation of Korea. This project seeks to fill that gap by writing teacher and student-
friendly units.  
 The nature of the topic itself helps answer or fulfill the second research question: “How 
can the Ohio Department of Education’s philosophy about civic competence be truly fulfilled in 
classrooms?” As stated earlier in this paper, the guiding philosophy of the Ohio Learning 
Standards for the Social Studies implies that for students to truly be civically competent, they 
must be globally aware. The Japanese occupation of Korea offers a perfect opportunity for full 
alignment of the Modern World History imperialism content statements and the Ohio 
Department of Education’s guiding philosophy about social studies education. Implicit in the 
philosophy is that social studies strands should be globally inclusive in content. To be globally 
inclusive of imperialism, the Japanese occupation of Korea must be taught. Japan is the only 
modern example of a non-white imperialist nation. Not only does the Japanese occupation of 
Korea offer a chance to examine the nuances of discrimination and race, but it also is incredibly 
pertinent to modern East Asian politics.  
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 Finally, the units aim to be secondary student-friendly. The third research question is, 
“How can the Japanese occupation of Korea be taught in a manner that is appropriate for high 
school classrooms?” The units are organized using the Inquiry Design Model, a method based on 
the C3 Framework and designed for use in K-12 classrooms (C3 Teachers). A variety of 
pedagogical strategies are employed, many coming from the text Bring Learning Alive!, which 
details strategies appropriate for all age groups (Bower, Lobdell, and Owens, 2010).  
The units are made for secondary students. However, they are explicitly designed for 
advanced, accelerated, or Honors students. Nearly all of the featured sources in the three units 
are text-based and advanced in reading level. In addition to this, much of the material is 
complex. The coexistence of freedom and oppression during cultural rule, for example, is the 
focus of unit two, lesson two and was rife with possible cognitive dissonance. The lesson plans 
in this project are not differentiated for lower-achieving students or those with special needs, for 
several reasons. For many groups of high school students, it is unreasonable to ask them to 
participate in these lessons as written. However, they can be made more friendly to all types of 
learners and students.  
 Incorporating principles of universal design for learning, especially multiple means of 
representation, would decrease many barriers. A teacher who wants to use this lesson plan but 
make it appropriate for her classroom of middle to low-achieving students would substitute 
several of the more difficult text-based featured sources for alternate means of representation. 
For example, the opening lesson of the project on Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-
Japanese Wars could utilize maps, infographics, and videos instead of or in addition to excerpts 
from historian Andrew Gordon’s book. Especially on the Fifteen Year War era, multiple easily-
accessible video resources are available on the Internet. Such sources ware omitted from this 
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project, because it is written with accelerated, high-achieving, and Honors students in mind. 
They are written with a high aim and without specific differentiation; differentiation without a 
context is difficult and would lack a clear purpose. Instead, the units are written with a high aim 
because it is easier to modify lessons to an easier level than it is to modify them to a more 
advanced level.  
 For lower-achieving students, the reading level of the featured sources in each unit pose 
another high barrier to learning. Again, this is not explicitly accommodated within the project. 
However, accommodations can be made. Software like Rewordify.com is crucial. Instead of 
teachers searching for new sources, they can use the provided featured sources and 
Rewordify.com will simplify difficult vocabulary and sentences. Overall, it should lower the 
reading level, making the sources much more accessible to different types of students.  
 Finally, the everyday reality of teaching is that time is not one’s friend; there is simply 
never enough of it. In the average classroom, even an advanced one, there likely is inadequate 
time to work through all nine lessons that comprise this project. In a course such as an elective 
East Asian history class, it might be possible. For the average broad-coverage modern world 
history course, though, it may be impractical to teach all nine. With the time barrier in mind, all 
nine lesson plans are included in the project to not limit educators seeking to use this resource. 
The logic is to give teachers as many options as possible. Those wanting to utilize this resource 
can pick which specific lessons fit their own classroom needs and goals.  
 If a teacher wants to teach the entire occupation of Korea, but is limited on time, this 
project is still useful. The lesson plans are designed to flow together as a group of three in each 
unit. For the most comprehensive learning experience, this is ideal. However, the reality of 
limited time often does not allow for ideal. Lessons can still stand on their own. The teacher 
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might choose one lesson plan from each unit. If so, unit one, lesson two; unit two, lesson three; 
and unit three, lesson three are the most salient from each unit. Unit one’s second lesson features 
the strongest pedagogy of the unit; students must use higher order thinking skills when 
participating in a mock townhall debate on whether or not Korea should be annexed. Unit two’s 
third lesson centers on the coexistence of freedom and oppression. This is the most complex 
concept of unit two and an ongoing debate among scholars. Most importantly, it is a concept 
with which students can relate. Especially in the modern day, students are aware that each of us 
has both privileged and disadvantaged identities. Many will understand this about their own 
identities. Finally, unit three’s third lesson focuses on the atrocities Japan inflicted upon Korea 
during World War II. The comfort women of this era are one of the most emotionally charged 
sources of tension between Japan and Korea today. It remains an annually controversial topic; 
students in this lesson will experience authentic engagement in a modern real-world issue.  
Implications   
 The units’ overarching themes of racism, colonialism, and oppression are ones which all 
students can understand. However, the Japanese occupation of Korea adds a distinct layer to the 
conversation as it contrasts sharply with typical American conceptions of race. The perspective 
on discrimination provided is distinctly East Asian. In the United States, racial narratives focus 
on white people versus people of color. The concept of tension and discrimination from two non-
white groups is not native to our understanding of race or discrimination. These lessons could 
open the door to more nuanced, intersectional understandings of oppression.  
 The Japanese occupation of Korea as a classroom topic also provides a rare opportunity 
to privilege East Asian and East Asian American voices in the conversation. The racially-based 
tensions, past and present, between Koreans and Japanese people are ones with which East Asian 
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and East Asian American students are the most likely to have had experience. Out of all groups 
of students, it will be most native to their cultures and experiences. Simply put, no one 
understands it as well as they do. This creates a chance for East Asian and East Asian American 
students to be the “resident experts” on a race-based topic, which is a rare opportunity. In 
American conversations on race and racism, East Asian American experiences and voices are 
often excluded in favor of more high-profile tensions. These high-profile tensions and 
experiences matter, but East Asian Americans must also receive chances to speak on their 
experiences. The occupation’s unique nature provides for conversations on the intersectional 
nature of oppression as well as opportunities to empower East Asian and East Asian American 
voices.  
 Also, the mere inclusion of substantive East Asian history taught from an East Asian 
perspective empowers these students. Too often, East Asian history is only taught when 
Westerners are involved. For example, the Korean and Vietnam War will undoubtedly receive 
ample attention in any high school world history course. However, as mentioned earlier, these 
two countries are frequently reduced to potential victims of the “domino theory” and lands in 
which we question the necessity of American intervention. In contrast, in the Japanese 
occupation of Korea, the critical voices are East Asian people – Japanese and Koreans. 
Westerners and any non-East Asian people play relatively insignificant roles, and it would be 
difficult to twist the narrative to make it appear that they do. As discussed in the introduction, 
East Asian American students deserve opportunities to have their voices heard. Also, given the 
recent rise in hate crimes against Asian Americans and the renewed attention to their 
experiences, efforts to empower East Asian students are especially needed and timely.  
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Reflections on Learning  
 This project’s conception dates back to December of 2018, when I read the book 
Pachinko (2017) by Min Jin Lee. This was when I first learned that the Japanese occupation of 
Korea happened, and that Koreans were treated poorly during it. Having been fed strict 
narratives of racism as white versus people of color, it was difficult to understand that Koreans 
could be discriminated against by people so ethnically similar. The tragic but unique experience 
of Koreans under Japanese rule immediately fascinated me, and I wished I had learned of it 
sooner. Nearly two years later, in the fall of 2020, I took a historiography course and spent the 
semester researching the occupation for that class. Now, in the spring of 2021, the interest first 
sparked in December of 2018 has extended into a capstone Honors project. Throughout the entire 
experience, numerous lessons have been learned. 
 The first lesson came forward throughout the background research process that occurred 
during historiography. It is that discrimination and racial tensions extend far beyond the simple 
narrative of white people versus people of color. Numerous examples exist around the world of 
violent ethnic tensions between two non-white ethnic groups, and the occupation is one of them. 
Students in America and other Western countries need a more global understanding of racism 
and ethnic tensions. I learned this lesson personally, but plan on carrying it forward into my 
future classroom. It is ignorant to think, and teach our students, that racism can only exist 
between white people and people of color. This narrative is perhaps unintentional but created by 
lack of teaching more global examples of racial and ethnic tensions. I will intentionally teach a 
more complex and globally inclusive perspective on racial tensions.  
Second, audience matters. This lesson was learned through the unit design process. One’s 
audience will and should influence the way information is presented. While I knew this already, 
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designing the units made it especially clear. During the background research process, I 
encountered many rich scholarly sources. They contained fascinating, esoteric information and 
analyses, which I anticipated sharing with students. However, it quickly became clear that much 
of that information and knowledge did not fit learning goals that were appropriate for a high 
school social studies classroom.  
 Third, clear goals are crucial to focused work and lesson plans. Goals as well as content 
must be appropriate for the audience. For high school students, this meant simplifying learning 
objectives I would expect of myself as an undergraduate student. For example, I might expect 
myself to know the nuances of Government-General relations with the Korean press under 
cultural rule. However, I would not expect high school students to learn this. While students are 
exposed to it through Yong-Jick Kim’s (2013) book chapter in unit two, lesson three, they are 
only asked to broadly understand and be able to explain the coexistence of freedom and 
oppression under cultural rule.  
 Clear goals ensure strong alignment of all aspects of a lesson and a unit. With such a vast 
amount of potential content on the occupation, it was critical that I wrote strong learning 
objectives and minded them through the design process. For example, the decision to include or 
exclude sources, or portions of them, was made based on whether or not the information would 
advance students toward the learning goals. All decisions were made with the learning objectives 
in mind.  
 The final lesson learned is that rich extensions of class work are feasible. Whether or not 
they occur is dependent upon the student’s willingness to complete extra work. When 
researching the occupation for historiography, I knew I wanted it to extend into my Honors 
project. However, I had significant doubts as to the feasibility of completing it in a semester and 
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was initially reluctant to try. Although I genuinely enjoy learning and extending it beyond the 
classroom, I might not have created the units without the requirement to complete an Honors 
project to graduate. After nearly completing the process, I can see that it was feasible for me 
intellectually and time management-wise from the beginning. The only barrier was my 
willingness to complete extra work.  
Not only was it feasible, but the process has created several rich learning opportunities 
for me. These include a possibility of speaking at a conference and co-authoring a journal article. 
If I had remained hesitant, none of these opportunities would exist. This lesson matters on a 
personal level because my work ethic and sense of self-efficacy have been strengthened. 
However, it is even more important to my future students. Many of my students will wish to seek 
out opportunities for academic enrichment, such as dual enrollment courses, summer camps and 
seminars, and jobs or internships. Most will be capable of achieving such experiences, but the 
difference between whether or not they occur will lie in how much extra work they are willing to 
complete and how capable they believe they are. I plan on empowering my students to “go the 
extra mile” and seek enriching learning opportunities. Being able to speak from personal 
experience will increase will increase my credibility when trying to empower my students.  
 Overall, the process of completing my Honors project has left me with several key 
lessons that will be salient moving forward for both myself and my students. Just through the 
process of completing it, my self-efficacy has been increased and I know I can now better 
empower my students to seek extended learning opportunities. Studying a nuanced example of 
imperialism strengthened my resolve to teach globally inclusive narratives of history. Finally, the 
process of designing the units reminded me of the importance of audience and strong goals in 
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education. The units designed will serve high school students academically, and the lessons 













































Inquiry Design Model (IDM) Blueprint™ 
Compelling 
Question 
Why did Japan annex Korea?  
Standards and 
Practices 
MWH.9-12.9: “Imperial expansion had political, economic, and social roots.” 
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western 
values and direct political control.” 
D2.His.14.9-12. “Analyze multiple and complex causes and effects of events in the past.” 
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an examination of the 
credibility of each source.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, including 




Students will view the map on the next page, showing the scope of the Japanese empire in 1914. The 
teacher should ask students what they notice that is different than expected about the map (that Korea 
and Japan are the same color). The teacher will read/review the news article linked on the next page with 
the class as well. The map will introduce students to the idea that Korea was once occupied by Japan, and 
the news article will show the continued relevance and controversy of this time period. 
 
Supporting  
Question 1  
Supporting  
Question 2  
Supporting  
Question 3  
What was Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese Wars? 
 
How did Korea advance from a 
protectorate of Japan to a colony of 
Japan? 
How competently was Korea ruled by 







Using the MOTU method, students will 
analyze sources and will participate in a 
response group discussion to analyze 
Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and 
Russo-Japanese Wars.  
On day 1, students will participate in a 
concept map activity that details Korea’s 
advancement from protectorate to 
colony and recognizes the differing 
Korean and Japanese viewpoints. On day 
2, students will participate in a mock 
town-hall debate. Students must choose 
a position of being either for or against 
Japan’s annexation of Korea and verbally 
defend their positions in front of the 
class.  
Students will analyze sources using the 
MOTU method and participate in a 
fishbowl discussion surrounding social, 
political, and economic aspects of the 
first decade of Japanese rule in Korea.  
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Featured Sources Featured Sources Featured Sources 
Source A:  
2 excerpts from Gordon, A. (2020). A 
modern history of Japan: from Tokugawa 
times to the present (4th edition). Oxford 





 Excerpt from Hamilton, A., Austin, H.H., 
& Terauchi, M. (1910). Korea: its history, 
its people, and its commerce. J.B. Millet 
Company.  
Source B: 
Excerpt from Korean Mission to the 
Conference on Limitation of Armament. 
(1921). Korea’s Appeal to the Conference 
on Limitation of Armament. Washington 




3 excerpts from Chung, H. (1921). The 
case of Korea: A collection of evidence 
on the Japanese domination of Korea, 
and on the development of the Korean 
independence movement. Fleming H. 
Revell Company. 
Source B: 
Excerpt from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. 
(2011). Assimilation and segregation of 
imperial subjects: “educating” the 
colonized during the 1910-1945 
Japanese colonial rule of Korea. 
Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 377-397. 
Source C 
3 excerpts from Caprio, M. (2009). 
Forming Korean assimilation policy. In 
Japanese assimilation policies in 
colonial Korea, 1910-1945. (pp. 81-
110). University of Washington Press. 
 
Summative  
Performance Task  
Argument 
Students will construct a brief written essay (300-500 words) answering the unit compelling 
question: Why did Japan annex Korea? Students should cite specific evidence from the 
sources in answering the question.  
 
Extension 
Students will film and edit a mock news clip, 3-5 minutes in length, featuring themselves as 
the newscaster. Students should report as if it were 1910 and they had just received word 
that Japan annexed Korea. In the clip, students should not only report but also answer the 




Students will write an individual response to Japan’s claims that the annexation of Korea was legal, 
detailed in the news article used in the unit staging the question. Students will decide their stance in 
agreement with, against, or in partial agreement with the sentiment expressed. Students will construct a 
blog post of 500-700 words and post it using a platform such as Wordpress, Google Sites or Wix.  
  
 
The unit design template is by Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014) from the C3 Teachers. 
Grant, Swan, & Lee (2014). IDM Working Blueprint Template. C3 Teachers. 
https://c3teachers.org/inquiry-design-model/. 
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Map of Japanese Empire in 1914 
 
New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage (n.d.). Map of the Empire of Japan in 1914 
[Image]. New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage. 
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/map-empire-japan-1914. 
 
News article: https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1995-10-12-1995285023-story.html 
New York Times News Service. (1995, October 12). Japan again reasserts legality of annexing 






Unit 1, Lesson 1 
Note: Designed for a standard 50-minute class period  
Objectives:  
• SWBAT understand the Japanese motivation to annex Korea, including prior Japanese 
involvement in Korean affairs and the debate between protectorate versus colony. 
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
Standards: 
MWH.9-12.9: “Imperial expansion had political, economic, and social roots.” 
D2.His.14.9-12. “Analyze multiple and complex causes and effects of events in the past.” 
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an 
examination of the credibility of each source.” 
Lesson compelling question: What was Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese 
Wars?  
Hook (response group):  
Time allotted: 5-7 minutes 
• Students will be presented with the following quote, projected or written on the 
whiteboard and read aloud by the teacher:  
o “Korea is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.” -Major Jacob Meckel, Prussian 
military advisor to Japan, c. 1885-1888 
• The teacher will ask students why Major Meckel might have said this to Japanese 
officials. The teacher should follow up with asking students if they think Korea truly 
posed a threat to Japan, and if so, why. To aid in the discussion, the teacher will display 
the map attached at the end of this lesson. 
Body (30-35 minutes): 
• MOTU source analysis demonstration (10 minutes): The teacher should project the 
following worksheet from the National Archives and Records Administration on the 
board. It lays out the MOTU method of source analysis developed by the NARA. Link 
here: 
https://www.archives.gov/files/education/lessons/worksheets/written_document_analysis
_worksheet.pdf. The teacher will use a small portion of featured source 1, perhaps the 
first two paragraphs, to demonstrate how students should use this method to analyze 
sources.  
• Small group MOTU source analysis (15-20 minutes): The teacher will split students 
into small groups of 2-4. Students will perform the MOTU source analysis method for 
each featured source of the lesson. The teacher should tell students they should pay 
particular attention, of course, to Korea’s significance in both wars. Students should be 
prepared to share out after completing the small group MOTU activity. 
• Response groups (5-10 minutes): On the whiteboard or SmartBoard, the teacher will 
create two columns, one with the heading Sino-Japanese War and the other with Russo-
Japanese War. Students will provide their responses on Korea’s role in each war, and the 
teacher will help clarify comments. As students provide responses, the teacher will write 
them on the board under the appropriate column. Once 3-5 answers have been provided, 
the teacher should move on to the next war.  
Closure (10 minutes): 
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• Large group debrief: The teacher will add a “bottom line” to each war on the chart on 
the board, and a “bottom line” for the overall lesson. The teacher will ask students what 
they think the “bottom line” or most important reason for Korea’s involvement in the 
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars was. The teacher will fill in the “bottom line” 
sections with student responses. Finally, the teacher will wrap the lesson by asking 
students if they still think Korea was truly a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Students 
will complete the exit ticket, summarizing in approximately 2 sentences per war why the 
Korean peninsula was involved.  
• The teacher should also assign homework for the following day: Complete MOTU 
analysis of the two featured sources for lesson two of the unit.  
Sources: 
Both excerpts taken from: 
Gordon, A. (2020). Empire and domestic order. In A modern history of Japan: From Tokugawa 
times to the present (4th edition). (pp. 117-141). Oxford University Press.  
Source 1 (pp. 119-120): 
 “After the Li-Ito agreement in 1885, the Japanese government kept a low profile in Korea 
for nearly a decade. The Chinese gained control by stationing ‘advisors’ at the Korean court to 
reform the Korean military and communications network. In addition, Russian diplomats won 
increased influence at the court, where some Koreans viewed them as a counterforce to excessive 
Chinese authority. This, in turn, led the British to occupy a small island off the Korean coast. 
The British demanded that Russia pledge to respect Korean territorial ‘integrity’ before they 
withdrew in 1887. The United States also joined the contest for influence in Korea. Several 
Americans served as foreign affairs advisors to the throne from 1886 into the 1890s.  
 With foreign powers pressing from all directions, Korea’s own leaders desperately 
maneuvered to gain some breathing space and independence. This proved impossible. In the 
early 1890s, long-simmering peasant anger at economic distress and the foreign presence erupted 
in a major uprising, the Tonghak rebellion. In 1894, this led directly to a war between Qing 
dynasty China and Japan, fought in Korea.  
 The Tonghak was a religious movement whose adherents blamed their impoverished 
plight on both the Korean elite and foreigners – the Japanese in particular but the Chinese as 
well. By the spring of 1894, Tonghak rebels had taken control of much territory and a major 
provincial capital, and the Korean government asked China to send troops to put down the 
uprising. 
 The commitment of Chinese troops gave the Japanese government an opening it was 
hoping for, leading to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Japan’s military 
buildup had by now given it a rough naval parity with China. Yamagata Aritomo and other top 
leaders decided the time had come to secure the upper hand in Korea. In the name of ‘protecting 
Japanese residents,’ in June 1894 they sent eight thousand troops to Korea and demanded an 
equal voice with China in administering Korea’s internal affairs. The Chinese refused. Japan 
responded in July by seizing control of the Korean royal place and installing a pro-Japanese 
administration. It forced this government to announce the end to its tributary relationship with 
the Qing rulers and to demand the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from Korea. In the 
name of cooperation with this puppet Korean government, the Japanese military forces then in 
Korea attacked the Chinese military and several days later declared war on China. 
 The Sino-Japanese War was in this way a struggle for control of the Korean peninsula 
fought between Japan and the Qing rulers of China. It consisted of some land battles but 
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primarily naval engagements. It ended in complete Japanese victory by April 1895. In the peace 
treaty concluded at the Japanese port of Shimonoseki, Japan made clear its aspirations for an area 
of advantage well beyond Korea.  It t won control of Taiwan and some nearby islands, as well as 
the Liadong peninsula. Taiwan indeed became a Japanese colony, although not at the simple 
stroke of a pen. Japan had to send an army of sixty thousand troops to put down fierce Taiwanese 
resistance to Japan’s initial colonial occupation, and forty-six hundred Japanese troops died from 
combat or disease.”  
 
Source 2 (pp. 123-124): 
 “From 1895 through the early 1900s, Korea remained their primary strategic concern. 
The Shimonoseki treaty of 1895 forced China to recognize Korea as an ‘independent’ state. With 
this provision, the Japanese expected to keep the Chinese at bay. But the forced retrocession of 
the Liadong peninsula immediately after the war also put at risk Japan’s position in Korea. 
Korea’s Queen Min, previously close to China, turned to Russia for support in countering 
Japan’s influence. But in October 1895, in an extraordinary act of insubordination, the Japanese 
envoy to Korea, Lieutenant General Miura Goro, and his legation staff brutally murdered the 
queen and several of her court ladies. The Japanese government subsequently recalled Miura to 
Japan and accused him of murder, but the courts deemed the evidence insufficient to even put 
him on trial.  
 Although not a party to the murderous conspiracy itself, the government in Tokyo 
supported the goal of maintaining the upper hand on the peninsula. In the following years, Japan 
tried to dominate the Korean government by stationing advisors in Seoul to administer Meiji-
style reforms. But Korean leaders were unhappy with Japanese control and the direction of 
reforms. They continued to play foreign powers against each other by turning to Russia for help. 
Over the next decade, the Russians came to rival the Japanese position in Korea. They 
challenged it in Manchuria as well by seizing the leasehold for Dairen at the tip of the Liadong 
peninsula in 1898. Japanese leaders responded with several initiatives to regain control in Korea 
and establish themselves as an imperial power in Asia. In 1900-01, Japan sent ten thousand 
troops to China – the largest single national contingent – to join the multinational force that put 
down the Boxer Rebellion… 
 In the wake of the Boxer uprising, the Japanese drew closer to the British, while the 
Russians kept their troops in Manchuria and sought to extract further exclusive concessions from 
China before leaving. The Japanese and British formalized their cooperative ties with an alliance 
in 1902. By this agreement, the British recognized Japan’s special interest in Korea. Each nation 
pledged to aid the other if Russia and a fourth party attacked either one. Such a combined attack 
never took place. Nonetheless, with a colony in Taiwan, troops in Peking, and an alliance with 
the British Japan had secured a place as one of Asia’s imperial powers. 
 Over the next several years, Japanese leaders sought above all to solidify hegemony in 
Korea. One option viewed with favor by Ito Hirobumi in particular was a diplomatic deal with 
the Russians. Japan would grant them primacy in Manchuria if they would retreat in Korea. 
Through 1903, the government negotiated in a halfhearted way with Russia. In fact, Japan was 
unwilling to concede full control of Manchuria to the Russians and the latter were equally 
insistent on maintain a Korean presence. In addition, political parties, journalists, and leading 
intellectuals, including a group of prominent Tokyo Imperial University professors, held rallies 
and issued increasingly forceful calls for war. This strengthened the hawkish voices among the 
Japanese negotiators…By February 1904, the Japanese government had decided to secure its 
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position in Korea as well as Manchuria by force. It declared war on Russia. This began the 
Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s second major military struggle over Korea in a decade… 
 In May 1905, the Japanese oligarchs secretly asked the American president, Theodore 
Roosevelt, to mediate. A treaty of peace was negotiated at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and 
signed on September 5, 1905. The settlement reflected the uncertain military situation. The 
Japanese gained control of Russian railway lines in southern Manchuria and took over Russian 
leases in two Manchurian ports as well. They also won recognition of their exclusive rights in 
Korea. But aside from territorial rights on the southern half of the virtually uninhabited Sakhalin 
island, Japan emerged with no outright gains of land and no financial compensation. This 
contrasted sharply with the Sino-Japanese War. Fed a steady diet of news celebrating victories in 
battle, and unaware that Japan was militarily and economically stretched to the limit, public 
opinion at home was severely disappointed. 
 Nonetheless, Japan was now clearly in control of Korea. Its advisors, in fact, ran the 
government. The Japanese army, through the office of resident general, administered Korean 
foreign relations. The resident general increased his power in 1907 when Japan forced the 
Korean monarch to resign and disbanded the Korean army. Japan then annexed Korea outright as 
a colony in 1910. The position of resident general was replaced by that of governor general, 
appointed by the emperor. Until 1945, the colonial administration under the governor general 
held complete military, judicial, legislative, and civil authority in Korea.” 
 
Map to be used in hook:  
  









Unit 1, Lesson 2 
Objectives: 
• SWBAT analyze primary sources to evaluate the bias, reliability, and value of a source. 
• SWBAT describe and analyze how Imperial Japan transitioned from indirect control of 
Korea as a protectorate to direct control as a colony. 
• SWBAT compare, evaluate, and reconcile potentially conflicting views and experiences – 
in this instance the Japanese and Korean views on events of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.  
Standards:  
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of 
Western values and direct political control.” 
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an 
examination of the credibility of each source.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
Lesson compelling question: How did Korea transition from a protectorate of Japan to a 
colony?  
Hook (5-10 minutes): 
• Homework review/review for preview (5-10 minutes): The teacher should briefly 
review the MOTU source analysis homework with students. The teacher should review 
broadly the main points students should have covered in each category of the MOTU 
analysis for both sources. Teachers should ensure they cover several salient points in their 
review. First, the author of featured source A is Terauchi Masatake, who was the first 
Governor-General of Korea and known for his militaristic rule. He was also the War 
Minister of Japan during multiple cabinets and held the office of Prime Minister during 
World War I. There are multiple members of the Korean Mission to the Conference on 
Limitation of Armament. Their names can be found in the beginning of the document; 
one is Syngman Rhee, the eventual first President of South Korea. Also, the conference 
that the group was appealing to was the infamous Conference on Limitation of 
Armaments held in Washington, D.C. from 1921-1922. It is also known simply as the 
Washington Naval Conference.  
Body (35 minutes): 
• Concept Map activity (20 minutes): Students will be creating a concept map on the 
whiteboard detailing what they view as important points or moments in the transition of 
Korea from protectorate to colony of Japan. Each student will receive a dry-erase marker 
with which to write on the whiteboard. The teacher should separate the board 
horizontally, with the top half labeled as being dedicated to the Japanese view, and the 
bottom half labeled as being dedicated to the Korean view. During the activity, students 
will go up to the board and leave answers as they please – each student must answer 
once, but there is no limit. Students may write their own “independent” points or respond 
to/build off of other students’ points, showing the connection via arrows. Students could 
also link two points from other students and provide their own personal commentaries.  
• Large group debrief (10 minutes): All students will return to their individual seats. The 
teacher will first circle/star points he or she finds especially important. The teacher will 
pose the following to students: “If you could narrow down the transition from 
protectorate to colony to 3 main points per side (Korean/Japanese), what would those 
points be?” Students will raise their hands to provide answers. As students provide 
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answers, the teacher will write them on the board. Finally, once all answers have been 
provided and written the teacher should briefly verbally review them.  
• Response groups (5 minutes): The teacher should pose questions along the following 
lines: “What accounts for the differences between the Korean and Japanese accounts of 
events? Is one side right or wrong? Can these accounts be said to complement each 
other? Conflict with each other? Both? What is each side’s agenda?” Students will 
voluntarily provide answers.  
Closure (10 minutes):  
• Exit ticket and homework (10 minutes): Students will complete an exit ticket by 
writing or typing and submitting answers via an online learning platform like Google 
Classroom. Students will summarize in 3 bullet points the transition from protectorate to 
colony. Students should respond with what they personally view as the 3 main takeaways 
from this time period. 
• While students complete the exit ticket, the teacher should also assign homework for the 
next day. Students should review MOTU sheets from all sources thus far. The teacher 
should also tell students the following day will be a mock townhall argument. All 
students should prepare a brief argument either for or against the annexation of Korea by 
Japan. Students should be prepared to verbally defend their positions using specific 
evidence from sources used thus far.  
Sources: 
Source A:  
Terauchi, M. (1910). The Relations of Korea with Japan. In Korea: its history, its people, and its 
commerce. (pp. 217-232). J.B. Millet Company. 
Excerpt taken from pp. 220 - 224 
 “Japan was again compelled to engage in a costly war, this time with Russia, largely on 
account of Korean affairs. But Japan had now realised that Korea was not capable of governing 
herself, and that the policy of maintaining her independence could not be pursued without certain 
modifications. Indeed, as the Resident-General declared in a speech made in July 1907,  
‘The identity of Korean and Japanese interests in the Far East and the paramount character of 
Japanese interests in Korea will not permit Japan to leave Korea to the care of any other foreign 
country: she must assume the charge herself.’ 
 Thus Japan took the responsibility of intervention in Korean affairs, after having given 
the Koreans ample opportunity to prove their fitness for self-government, and after having found 
them wholly unprepared for the task. Subsequently to the outbreak of war with Russia, Japan, by 
successive agreements, obtained entire control of Korea’s foreign affairs. This fact being 
afterwards recognised by the other Treaty Powers, they duly withdrew their diplomatic 
representatives from Seoul. With respect to domestic affairs, Japan has assumed advisory 
supervision of the general administration, but, in military matters, if ‘the welfare of the Imperial 
House or the territorial integrity of Korea’ is endangered by the aggression of a third Power, or 
by internal disturbances, Japan is to have direct control… 
 In addition to assuming direct control of Korean affairs, the Resident-General, 
representing the Japanese Government, commenced faithfully to exercise his advisory functions 
in the general administration. As to the details of his procedure, he caused the Korean 
Government to engage a number of Japanese advisers, councillors, or assistant-councillors, both 
for the Imperial Household and for the various Departments of State, in addition to a financial 
adviser and a diplomatic adviser, who had been engaged before the establishment of the 
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Residency-General. Technical experts were also engaged for the public works and for the model 
experimental farms where instruction was given in industry, agriculture, and forestry. In matters 
relating to the reform of local administration, it was arranged that the Vice-Residents of the 
Japanese local Residencies should act as councillors to Provincial Governors; and Finance 
Councillors were distributed among the thirteen provinces to act as advisers to the Provincial Tax 
Supervisors...For the administration of justice, a Japanese legal councillor, or assistant-
councillor, was attached to each of the courts, local and high, in Seoul and to each of the courts 
in the Provincial Governments as well as to magistracies of prefectures and districts. Thus no 
radical changes were introduced into the old Korean administrative organisation. On the 
contrary, the Resident-General tried to improve the existing Korean administration by general 
guidance under the various Japanese advisory bodies. The Central Government had competence 
to enact any necessary laws and ordinances for reform measures, and to instruct Local 
Governments to act in accordance with advice, while local officials were expected to pay due 
attention to advice given by the Japanese councillors. 
 But the operation of this system proved unsatisfactory, owing to the fact that the Korean 
officials paid little respect to the advice given, so long as they were free to adopt or reject it at 
will. Moreover, the incapacity of Korean officials and the habitually crooked methods of the 
Korean Government greatly handicapped the success of the projected programme. Thus it 
resulted that advisory guidance had practically little or no effect in bringing about the desired 
changes in the old-time maladministration of affairs. So many evils and abuses had taken root 
that more direct management on the part of the Resident-General, together with some 
modifications in the Government organisation and the employment of capable officials, became 
vitally important, since otherwise the welfare and prosperity of the Korean people could not be 
promoted. These experiences and considerations compelled the conclusion of a new Agreement. 
It was signed on July 24, 1907. By it the Resident-General was given more direct participative 
power in the general administration. He acquired initiative as well as consultory competence to 
enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and remove Korean officials, and to place 
capable Japanese subjects in the ranks of Korean officialdom. The Agreement provided specially 
for differentiation of the Judiciary and the Executive, as much corruption existed under the old 




Korean Mission to the Conference on Limitation of Armament. (1921). Korea’s appeal to the 
conference on limitation of armament. Washington Government Printing Office. 
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=9OdAAAAAYAAJ&pg=GBS.PA1.   
Excerpt taken from pp. 22 – 25 
 “The treaty terminating the war with Russia was consummated at Portsmouth in 
September, 1905, and its was no sooner signed and out of the way than Japan began her 
aggressive activities in Korea. A treaty establishing a protectorate by Japan over Korea was 
prepared and Marquis Ito was sent to Seoul to secure its signature. For days he importuned the 
Emperor and the cabinet ministers to carry out the will of his imperial autocratic master, but they 
flatly refused. There were stormy sessions. Threats and cajolery were used to no avail; finally it 
was apparent that more vigorous methods must be adopted.  
 The palace was a second time surrounded by Japanese troops and was invaded with 
swaggering officers and their conspicuously armed guards. The Emperor and the ministers had 
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been assembled at the peremptory order of Marquis Ito. They were argued with en masse with no 
result, and then the three ministers who were the most outspoken in their condemnation were 
taken out, one by one. Japanese officers returned, sheathing swords and buckling holsters, saying 
to those who still sat in council, ‘Now will you sign?’ The Emperor and his remaining ministers 
had every reason to believe that their absent colleagues had become martyrs to Korean freedom 
as had their beloved Queen Min. Still they stubbornly refused.  
 The details of this conference have been recorded in numerous historical works. They are 
common knowledge. The protectorate treaty never was signed or legally executed, although 
Japan announced to the world that it had been. Even if actually signed, it would still be invalid 
because of personal duress.  
 There were present at the opening of this conference on behalf of Korea the Emperor and 
his eight ministers: Hahn Kin-sul, premier; Park Chee-soon, vice premier and minister of foreign 
affairs; Min Young-kee; Lee Ha-young; Yi Won-yong; Yi Kun-tak; Yi She-yong; and Kwon 
Choong-hyun. The status of the ministers was, of course, advisory. The final decision and the 
execution of the document was rested with the Emperor. The Emperor did not sign, nor was he 
ever advised to sign by a majority of his ministry. 
 The Three Yi’s did sign. One of their rewards for this act of treachery to Korea was that 
Yi Won-yong was given the title of count, with a bribe of 1,000,000 yen ($500,000). It is 
claimed that Lee and Kwon consented without signing. Others claim that these two simply 
refused to participate. In any event, the Emperor, the premier, the minister of foreign affairs, and 
Minister Min did not sign or acquiesce in the protectorate in any manner or form, but were all 
outspoken and courageous in their denunciation and repudiation of the acts of the Japanese.  
 The Imperial Government of Japan reported this thing consummated on November 17, 
1905, and the world for the time being accepted this misstatement as the truth. It was plausible 
enough, for the traitor, Yi Won-yong, fraudulently signing himself as acting minister of foreign 
affairs, although Park Che-soon was the minister, instructed Kim Yun-chung, another Korean 
traitor, then stationed at Washington as charge de affaires for Korea, to announce the treaty to the 
United States and to turn the legation over to the Japanese. This Kim did, and returning to Korea 
was rewarded by Japanese for his treachery by being made prefect of Chemulpo, later counsellor 
in Chula Province, and was given a vast estate of several thousand acres. 
Secretary of State Root had no means of knowing , at the time, that Japan’s statement of 
the signing of the protectorate treaty was untrue, nor that Yi Won-yong and Kim Yun-chung had 
been bribed to misrepresent the facts to him, and accordingly recognized the Japanese 
protectorate of Korea and withdrew the diplomatic representatives of the United States to Korea. 
In the meantime the Emperor had become convinced by the attitude of Japan of its ultimate 
purposes and in October, 1905, had dis patched his faithful friend and confidant, Prof. Homer B. 
Hulbert, an American, to Washington with a protest to the United States and asking its aid and 
‘good offices.’ Prof. Hulbert arrived in Washington almost on the very day it is alleged the treaty 
was signed. It was useless for him to attempt to get Kim Yun-chung, the acting chargé de affaires 
for Korea, to present the protest, because the chargé was in Japan’s pay, and he was delayed in 
seeing Secretary Root until after the formal recognition of the Japanese protectorate had taken 
place. He did finally see Secretary Root, however, but under the circumstances was not formally 
received as a representative of Korea. The protest of the Emperor was delivered to the State 
Department and simply became a part of its confidential files. The next day Prof. Hulbert 
received a cable from the Emperor denying the execution of the protectorate treaty and it was 
 33 
promptly delivered to the State Department and it, too, became a part of the files of the 
department 
 After the announcement of the protectorate the Emperor for all practical purposes was a 
Japanese prisoner, confined in his own country. No one, except that he was a pronounced pro-
Japanese, was allowed to see him. Seasoned and experienced correspondents from the leading 
world’s newspapers were sent to interview him, but without success. Prof. Hulbert, his faithful 
friend, did manage to see him in spite of Japanese espionage, and the Emperor delivered to him 
credentials to the powers with which Korea had made treaties, reciting the fraudulent character 
of the protectorate and asking the ‘good offices’ of those nations to assist Korea in her 
predicament. However, Prof. Hulbert, alone and unaided, could not accomplish a great deal, 
except to persist in his efforts to inform the world, in season and out, of the fraudulent character 
of Japanese usurpation in Korea. This he did with a faithfulness and self - sacrifice that we may 
expect from a red - blooded American, fighting for the weak and oppressed. 
Japan sought to, and for all practical purposes did, vitiate the credentials issued to Prof. 
Hulbert and the envoys to The Hague conference, by announcing the abdication of the Emperor 
who had signed the credentials. Those who believed the announcement, of course, considered the 
credentials automatically canceled. This announcement was made July 19, 1907, and five days 
later, on the 24th, the subsidized Korean traitor, Yi Won-yong, purporting to act for Korea, 
signed a treaty with Marquis Ito, representing Japan, turning over to Marquis Ito, as Japanese 
resident general the entire governmental functions of Korea, internal and otherwise.  
It is impossible to believe, in view of the Emperor’s attitude and many public protests, 
that the Emperor ever actually and of his own volition consented to any of these acts that Japan 
announced that he had promulgated. In any event, on the theory that ‘dead men tell no tales,’ he 
was poisoned on January 24, 1919. His death was kept a secret or some days and finally it was 
officially announced that he had died of apoplexy. 
The crown prince was an unfortunate - a mental deficient — and being born of Queen 
Min in those troublesome times preceding her murder he came into the world with no chance. 
The very terrors and ordeals through which his mother had passed were to shield him. He was 
born without means of ordinary comprehension and he believes to - day the irrefutable proof 
before the world by which it will condemn Japan's duplicity. 
Japan did not balk at making use of this unfortunate to further her purposes. Late in 
August, 1907, after the Japanese had announced the abdication of Emperor Yi, the crown prince 
was crowned Emperor, ‘amid the sullen silence of a resentful people.’… 
He was known throughout the world as the ‘puppet Emperor,’ and, of course, the 
Japanese did with him as they willed. Edicts were issued in his name that probably never saw, or, 
seeing them, could not comprehend beyond the bright red seals and yellow ribbon. 
The first order was to disband the Korean army, small as it was and as helpless as it was, 
with the more numerous Japanese troops occupying all places of vantage. The different 
detachments were ordered to report at a given point ‘without arms,’ and the order of disbandment 
was read to them. Many of them refused and fought with bare hands. They were shot down, 
dying as a final protest against this usurpation of their country's freedom. 
Eventually the Japanese tired of the red tape necessary to continue the form and pretense 
of a Korean Government with this unfortunate puppet Emperor and in 1910 came out boldly with 
their rescript of annexation. 
Of course, this was their objective and their intention from the beginning. Yet up to the 
very day of annexation they had always denied it to the world. At each aggressive step plausible 
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excuses were give, and the nations of the world were reassured time and again that Japan had no 
intention of finally annexing Korea. Marquis Ito, the first governor general, characterized ‘all 
annexation talk as absurd’ and this cry was taken up and reiterated by all Japanese officials and 
diplomats with a perfect hypocrisy that misled the world.” 
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Unit 1, Lesson 2, Day 2 
Note: Designed for use in a standard 50-minute class period  
Objectives:  
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
• SWBAT evaluate the validity of arguments based on evidence cited and logical strength. 
Standards: MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute 
positions.” 
MWH.9-12.9: “Imperial expansion had political, economic, and social roots.” 
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of 
Western values and direct political control.” 
Lesson compelling question: How did Korea transition from a protectorate of Japan to a 
colony? Was it logical for Japan to directly annex Korea as a colony? 
Hook (5-8 minutes):  
• You-are-there/simulation (5 -8 minutes): The teacher will ask students to imagine the 
following situation: They are in the year 1909 and are thoroughly informed of Japan’s 
activities in Korea over the past 15 years. Japanese officials are unsure whether Korea’s 
status as a protectorate will be adequate enough to ensure geopolitical security. As such, 
top officials have decided to host a townhall. Students will present arguments for or 
against Korea’s annexation as if they were presenting them to Prime Minister Katsura 
Taro, Korea’s resident-general Ito Hirobumi, or any grouping of high-ranking Japanese 
officials. The teacher will split students into two groups – group A will present arguments 
for either position, and group B will carefully listen and decide on a “wining” side. Group 
B will vote on whether or not they would annex Korea if they were Japanese officials, on 
the basis of their peers’ arguments. Students presenting in Group A must cite specific 
evidence from sources presented in lessons 1 and 2. The teacher should initially ask for 
volunteers for group A, but if too few students volunteer then he or she should choose 
students at random to even out the group numbers.  
Body (30-35 minutes):  
• Mock townhall discussion (30-35 minutes):  
• The teacher should have a podium, stand, or designated spot for each student in group A 
to stand while arguing their positions. Each student should be granted roughly an equal 
amount of time. If there are, for example, 10 students in group A then each student 
should receive approximately 3-4 minutes to make their cases. Regardless, students 
should have enough time to thoroughly develop a point but must do so concisely. 
Students in group A must inform the teacher in advance of which side they plan to argue. 
• Students in group A will present their arguments, and the teacher will act as timekeeper. 
If possible, the arguments presented should alternate sides each time. When a student 
presents an argument against annexation, it should be followed by an argument for 
annexation, and so on.  
• While group A presents arguments, students in group B should be taking careful notes. 
They should note evidence cited, logical fallacies, strengths of students’ arguments, and 
the “bottom line” of why each presenter believes his or her position is correct.  
• After all students in group A have presented, students in group B should receive 
approximately 5 minutes to confer with one another and discuss a winner. The vote does 
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not need to be unanimous, but students do need at least a 2/3 majority (or similar 
appropriate ratio, depending on the number of group members). 
Closure (10 minutes):  
  
• Large group debrief (10 minutes): Students in group B will share their decision with 
the class. The group should have one spokesperson share the vote either for or against 
annexation. After sharing, the teacher should ask other students in group B to share why 
they chose to vote that way. If any students from group B did not vote in the same 
manner as the majority, they should also verbally share why.  
• Finally, the teacher should ask students what they felt the strongest argument points were. 
Teachers should also ask students if and how any arguments presented changed or altered 
their personal opinions. Students should elaborate on how their opinions were altered 




Unit 1, Lesson 3 
Note: Designed for use in a standard 50-minute class period 
Objectives:  
• SWBAT describe the main political, social, and economic characteristics of the first 
decade of Japanese rule in Korea. 
• SWBAT explain the difference in treatment of Koreans and Japanese during the first 
decade of Japanese rule in Korea. 
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
• SWBAT analyze primary sources to evaluate the bias, reliability, and value of a source. 
Standards: 
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of 
Western values and direct political control.” 
D2.His.4.9-12: “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives of 
people during different historical eras.” 
Lesson compelling question: What were the political, social, and economic characteristics of 
the first decade of Japanese rule in Korea? 
Hook (5-10 minutes): 
• Post-it/whiteboard activity (5-10 minutes): Prior to class, students should have read all 
featured sources for the lesson and underlined/noted important points. At the beginning 
of class, each student will receive a dry-erase marker or write their answers on a Post-It 
note. Students should write directly on the board or on a Post-It one major point from the 
reading they found important. Students may write as many answers as they wish, but 
every student must supply at least one response.  
Body (30-35 minutes): 
• MOTU source analysis review (5 minutes): The teacher will briefly review each source 
with students using the MOTU method. The teacher will project a copy of the MOTU 
worksheet on the board, an annotate it either by typing on the document or writing using 
SmartBoard electronic pens. The teacher will review each letter of the MOTU acronym, 
and ask students for voluntary responses.  
• Fishbowl discussion (25-30 minutes): Students will be split into two groups, and desks 
or chairs should be arranged so that one group of students can sit in the “in” circle that is 
actively discussing and the other group can sit in the “out” circle or group that is actively 
listening. To prepare for this discussion, the teacher should ask students to review 
important points they found in the readings. Students might also think of discussion 
questions they wish to pose. The teacher should begin the discussion by posing the 
question, “How competently was Korea ruled by Japan during the first decade?” Students 
must point to specific evidence in the sources during the discussion, and ensure that they 
cover political, social, and economic factors during the conversation. Finally, students 
should keep in mind the previous MOTU analysis activity just completed. Round 1 will 
consist of group 1 actively discussing for 8 minutes, then group 2. For round 2, the 
teacher should begin by posing the questions, “How does the first decade of Japanese rule 
of Korea compare and contrast with traditional examples of imperialism? How does it 
contrast with typical notions of race and discrimination?” Discussion of topics from the 
previous round may continue into this round as well. Each group will receive 5 minutes 
for discussion in round 2. 
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Closure (5 minutes): 
• Large group response (2-3 minutes): The teacher will ask for brief student responses on 
the “main takeaway” from the lesson.  
• Exit ticket (remainder of class period): Students will write a 3-4 sentence argument in 
response to the supporting question, making sure to address political, social, and 
economic aspects of Japanese rule in Korea. These will be turned in to the teacher before 
the class period ends, either on paper or digitally.  
Sources:  
Source 1: 
Chung, H. (1921). The case of Korea: A collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of 
Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement. Fleming H. Revell 
Company. 
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 64: 
 “Habeas corpus is unknown in Korea, and every man is considered guilty until he proves 
his innocence. The law courts in Korea are part of the administrative system under the Governor-
General. The judiciary, instead of being independent and a bulwark of liberty for those oppressed 
by other branches of the administration, as it is in America and Great Britain, forms a part and 
parcel of the system. The judges, the nominees of the Governor-General, cannot be expected, 
under the circumstances, to be unbiased. They have the absolute authority to select the evidence 
they will admit. The defendant has no right to call witnesses on his own behalf. He may have a 
complete defense and not be allowed to present it. He can only make request that witnesses be 
called, and the judges grant the application or not as they see fit. The judges’ action is not subject 
to review by a higher court.” 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 67-71 
 “A most serious phase in the matter of judicial administration in Korea is the fact that the 
system gives no assurance for justice to any one who may be caught in its toils. Nowhere in the 
whole process has there been any attempt to safeguard the innocent, but, on the other hand, there 
are six things that make it practically impossible to clear a person against whom a case has been 
made. They are as follows:  
1. The right of the police to arrest without due process of law. No warrant is required for 
arrest. Neither the prisoner, his attorney, his family, nor his friends have any way of 
ascertaining the charge, if any, on which the arrest and detention is made. Bail is 
often not allowed, and not at all during the preliminary investigation. The right of 
habeas corpus is unknown.  
2. Presumption of guilt. Instead of following the true legal maxim that ‘every man is 
considered innocent until proven guilt,’ the official and popular attitude is the very 
reverse of this, and the Japanese newspapers refer to the accused as criminals. The 
expression ‘proving the guilt’ of the accused is never heard. In case of acquittal, it is 
said that he ‘proved his innocence’ or was pardoned. 
3. Right of counsel is denied. An accused person is not allowed to talk with a lawyer or 
with others about his defense until after the police investigation and the hearing 
before the procurator (prosecuting attorney) has been concluded. During this period 
of investigation the accused is in the hands of the police with all access to the outside 
world completely cut off, and the sole object of the police is to make a case that will 
insure conviction… 
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4. Secret police investigation. Here is the very citadel of this iniquitous system. It is 
beyond dispute that the police use threats, deception and all forms of physical and 
mental torture to secure admissions of guilt or in their efforts to gain incriminating 
evidence against others. When such admission or evidence is obtained, it is reduced 
to writing, signed by the accused, and becomes the basis for inquiry both before the 
procurator and the trial judge. One would expect that the court would look upon such 
testimony with suspicion, and that unless it was confirmed or corroborated in open 
court, it would be thought and insufficient basis for conviction. On the contrary 
experience shows that it is almost impossible to get the judges to give credence to 
evidence tending to overthrow false admissions made under the pressure of the secret 
police investigation… 
5. Collusion between police and procurator. The procurator acts as prosecuting attorney 
when the case is tried, but in advance of this the prisoners are brought before him for 
preliminary examination. After this examination he has the authority to reverse the 
police findings. However, the police report quoted above is authority for the 
statement that the police often serve as procurators. In such cases the hearing must be 
mere empty form. A Japanese lawyer in the course of his argument on a very 
important case said: ‘This case convinces me that the police and procurators are one 
and the same.’… 
6. Biased judges. The process verbal from the police court and procurator is used as 
evidence on the trial before the judges. Judges are required to familiarize themselves 
with this record before the hearing begins. Thus they form their opinions before the 
defendant or his counsel can be heard… 
To this must be added the fact that the accused has no right to set up and develop his 
defense in open court as has been referred to. We already have a fairly good outline of the 
Japanese legal system in Korea. If the whole system is thus deficient in theory, what 
could be expected in the way of practical results? Is it any wonder that the Koreans look 
upon the courts as machinery of oppression? The judicial power given to the police to 
execute judgments without trial on minor offenses is known as ‘Summary Judgment.’ 
The following table will indicate the proportion of the number of cases handled by the 
police in this fashion. 
 In 1913 there were 21, 483 convictions without a trial out of 36, 953. 
 In 1914 there were 32,333 convictions without a trial out of 48, 763.  
 In 1915 there were 41,236 convictions without a trial out of 59,436. 
 In 1916 there were 56,013 convictions without a trial out of 81,139.”  
 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 125 – 127: 
 “With this policy in view, the intellectual suppression of the Korean people has been as 
systematically carried out as political or economic subjugation. One of the first things the 
Terauchi administration did after the annexation was to collect all books of Korean history and 
biographies of illustrious Koreans from schools, libraries, and private homes and to burn them. 
Priceless treasures of historical records were thus destroyed by this needless vandalism of the 
Japanese. All Korean periodical literature – from local newspapers to scientific journals – has 
been completely stamped out. In true Japanese fashion the Government does not say that the 
Koreans shall not publish anything for themselves. But they lay down such rules and regulations 
as make it impossible for a Korean to start a publication of any kind. To start a publication, 
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whether a newspaper, magazine or book, one must obtain permission from the censor, which is 
next to impossible. If this difficulty is overcome, the publisher must deposit a certain sum of 
money with the police to meet the contingency of a fine. When an issue of a magazine is to be 
printed, two galley proofs must be sent to the censor and his stamp of approval obtained on each 
page before it can finally go to the press. If the censor has overlooked anything, the entire issue, 




Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the 
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 
47(3), 377-397. 
Excerpted from p. 382:  
“The reality was an education based on segregation between the Japanese and the 
Koreans, with the latter being denied access to quality educational opportunities and post-
secondary education. In August 1911, following the example of the colonial education policy in 
Taiwan, an educational ordinance established separate school systems for Koreans and Japanese 
on the peninsula, with Korean common and higher common schools the equivalent respectively 
of primary and junior high schools in Japan. Unlike the six-year elementary schools of Japan, the 
‘common’ (elementary) schools in Korea provided only four or five years of schooling. Also, 
whereas Japan’s secondary schools offered five years of training, Korea’s secondary schools, 
called ‘higher common schools’, offered only four years for boys and three years for girls.15 
 The purpose of colonial education in Korea is also reflected in the type of schools 
offered to Koreans: common schools focused on Japanese language training and the inculcation 
of duty as colonial subjects; vocational education in the secondary schools aimed at the creation 
of semi-skilled employees in the agricultural, commercial and industrial sectors; two-year 
technical colleges (senmon gakko) trained persons to acquire limited technical skills to occupy 
middle-management positions. University education was not accessible to Koreans initially, until 
Keijo Imperial University opened in Seoul in 1924. As the only four-year institute of higher 
education in the colony catering mostly to Japanese nationals, it also accommodated Koreans. 
However, the admission of Korean students was strongly restricted to between onequarter and 
one-third of the total number of students. For example, the total enrolment of the Imperial 
University in 1934 in the 10 years since its establishment was 930, of which Koreans comprised 
only 32%.16 
Segregated schools underscored the difference in status between the colonisers and the 
colonised. Educational policy considered advanced training unsuitable for colonial subjects and 
stressed primary Japanese language and vocational skills, thus supporting an economic policy 
that required a skilled workforce.17 At the same time, Japanese language education became 
compulsory in all the schools, while Korean language and literature classes were deliberately 
reduced or abolished. All schools in Korea also required students to take ethics courses that 
taught the ‘concept of loyalty to the Emperor and the state’ in order to turn Koreans into loyal 
subjects of the Japanese empire. 
 
16 Sungho H. Lee, Korean Higher Education: Its Emergence, Development & Future Challenges 
(Seoul, Korea: Hakjisa, 2006), 127–28. 
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17 Michael E. Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925 (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1988), 40.” 
 
Source 3: 
Caprio, M. (2009). Forming Korean assimilation policy. In Japanese assimilation policies in 
colonial Korea, 1910-1945. (pp. 81-110). University of Washington Press. 
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 82-83 
“The idea that Korean assimilation would be easy gained a strong following at this time. 
Ukita Kazutami, editor of the magazine Taiyō (The Sun) who was a leading voice on Japanese 
imperialism, wrote that the differences in religion, race, customs, and habits prevented the Irish 
from assimilating with the English; the people of Posen (Poznan, in present-day Poland), Alsace, 
and Lorraine from assimilating with the Germans; and the Poles and Finns from assimilating 
with the Russians. The case of the Japanese and the Koreans, he asserted, was different, as the 
two peoples have been of the same race and of the same culture for centuries. He predicted that 
the Japanese would have relatively few problems in assimilating the Korean people, and that the 
relationship would evolve peacefully, like the relationship between England and Scotland, rather 
than become estranged, as with England and Ireland.3 
Some observers noted resemblances between Japan’s tasks in Korea and those the Meiji 
government faced after it replaced the Tokugawa regime. Count Hayashi Tadasu, an active 
participant in the Meiji government’s diplomatic circles, put forth one such argument. Hayashi 
recalled the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji, a process he witnessed from its inception. Both 
situations, he began, required people to upgrade their dress, their living styles, and their eating 
habits. The inferior Korean people, he cautioned, also faced the challenge of assuming a 
‘Japanese style’—they must adopt ‘Japanese spirit and thought.’ The historic similarities that the 
Korean and Japanese shared strengthened Japan’s chances of success with assimilation. Hayashi 
concluded, ‘If the Japanese failed to assimilate the Koreans there must be something particularly 
inferior with our political skills.’4 
Others argued the merits of assimilation by drawing on the historical roots that the two 
peoples allegedly shared. Kita Sadakichi, employed by the Education Ministry, justified Korean 
assimilation by claiming Japan’s success in assimilating the Ainu, a people he argued to be now 
‘almost indistinguishable’ from Yamato Japanese. This experience, he predicted, would be 
valuable to Japanese assimilation of Koreans. Kita’s most important work, however, traced the 
shared origins of the Japanese and Korean peoples. He explained that assimilation was 
appropriate because it represented a return to the historical, and natural, relationship that the two 
peoples once shared. Writing for the journal Minzoku to rekishi (Ethos and History) he argued 
the Yamato people’s origins to be a result of the ‘fusion’ (yūgō) of several lesser peoples.5 These 
peoples were absorbed by the Tenson people, the alleged descendents of Japan’s sun-goddess 
(Amaterasu Ōmikami). The Japanese and Korean peoples, Kita reported, evolved from these 
roots: their differences were a ‘small branch’ rather than a ‘large branch’ division; they were 
ethnic rather than racial. He estimated that no two peoples shared as close a relationship as the 
Koreans and the Japanese. In fact, he surmised, it would not be incorrect to consider them the 
same people. 
 
3 Ukita Kazutami, “Kankoku heigō no kōka ikan” (What Are the Effects of Korean 
Annexation?), Taiyō (October 1, 1910). Marius B. Jansen offers biographical information on 
Ukita in his “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 
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ed. Myers and Peattie (61–79), 73. Nitobe Inazō offered a similar comparison in December 1919 
by writing “to an English student of colonization it will be highly interesting to watch the 
development of Korea to a Wales or— to an Ireland.” Nitobe Inazō, “Japanese Colonization,” 
Nitobe Inazō zenshū, vol. 23, 120. 
4 Hayashi’s comments were included in a longer article titled “Heigō go no Chōsen tōchi 
mondai” (Korean Administration Issues Following Annexation), Taiyō (October 1, 1910): 77–
78. 
5 Kita Sadakichi, “Kankoku no heigō to kokushi” (National History and Korean Annexation) 
(Tokyo: Sanseido, 1910); “Chōsen minzoku to wa nan zoya” (What Is the Korean Race), 
Minzoku to rekishi (June 1919): 1–13; and “Nissen ryōminzoku dōgenron” (The Same Origin 
Theory of the Korean and Japanese Races), Minzoku to rekishi (January 1921): 3–39. See also 
Duus, The Abacas and the Sword, 415–17.” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 90-91 
“Japanese residents in Korea offered similar images of the Korean as primitive. Kubo 
Takeshi, who taught at Keijō medical school, contributed more than three hundred pages of 
medical research on Koreans to the Korean Medical Journal (Chōsen igakkai zasshi), the organ 
of the Korean Medical Association (Chōsen igakkai) founded in 1911. Kubo’s research on the 
Korean anatomy depicted the people as weak in the physiological characteristics of the civilized, 
yet strong in those of the uncivilized. While their development in “expressive movement” (hyōjō 
undō) muscles remained inferior, the muscles required for basic survival—those for hearing and 
smelling—remained superior, when compared to those of the Japanese.26 Many of his results 
boldly generalized the physiological construction of the Korean people based on autopsies 
performed on the limited number of cadavers that a local prison provided him. His attempt to 
characterize his Korean students accordingly—he accused them of stealing a skull bone based on 
his theory that the Korean head shape made them more prone to criminal activity—led to their 
boycott of his class.27 
 The Koreans’ backwardness was reflected in their daily life. Nakajima Motojirō, also 
writing for the Korean Medical Journal, attributed the habit of Korean women carrying heavy 
loads on their heads to their pelvic bone being smaller in diameter than that expected for women 
their size.28 Koreans also lacked the standards of hygiene and cleanliness acceptable to civilized 
people. Toriga Ramon, who authored a 1914 guidebook for potential Japanese migrants to Korea 
titled Chōsen e iku hito ni (To People Going to Korea), advised his readers to expect Korean 
inns, like Korean houses, to be ‘dirty.’29 Hara Sōichirō criticized Korean houses as “narrow and 
suffering” (semakurushii). He added: ‘Japanese houses are small when compared to European 
houses. But when I see Korean houses I have to sink to another level in poverty [binjyaku].’30  
Both Toriga and Hara cited the Korean lack of spirit (tamashii). Toriga believed this to be 
a characteristic shared by other underdeveloped peoples: in Japan there is a Japanese spirit, in 
Russia a Russian spirit, and in America an American spirit. It would sound strange (hibiki ga 
warui) to consider an Egyptian, Indian, or Chinese spirit. He then questioned whether there was a 
Korean spirit. 
 
26 Both studies appeared in Kubo Takeshi, “Chōsenjin no jinshu kaibōgakuteki kenkyū” 
(Research on the Korean Racial Anatomy), Chōsen igakkai zasshi 22 (July 1918): 52–86, 146–
53. His research was also published in Chōsen oyobi Manshū, giving him a larger reader 
audience. 
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27 Sŏul taehakkyo ŭikkwa taehak, Sŏul taehakkyo ŭikkwa taehaksa (The History of the College 
of Medicine, Seoul National University) (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ŭikkwa taehak, 1978), 46–49. 
28 Nakajima Motojirō, “Chōsen fujin no kotsuban gaikei keizokusu ni oite” (On the Outer 
Diameter Measurements of the Korean Women’s Pelvic Bone), Chōsen igakkai zasshi (January 
1913): 125–26. 
29 Toriga Ramon, Chōsen e iku hito ni (To People Going to Korea) (Osaka: Hakuaisha 
joseikappan, 1914). 
30 Hara Sōchiro, Chōsen no tabi (A Korean Trip) (Tokyo: Iwamatsudō Shoten, 1917), 69–70.” 
 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 16-17 
“Japanese discussion on assimilation, often incorrectly associated with Japan’s wartime 
imperialization (kōminka) policies, preceded Korean annexation. Japanese debated the policy’s 
merits and demerits in 1895 after Taiwan was absorbed into the empire; discussion in 1910 
considered the pace and direction to which the colonial administration would push Korean 
assimilation. Japan’s ‘uniqueness’ as a colonial power was in its attempts to assimilate an 
ethnically similar people amid the unbridled land grabbing that characterized the period that Eric 
Hobsbawm famously dubbed the ‘Age of Empire’ (1875–1914).45 Yet, Japanese were inspired 
by British, Prussian, and French efforts in their peripheral territories, rather than these states’ 
efforts in their external possessions. A survey of Meiji-era discourse on assimilation policy 
reveals Japan’s views of ‘colonized’ to consist of a rather broad set of examples, with the 
English formation of the United Kingdom, the French annexation of Algeria, and the Prussian 
incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine serving as the most popular examples. The Japanese 
recognized assimilation to be the governing policy in territories such as Scotland and Wales, 
territories generally not treated in the contemporary literature as ‘colonies.’ They revised pre-
annexation images that saw Koreans as foreign to argue that the similarities shared by the two 
peoples made assimilation more appropriate in Korea than in other European situations.46 Such 
discussions were required to address the more difficult question of whether assimilation was 
indeed the most appropriate policy for the Korean situation. 
 
45 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987). 
46 For examples of Tokugawa-era Japanese seeing Koreans as foreigners, see Ronald P. Toby, 
“Carnival of the Aliens: Korean Embassies in Edo-Period Art and Popular Culture,” Monumenta 
Nipponica 41, no. 4 (1986): 415–56; and Ikeuchi Satoshi, Kinsei Nihon to Chōsen hyōryūmin 










Inquiry Design Model (IDM) Blueprint™ 
Compelling 
Question 
Can freedom exist under an oppressive regime? 
Standards and 
Practices 
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western 
values and direct political control.” 
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and the 
colonized.”  
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an examination of the 
credibility of each source.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, including 
multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.” 
D2.His.4.9-12. “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives of people during 
different historical eras.” 
Staging the 
Question 
The teacher will play a news clip on the centennial celebration of the March 1st movement and explain that 
clearly this day is important to Korea’s current national identity. Koreans view it as a pivotal moment and 
significant first step toward eventual liberation in 1945. The teacher will tell students that the March 1st 
movement was important, and did lead to freedoms. The teacher will explain to students that the new unit 
will focus on the extent of such freedoms, and whether freedom can truly exist for people governed by an 
oppressive regime like Imperial Japan.  
 
Supporting  
Question 1  
Supporting  
Question 2  
Supporting  
Question 3  




Why did Japan implement the cultural rule 
policy (bunka seiji)?  
Did freedom and oppression coexist 







Students will participate in jigsaw groups 
to perform MOTU analysis on the 
featured sources. Depending on class size, 
there should be two groups (or any even 
number). Group 1’s sources (A and B) 
focus on the events of the March 1st 
movement and its purpose. Group 2’s 
sources (C and D) focus on the Japanese 
government’s initial reactions to the 
movement.   
Students will individually read the 
sources and perform MOTU analysis in a 
manner of their choosing. Students will 
then participate in a writing for 
understanding exercise, during which 
they will use evidence from the sources 
to answer the lesson supporting 
question: Why did Japan implement the 
cultural rule policy (bunka seiji)? 
Students will argue one of two 
assigned positions in small groups of 4. 
The activity consists of two rounds; 
round 1 is two students arguing their 
positions and debating while the other 
two group members take notes. In 
round 2, students will switch roles. 
Position A is that the cultural rule 
period represented an overall increase 
in freedoms for Koreans which 
outweighed any limitations. Position B 
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is that the cultural rule period was 
overall more oppressive than it was 
liberating. 
Featured Sources Featured Sources Featured Sources 
Source A: 
What March First Means to Koreans, by 
Soon Hyun, the original representative of 
thirty-three Korean leaders who signed 
the Declaration of Independence, 1919.  
Source B: 
Korean Declaration of Independence, 
1919.  
Source C: 
Excerpt from Chung, H. (1921). The case 
of Korea: A collection of evidence on the 
Japanese domination of Korea, and on the 
development of the Korean independence 
movement. Fleming H. Revell Company. 
Source D:  
Red Cross Pamphlet on March 1st 
Movement, 1919. 
      
Source A:  
3 excerpts from  
Caprio, M. (2009). Japanese assimilation 
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945. 
University of Washington Press. 
Source B:  
Excerpt from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). 
Assimilation and segregation of imperial 
subjects: “educating” the colonized 
during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial 
rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 
47(3), 377-397. 
Source C: 
Devine, R. (1997). Japanese Rule in 
Korea after the March First Uprising. 
Governor General Hasegawa’s 
Recommendations. Monumenta 
Nipponica 52(4), 523-540. 
 
Source A: 
Excerpt from Gordon, A. (2020). 
Democracy and Empire Between the 
World Wars. In A modern history of 
Japan: From Tokugawa times to the 
present (4th edition). (pp. 166-187).  
Source B: 
Excerpt from Chung, H. (1921). The 
case of Korea: A collection of evidence 
on the Japanese domination of Korea, 
and on the development of the Korean 
independence movement. Fleming H. 
Revell Company. 
Source C: 
3 excerpts from Kim, Y.J. (2013). 
Politics of Communication and the 
Colonial Public Sphere in 1920s Korea. 
In Colonial Rule and Social Change in 
Korea (pp. 76-113). University of 
Washington Press.  
Source D: 
4 excerpts from Kwon, I. (1998). “The 
New Women’s movement” in 1920s 
Korea: rethinking the relationship 
between imperialism and women. 
Gender & History, 10(3), 381-405. 
 
Source E:  
3 excerpts from Uchida, J. (2013). The 
public sphere in colonial life: residents’ 
movements in Korea under Japanese 




Performance Task  
Argument 
Students will construct a short-written essay (400-700 words) answering the unit compelling 
question: Can freedom exist under an oppressive regime? Students should cite specific 




Students will write a letter to the editor as if they were an ethnic Korean living in Korea 
during the cultural rule period. Students will express their viewpoint on whether cultural rule 
has been more liberating or restricting for Koreans, as if from a contemporary Korean 
perspective. Within the letter, students should answer the compelling question and cite 




As a class, students will design, film, and edit a video (5-10 minutes in length) designed to inform the 
general public about the March 1st movement and to commemorate it. This video should consist of general 
information and facts, but also student commentary on the movement. Once completed, the video should 
be posted to YouTube by the teacher. The purpose is to give students an opportunity to responsibly use 
their digital platform as well as attempt to make the March 1st movement more widely known outside of 




The unit design template is by Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014) from the C3 Teachers. 

















Staging the Question 
The teacher will show the video clip linked below:  
Arirang News. (2019, March 1). March 1 movement marks centennial anniversary [Video]. 
YouTube. https://youtu.be/E083JLOB0Gk. 
 
The teacher and the class will also read the following article, to contrast with how South Koreans 
view the movement. The teacher may elect to have students individually read the article, and 
then as a class discuss how it contrasts with the modern South Korean view of the day.  
 
Fretwell, J. (2020, February 29). “The 3.1 people’s uprising”: how North Korea sees the March 
First Movement. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2020/02/the-3-1-peoples-uprising-how-
north-korea-sees-the-march-first-movement/.  
 
If desired, the teacher may also display the images in this USA Today article for more examples 
of how South Koreans today celebrate the March 1st Movement. 
 
USA Today. (2019, March 1). South Korea celebrates 100th anniversary of March 1st 




Finally, the teacher will say/pose the following to students (use this as a general outline or 
guide):  
• The March 1st Movement is clearly an important piece to South Korea’s national identity 
today. The video made it clear that it is a source of pride, and South Koreans today view 
it as a pivotal moment and a significant first step toward eventual liberation in 1945. 
Modern North Koreans have a contrasting view, but clearly it was a significant event. 
The movement it started did lead to some changes that involved freedoms. We will be 
studying the extent of these freedoms, and asking ourselves: how free can a people be 


















Unit 2, Lesson 1 
Objectives  
• SWBAT explain why the first decade of Japanese colonial rule in Korea resulted in the 
March 1st movement. 
• SWBAT describe the events of the March 1st movement as well as the Japanese 
government’s initial reaction.  
Standards: 
• MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the 
colonizers and the colonized.”  
• MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an 
examination of the credibility of each source.” 
• D2.His.4.9-12. “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives 
of people during different historical eras.” 
• D2.His.5.9-12. “Analyze how historical contexts shaped and continue to shape people’s 
perspectives.” 
Lesson compelling question: What was the March 1st (Sam-il) Movement?  
Hook (5-10 minutes): 
• Provocative proposition/simulation (5-10 minutes): The teacher will pose the 
following question to students: How far would you be willing to go for freedom?  
• Then, the teacher will pose the following scenario to students: 
o Imagine you are a Korean teenager living in Seoul, renamed Keijo, in 1919. 
During all of your adolescence, the Governor-General of Korea has been Terauchi 
Masatake. You are frustrated with the Terauchi administration’s military rule, the 
hypocrisy of Japan, and the apathy of foreign powers. The Japanese government 
was insulted by the rejection of the racial equality clause at the League of Nations 
yet they treat your people as subhuman. The Americans have refused to help 
Korea. There seems to be no foreseeable end in sight to Japanese rule if things 
continue as they are. One day in February, you hear that a group of people are 
planning a large protest against Japanese rule and will be demanding Korean 
independence. This will take place in Seoul, not far from where you live. With the 
knowledge and understanding you gained from the previous unit in mind, what 
might motivate you to participate in such a moment? What might stop you? 
Would you attend the protest, if you were in this situation?  
• The teacher will pause to give students a few moments to collect their thoughts, and then 
take student responses. Students should verbally share their answers with the class. After 
listening to several student responses, the teacher should follow up with the following 
statement, or one similar: “Clearly you all have a wide variety of ideas on what actions 
you would take. Some of you indicated you would attend the protest, despite the possible 
consequences of torture or jail. If your entire life was spent under harsh military rule, you 
might have had enough and wanted to take action. Well, some Koreans actually did 
exactly this on March 1, 1919.”  
Body (30-35 minutes): 
• Jigsaw groups (30-35 minutes): The teacher will split students into two groups of 
roughly equal size. Students in the same group should move their chairs or change desks 
to sit near one another. If the class is large, students should be split into any even number 
of groups. Group 1 (or half the total groups) will be responsible for performing MOTU 
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analysis for sources A and B. Group 2 (or the other half of the total groups) will be 
responsible for performing MOTU analysis four sources B and C. The teacher should 
inform students that the main theme of Group 1’s sources is the events of the March 1st 
movement in Korea, while the main theme of Group 2’s sources is Japan’s initial 
response to the protests.  
• Students will receive ten minutes to read their sources and begin MOTU analysis 
individually. The teacher may project a timer onto the whiteboard so students are aware 
of how much time remains for individual work. Students should complete as much 
MOTU analysis for each source as they are able in the ten minutes.  
• When the ten minutes are up, the teacher should verbally alert the students and refresh 
them on directions. Students will work with their group members to complete the rest of 
the MOTU analysis for each source. Students should fill in worksheets either physically 
or digitally. Students will receive ten to fifteen minutes (depending on student progress) 
to complete MOTU analysis for each assigned source with their group members. Students 
should be made aware that the MOTU sheets they complete with their group members 
will be turned in for a grade on accuracy and attention to detail. Students should be 
prepared to share out/peer teach. Group members should pick one spokesperson per 
source.  
• Once the ten (or fifteen) minutes are up, the teacher should once again verbally alert 
students. Students will move on to sharing the findings of their group/peer teaching. 
Teachers should allot approximately ten minutes for this portion of the activity. Group 1 
should start with the peer-teaching of MOTU analysis for source A, then move on to 
source B. Students taking on the role of peer-teacher should move to the front of the 
classroom and the teacher should project a blank MOTU analysis sheet on the 
whiteboard. The student should fill in main points of each section of MOTU analysis they 
share by writing on the whiteboard with a dry-erase marker, or using a stylus pen if the 
whiteboard is interactive. 
Closure (5 minutes): 
• Exit ticket (5 minutes): Students will fill out an exit ticket, answering the following: 
Briefly summarize the events and purpose of the March 1st movement, as well as Japan’s 
initial response. If possible, this can be typed and turned in on a digital learning 
management system such as Google Classroom. If not, students may write this on a sheet 
of paper and turn it into the teacher. 
• Final wrap up/preview for tomorrow (remainder of class period/while students 
complete exit tickets): As students are finishing their exit tickets and final details of 
MOTU analysis sheets, the teacher will verbally summarize the day. Students examined 
the March 1st movement, which began as a protest in Seoul against the Japanese rule of 
Korea. Participants advocated for Korean national self-determination. Students also 
examined the short-term Japanese response to the March 1st movement, which included 
arresting protestors, beating protestors, and burning villages suspected of being involved 
in independence activity. The teacher will tell students that they have examined Japan’s 
short-term response, and the cruelty of it. However, tomorrow the class will be looking at 
Japan’s long-term response, which differed quite significantly from the short-term.  
• Before exiting the room, students should turn in their exit slips, either on a digital 
platform or by handing their physical exit slips to the teacher. Also, students should turn 
in their MOTU analysis sheets. Again, these can be physically handed to the teacher if 
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paper copies are utilized. If not, students should turn them in on a digital learning 
management system, such as Google Classroom.  
 
Sources:  
Source A:  
Hyun, S. What March First means to Koreans, by Soon Hyun, the original representative of 
thirty three Korean leaders who signed the Declaration of Independence. 1919. Kada-
m2075. The Reverend Soon Hyun Collected Works. Korean American Digital Archive, 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.   
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p15799coll126/id/14684/rec/1 
 
“Never has men’s merit toward the progress of democratic principles and against brutal 
force of militaristic aggression failed in the human history. It is so with the assurance of the 
Allied Victory against defeating forces of Germany and Japan. It is so with the belief of Koreans 
for the achievement of their long fight for regaining freedom from the Japanese. 
After ten year bitter experience of two-fold pressure, political and economic, under the 
subjugation of Japan by her treacheries of protectorate and annexation in 1905 and 1910 
respectiely, 25 million Koreans were united as one men in expressing their aspiration for the 
national independence of Korea on March First 1919/  
On that day, thirty three leaders chosen from three principal religions – Christian 
Churches, Chuntokio Sect and Buddhist Temples met together at Myung Wall Kwan a Korean 
restaurant in the heart of Seoul, the capital of Korea, and signed the Declaration of 
Independence. Mr. Son pyung Hee read this historical document before them, and they shouted 
“Mansei” three times for the independence of Korea. Mr. Son bravely announced to General 
Terauchi, then Governor – General of Korea through telephone about what they had done. 
Afterwar thirty three were arrested by the Japanese police and thrown into prison.  
Simultaneously, at the Pagoda Park, a croud [sic] of 100000 people gathered together 
under the leadership of young leaders. A musical concert was opened with singing of Korean 
anthem. When the music came to its end, a large Korean national flag was unfurled at the top of 
musical hall, and shower of leaflets on which was printed the Declaration of Independence fell 
on the croud [sic]. The people received these leaflets with thundering cheers. Then the whole 
croud [sic] marched up to the Union Square of Chongo where they devided [sic] into five groups 
in a most orderly manner. 
First group proceeded toward the Tuksoo Palace to pay their last homage to the Ex-
emperor whose remains were then lying in state. At the palace gate, patriotic speeches were 
delivered to mass. Another group went eastward to the Changtuk Palace where Emperor Yung 
Hee or the son of Ex-Emperor lived. They informed him what the movement ment [sic]. One 
group marched to the old Legation Quarters, where copies of Declaration of Independence were 
delivered to the American, French, Russian, and British Consul – Generals with compliments of 
Korean people. One group proceeded northward to the Kyungpok Palace where a new 
magnificent building was being built for the Japanese government. At the front of this Palace, the 
leaders also delivered patriotic speeches in the sense of protesting the Japanese rule and 
reminding the people of their old free days. Another group or the last group took their course 
southward toward the office of the Japanese Governor-General. When they reached the edge of 
the old Japanese concession, they were received by the Japanese troops who were waiting for 
them with brutal treatment. 
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Practically, all the processions were headed by school boys and girls who did nothing but 
singing their songs of independence, hoisting the Korean flags and shouting “Mansei”. Yet they 
were attacked by the Japanese police and soldiers and treated with most inhuman brutality. 
Hunders of boys and girls were arrested and thrown into prison and underwent unspeakable 
tortures. In their savage manner of the Japanese authorities, young girls were undressed and 
lashed to the utmost sense of shamefulness. Many of leaders were killed instantly at the points of 
Japanese soward [sic] and bayonet. This was the first scene of March First at Seoul, and similar 
demonstrations and programs were held on the same day at defferent [sic] cities, towns and 
villages throughout Korea. Later Koreans in Manchuria and Siberia held such demonstrations in 
the sense of showing their sympathy to their kindreds in Korea. So March First means to 
Koreans the rebirth of national spirit, the rebuilding of national unity and the resourceful force of 
justice against brutality and inhumanity done to them by the Japanese war-lords.” 
 
Source B:  
Declaration of Independence: English translation. 1919. Kada-m2042. The Reverend Soon Hyun 
Collected Works. Korean American Digital Archive, University of Southern California, Los 
Angeles, CA.  http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll126/id/14680. 
 
“We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people. 
We tell it to the world in witness of the equality of all nations and we pass it on to our posterity 
as their inherent right. 
 We make this proclamation, having back of us our 5000 years of history, and 20,000,000 
of a united loyal people. We take this step to insure our children for all time to come, personal 
liberty in accord with the awakening consciousness of the new era. This is the clear leading of 
God, the moving principle of the present age, the whole human race’s just claim. It is something 
that cannot be stamped out, or stifled, or gagged, or suppressed by any means. 
 Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we have come 
after these long thousands of years to experience the agony of ten years of foreign oppression, 
with every loss to the right to live, every restriction of freedom of thought, every damage done to 
the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent advance of the age in 
which we live. 
 Assuredly, if the defects of the past are to be rectified, if the agony of the present is to be 
unloosed, if the future oppression is to be avoided, if thought is to be set free, if right of action is 
to be given a place, if we are to attain any way of progress, if we are to deliver our children from 
the painful, shameful heritage, if we are to leave blessing and happiness intact for those who 
succeed us, the first of all necessary things is the clear-cut independence of our people. What 
cannot our twenty millions do, every man with sword in heart, in this day when human nature 
and conscience are making a stand for truth and right? What barrier can we not beak, what 
purpose can we not accomplish?  
 We have no desire to accuse Japan of breaking many solemn treaties since 1636, nor to 
single out specially the teachers in the schools or government officials who treat the heritage of 
our ancestors as a colony of their own, and our people and their civilization as a nation of 
savages, finding delight only in beating us down and bringing us under their heel. 
 We have no wish to find special fault with Japan’s lack of fairness or her contempt of our 
civilization and the principles on which her state rests; we, who have a greater cause to 
reprimand ourselves, need not spend precious time in finding fault with others; neither need we, 
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who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over what is past and gone. 
Our urgent need today is the settling up of this house of ours and not a discussion of who has 
broken it down, or what has caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects in accord 
with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be filled with bitterness or resentment over 
past agonies or past occasions for anger.  
 Our part is to influence the Japanese Government, dominated as it is by the old idea of 
brute force which thinks to run counter to reason and universal law, so that it will change, act 
honestly and in accord with the principles of right and truth. 
 The result of annexation, brought about without any conference with the Korean people, 
is that the Japanese, indifferent to us, use every kind of partiality for their own, and by a false set 
of figures show a profit and loss account between us two peoples most untrue, digging a trench 
of everlasting resentment deeper and deeper the farther they go.  
 Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils of the past by ways 
that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly feeling make a new world in which the two 
peoples will be equally blessed?  
 To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not only loss of peace 
forever for this part of the Far East, but will also increase the ever-growing suspicion of four 
hundred millions of Chinese – upon whom depends the anger or safety of the Far East – besides 
strengthening the hatred of Japan. From this all the rest of the East will suffer. Today Korean 
independence will mean not only daily life and happiness for us, but also it would mean Japan’s 
departure from an evil way and exaltation to the place of true protector of the East, so that China, 
too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of Japan aside. This thought comes form no minor 
resentment, but from a large hope for the future welfare and blessing of mankind. 
 A new era wakes before our eyes, the old world of force is gone, and the new world of 
righteousness and truth is here. Out of the experience and travail of the old world arises this light 
on life’s affairs. The insects stifled by the foe and snow of winter awake at this time with the 
breezes of spring and the soft light of the sun upon them. 
 It is the day of the restoration of all things on the full tide of which we set forth, without 
delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for the glory of our people. 
 We awake now from the old world with its darkened conditions in full determination and 
one heart and one mind, with right on our side, along with the forces of nature, to a new life. 
May all the ancestors to the thousands and ten thousand generations aid us from within and all 
the force of the world aid us from without, and let the day we take hold be the day of our 
attainment. In this hope we go forward. 
THREE ITEMS OF AGREEMENT 
1. THIS WORK OF HOURS IS IN BEHALF OF TRUTH, RELIGION AND LIFE, 
UNDERTAKEN AT THE REQUEST OF OUR PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO MAKE 
KNOWN THEIR DESIRE FOR LIERTY. LET NO VIOLENCE BE DONE TO 
ANYONE. 
2. LET THOSE WHO FOLLOW US, EVERY MAN, ALL THE TIME, EVERY HOUR, 
SHOW FORTH WITH GLADNESS THIS SAME MIND. 
3. LET ALL THINGS BE DONE DECENTLY AND IN ORDER, SO THAT OUR 
BEHAVIOUR TO THE VERY END MAY BE HONORABLE AND UPRIGHT. 
The 4252nd Year of the Kingdom of Korea, 3rd Month. 
Representatives of the People. 
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The signatures attached to the document are: 
 Son Byung Hi, Kil Sun Chu, Yi Pil Chu, Paik Long Sung, Kim Won Kyu, Kim 
Pyun Cho, Kim Chang Choon, Kwon Dong Chin, Kwon Byung Duk, Na Long Whan, Na 
In Hup, Yang Chun Paik, Yang Han Mook, Lew Yer Dai, Yi Kop Sung, Yi Mung Yong, 
Yi Seung Hoon, Yi Chong Hoon, Yi Chong Il, Lim Yei Whan, Pak Choon Seung, Pak Hi 
Do, Pak Tong Wan, Sin Hong Sik, Sin Suk Ku, Oh Sei Chang, Oh Wha Young, Chugn 
Choon Su, Choi Sung Mo, Choi In, Han Yong Woon, Hong Byung Ki, Hong Ki Cho” 
 
Source C: 
Chung, H. (1921). The case of Korea: A collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of 
Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement. Fleming H. Revell 
Company.  
Excerpt taken from pp. 233-238 
 “The following description of three devastated villages in the Suwon district, given by an 
American who visited them, furnishes a vivid picture of what has been going on in the remote 
parts of Korea ever since March 1, 1919. 
Chai-Amm-Ni  
 On Thursday, April 17, news was brought to Seoul by a foreigner that a most terrible 
tragedy had occurred in a small village some fifty li (seventeen miles) south of Suwon. The story 
was that a number of Christians had been shut up in a church, then fired upon by the soldiers, 
and when all were either wounded or dead, the church was set on fire insuring their complete 
destruction. Such a story seemed almost too terrible to be true, and being of such a serious 
nature, I determined to verify it by a personal visit. On the following day I took the train to 
Suwon, and from there cycled to within a few miles of the village; knowing the strenuous 
objections that would be made to my visit, I made a detour of several miles over a mountain 
pass, to avoid the police and gendarme station which I knew was near the village… 
 The appearance of the village was one of absolute desolation; about eight houses 
remained; the rest (thirty-one) with the church had all been burned to the ground. All that 
remained were the stone jars of pickles and other edibles; these stood in perfect order among the 
ruins. The people were scattered about sitting on mats, or straw; some had already improvised 
little shelters on the adjoining hillside, where they sat in silence looking down in bewilderment at 
the remains of their happy homes. They seemed bereft of speech; they were probably trying to 
fathom why this terrible judgment should overtake them, and why they should suddenly become 
widows and their children orphans. There they sat, helpless and forlorn, entirely overcome by the 
calamity that had overtaken them. 
 Before the long the Government party left the village, and when the officers were well 
out of sight, the tongues of some of these poor frightened people loosened, and they revealed to 
me the story of the outrage, which follows: 
 On Thursday, April 15, early in the afternoon, some soldiers had entered the village and 
had given orders that all adult male Christians and members of the Chuntokyo (Heavenly Way 
Society) were to assemble in the church as a lecture was to be given. In all some twenty-nine 
men went to the church as ordered and sat down wondering what was to happen. They soon 
found out the nature of the plot as the soldiers immediately surrounded the church and fired into 
it through the paper windows. When most of the Koreans had been either killed or wounded, the 
Japanese soldiers cold-bloodedly set fire to the thatch and wooden building which readily blazed. 
Some tried to make their escape by rushing out, but were immediately bayoneted or shot. Six 
 54 
bodies were found outside the church, having tried in vain to escape. Two women, whose 
husbands had been ordered to the church, being alarmed at the sound of firing, went to see what 
was happening to their husbands, and tried to get through the soldiers to the church. Both were 
brutally murdered. One was a young woman of nineteen – she was bayoneted to death; the other 
was a woman of over forty – she was shot. Both were Christians. The soldiers then set the village 
on fire and left… 
 
Su-Chon 
 The hamlet of Su-chon is beautifully situated in a pretty valley some four or five miles 
from Chai-amm-ni, where the previously reported massacre occurred. But the hand of the 
despoiler had been there, and his finger prints, black and brutal, lay heavily upon the landscape. 
The narrow streets were lined with ash heaps; out of forty-two cottages eight alone remained. 
Little attempts had been made to clear away the debris by the survivors, for they had no sense of 
security of life and property, and they apparently feared that any attempt to gather their things 
together would only bring fresh disasters… 
 The following is the story of the destruction of the village: 
 On April 6, before daybreak, while all were sleeping, some soldiers had entered the 
village and had gone from house to house firing the thatched roofs, which quickly caught and 
destroyed the houses. The people rushed out and found the whole village blazing. Some tried to 
put out the fire, but were soon stopped by the soldiers who shot at them, stabbed them with their 
bayonets or beat them. They were compelled to stand by and watch their village burn to ashes. 
After completing this nefarious work, the soldiers left them to their fate. I was informed that only 
one man was killed, but that many were seriously injured. I inquired if the wind had spread the 
fire from house to house. The reply was that the village was on fire at several places at the same 
time, and that the soldiers carried matches and set fire to the thatch of many houses… 
Wha-Su-Ri 
 Wha-su-ri must have been a picturesque village before the barbarous troops of His 
Majesty’s Government transformed it into an ash-heap. The village is surrounded by wooded 
hills, which slope towards the valley of fertile paddy fields. In the center of the village there had 
been a lovely ‘country residence,’ which had a tiled roof and gateway. Now it is nothing but a 
huge heap of broken tile, dirt and brick…Out of some forty odd houses eighteen remained. No 
wind had spread the fire; something more sure, more definite, more cruel – the hands of Japanese 
troops whose hearts must have been filled with murder… 
 The following is the story of the burning of the village: 
 On April 11, some time before daybreak, the villages were suddenly aroused out of their 
sleep by the sound of firing and the smell of burning. Running into the open they found soldiers 
and police firing the houses and shooting and beating the people. Leaving everything, they fled 
for their lives, old and young, the mothers with their babies at their breasts, and the fathers with 
the younger children – all of them fled to the hills. But before they could make good their escape, 
many were murdered, shot by the soldiers, wounded and beaten, while a number were arrested 








Red cross pamphlet on March 1st Movement. 1919. kada-m1895.The Reverend Soon Hyun 
Collected Works. Korean American Digital Archive, University of Southern California, Los 
Angeles, CA. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll126/id/5245, 20 
September 2020.  
 





Unit 2, Lesson 2 
Objectives:  
• SWBAT explain why Japan implemented the cultural rule policy in Korea. 
• SWBAT evaluate the appropriateness of cultural rule as a policy in Japanese occupied 
Korea.  
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
Standards: 
• MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, 
spread of Western values and direct political control.” 
• MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the 
colonizers and the colonized.”  
• MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical 
events, including multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.” 
Lesson compelling question: Why did Japan implement the cultural rule policy?  
Hook (5 minutes):  
• Review for preview (5 minutes): The teacher will ask the students what the main focus 
of the previous day was, using the following prompts: 
o In just a few sentences, can anyone summarize what we learned yesterday? 
(Looking for answers similar to/containing: We learned about the March 1st 
movement, when thousands of Koreans protested Japanese rule in Seoul and 
demanded independence. The movement spread throughout the country and was a 
result primarily of the harsh militaristic rule of the first decade of Japanese rule. 
Japan initially responded with brutality.) 
o Why might the March 1st movement be a major problem for the Japanese 
government? (Looking for answers similar to/containing: The March 1st 
movement showed very clearly to Japan that their current approach to ruling 
Korea was not working. Koreans were clearly very unhappy. While Japan could 
have continued in their previous manner, they would have run the risk of 
increasing Korean frustration and resistance.) 
o The teacher should share with students that the bottom line for the Japanese 
government after the March 1st movement is that Korean policy clearly needs to 
change. Continuing military rule was simply not an option; they very much 
needed to change course. So today, the class will look at how that happened. 
Body (35-40 minutes): 
• Instructions: The teacher should begin by previewing the day verbally and giving 
students instructions. The teacher will tell students that they will be reading the sources 
individually and performing MOTU analysis individually. Students will receive 15 
minutes to read individually and perform MOTU analysis as they read. Students will have 
a choice of how to perform MOTU analysis – they can either fill in a MOTU worksheet 
from the National Archives and Records Administration or annotate the document with 
notes on MOTU components. This can be done either physically or digitally using a 
highlighting and annotating Chrome extension such as Weava. After receiving time to 
read and perform MOTU analysis, students will receive 20-25 minutes to write a brief 
essay.  
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• Independent reading/MOTU source analysis (15 minutes): Students will receive 15 
minutes to read the sources and perform MOTU analysis in a manner of their choosing. 
The teacher should project a timer onto the whiteboard/SmartBoard to assist students 
with pacing. The teacher should tell students that once they finish reading, they will be 
writing an extended response/brief essay answering the lesson compelling question. The 
lesson compelling question is: Why did Japan implement the cultural rule policy?   
• Writing for understanding (20-25 minutes): Students will write a brief essay (~300-
500 words) in response to the lesson compelling question. Students should cite specific 
evidence from the sources and aim for quality over quantity when developing supporting 
points to their arguments.  
Closure (5 minutes): 
• Students should finish writing their final thoughts and submit them, if completed 
digitally. If written physically, the teacher should collect them.  
• The teacher should verbally summarize the day. Students read sources independently on 
various reasons and motivations Imperial Japan had for implementing the cultural rule 
policy in Korea. The teacher should reassure students that despite not verbally discussing 
sources, they will remain important throughout the remainder of the unit. The teacher 
should tell students that the following day’s lesson will focus on freedoms and limitations 
Koreans experienced under cultural rule. Students will want to keep in mind Japanese 
motivations as they read about and discuss the next day’s topic.  
• The teacher should assign homework for the following day: Students should read the 
sources for lesson 3, and perform MOTU analysis as they see fit (annotating, filling out a 
worksheet, etc.). When reading, students should keep in mind lesson three’s compelling 




Caprio, M. (2009). Post-March first policy reform and assimilation. In Japanese assimilation 
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp. 112-113). University of Washington Press.  
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 112-113 
“News of the government-general’s harsh reaction to the Korean independence 
movement quickly spread throughout the empire and beyond. Criticism from abroad took a 
number of forms. Some critics specifically targeted Japan’s colonial policy; others equated the 
harsh reaction by the Japanese to their uncivilized nature as a people. Criticism by Japanese also 
focused on their country’s assimilation policy. While some faulted contradictions in the 
approach—assimilation rhetoric and segregation practice—others cast blame on the Korean 
people. Their “cacophony” (sōjō) demonstrations proved them to be unworthy of assimilation as 
Japanese. Dissention appeared even among Koreans who used the Japanese media to criticize 
Koreans who had 
encouraged an activity that held so little promise of success.3 
Criticism by acting British consul in Korea, General William M. Royds, faulted Japanese 
assimilation rhetoric rather than Japanese effort: 
 
The Japanese policy at present openly aims at depriving the Coreans of even their own 
language and customs, and their total assimilation by Japan, and their deliberate attempt 
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to enforce this policy by every available means is the cause of the universal hatred in 
which the Japanese are held throughout the land. 
 
Royds’s advice reflected disdain for the brutal administration to which Japan 
subjected Koreans during its initial decade of colonial rule: ‘It seems evident that a few 
reasonable concessions and a more sympathetic attitude would do more to restore quiet and 
contentment than an attempt to stamp out the dissatisfaction by force.’4 
Some in the United States Congress believed that Japanese behavior demonstrated this 
people to be racially inferior, particularly after receiving news that Japanese had burned Koreans 
in Christian churches. George W. Norris, a senator from Nebraska, used Japan’s barbaric 
behavior to justify attitudes against the United States joining the League of Nations. After 
reviewing Japan’s history of deception in Korea that led to annexation, he presented an 
incriminating account of Japan’s handling of the March First Movement. Norris characterized 
the plight of Korea—a country ‘on the eve of a great upheaval for Christianity and civilization 
when the Japanese took 
possession’—as a case of pagan Japanese persecution of Korean Christians. This alone, he 
claimed, made Japan’s crimes much more heinous than the other atrocities conducted by other 
colonial powers at this time. The Korean case, claimed Norris, illustrated why the League of 
Nations treaty needed amendment before the United States could join. To accept the treaty as 
pro- 
posed would ‘put the clock of civilization back a thousand years,’ as was now happening in 
Korea.  
 
3 Yun Ch’iho notes his interview with the Osaka Mainichi shinbun on why he refused to 
participate in the March First Movement in his Yun Ch’iho ilgi, vol. 7 (March 2, 1919). 
4 Quoted in Ku, Korea Under Colonialism, 138. See also Nagata, Nihon no Chōsen kankei to 
kokusai kankei, chapter 7, for a review of the U.S. response to Japan’s handling of the Korean 
independence movement.” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 123- 125 
 “As Japanese adjusted their images of the Korean people, the government-general 
gradually introduced policy revisions. Discussion on reforms began soon after the March First 
Movement was quelled. Prime Minister Hara Takashi, one of Japan’s foremost advocates of 
assimilation, took the lead in pushing these reforms.32 His statements blurred divisions between 
Japan’s homeland and colonial subjects, whom he felt should be accorded equal positions in 
Japan’s extended community. 
 Hara contributed one of his earliest public statements on assimilation to Itō Hirobumi’s 
‘secret papers’ (discussed in chapter 2). The deputy foreign minister made generous use of the 
European example in his arguments. Taiwan should be incorporated not as a ‘colony’ in the 
British model, but as an extension of the homeland. Japanese administration policy should 
assimilate the Taiwanese as Japanese, as seen in German-controlled Alsace and Lorraine and in 
French Algeria. The cultural heritage shared by the Japanese and the Taiwanese rendered this 
policy appropriate. To implement this policy, Hara advised as follows: Japan’s legal system 
being extended to the island, its governor general receiving orders from a Tokyo-based Taiwan 
administrative minister (Taiwan jimu daijin), and Japanese institutions holding jurisdiction over 
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their respective counterparts in the colony. He thus advised that Taiwan’s administration be 
organized as extensions of the capital, just like Japan’s other prefectures.33… 
 Hara placed blame for the March First disturbances squarely on military rule and, 
specifically, the barriers it erected to block integration of Korean and Japanese. In a 1919 
opinion paper (ikensho), the prime minister defined the government-general’s role as promoting 
integration not only in schools and workplaces, but also in the two people’s living 
arrangements… 
Hara specifically targeted the education system that segregated Koreans from Japanese. 
One cannot expect a people to change, he stressed, while administering them as fools. 
Differences that the government-general had created in the two systems nurtured the 
discriminative attitude to which Japanese stubbornly clung. Hara further recommended that 
Koreans be taught their history to allow them to understand the progress made by the Japanese, 
and to be able to compare the past decade to the centuries of stagnation that their ancestors 
endured under Korean rule.37 
 The prime minister’s most difficult decision rested on his choice of Hasegawa’s 
replacement. The anti-Japanese demonstrations eliminated any chance of a civilian assuming this 
post—his first choice had been the present vice governor general and adopted son of Yamagata 
Aritomo, Yosaburō—as his selection required the army faction (Yamagata, Terauchi, Hasegawa, 
and Tanaka)’s backing. The new governor general also had to be distanced from this group to 
signal to Koreans and the critical international community Japan’s willingness to push reform. 
His ultimate selection, Saitō Makoto, was different in a number of ways from other governor 
generals. First, Saitō was from the navy rather than the army. Also, Saitō was retired at the time 
of his appointment and thus technically civilian. However, after the appointment Hara had the 
admiral’s name returned to the active roster to conform to the existing Organic Regulation of the 
Korean Government-General.38 
Saitō also spoke excellent English, a talent that proved indispensable. It opened a direct 
line of communication with Korea’s foreign residents, and thus an indirect line with their 
governments, to sell his reforms. 
 
32 Governor General Hasegawa Yoshimichi outlined a similar set of reform measures before 
leaving office in August 1919. “Sōjō zengosaku shaken” (A Personal Opinion of Better Strategy 
after the Disturbances), Saitō Makoto monjo, vol. 1, 77–227. See Richard Devine’s English 
translation and commentary in his “Japanese Rule in Korea after the March First Uprising: 
Governor General Hasegawa’s Recommendations,” Monumenta Nipponica 52, no. 4 (Winter 
1997): 523–40 
33 Hara Takashi, “Taiwan mondai futa an” (Two Proposals for the Taiwan Problem), in Hisho 
ruisan, ed. Itō et al., 32–34. 
 
37 Hara Takashi, “Chōsen tōchi shaken” (A Personal Opinion on Korean Administration), in 
Saitō Makoto kankei monjo, reel 104 (1919), Japanese Diet Library, 1998. 
38 Hara changed this legislation to allow for a civilian governor general a week later. However, 
army generals dominated this post until Japan’s retreat from the peninsula in 1945. See Dong, 
“Japanese Colonial Policy in Korea,” 248–49.” 
 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 126-128 
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“From his first days in office, Saitō maintained that he intended to honor the initial 
intention of annexation as articulated in the Rescript issued by the Meiji Emperor in 1910. In his 
1921 New Year’s address Saitō vowed that his administration would  
 
continue with the fundamental plan of Korean administration that remains unchanged, 
namely to honor the imperial words of ‘impartial humaneness (isshi dōjin), to integrate 
Korea into the general world situation, and to imperialize our 20 million brethren (dōhō) 
while constructing a paradise of peace over the 3,000 ri of rivers and mountains.45 
 
He anchored his reforms with what came to be known as ‘cultural policy’ (bunka seiji), a 
policy with five fundamental goals: the maintenance of public peace, the spread of education, the 
promotion of local rule, the development of industry and transportation, and the improvement of 
health. These goals sought to enhance the development of the peninsula and the prosperity of its 
people, both prerequisites to the Korean people assuming a status of equality with their Japanese 
counterparts in preparation for assimilation.46… 
Publication legislation reforms constituted just one of the many reforms that the 
government-general would introduce in the years that followed the March First demonstrations. 
A 1920 report summarized the twenty-four reforms that it had enacted to date, and eight new 
reforms planned for implementation in the near future.50 Many suggested the influence of Prime 
Minister Hara Takashi’s opinion paper, but few reached the level of integration that Hara had 
recommended at this time. The reforms first eliminated important physical symbols of Japanese 
power that distinguished Japanese from Korean. They banned uniforms for most Japanese 
government-general officials. Although it was not specifically stated, these officials would 
presumably be disarmed of their swords, as well. The hated kenpeitai, the gendarmes who were 
most responsible for Japan’s botched handling of the independence movement, were exiled to 
northern border patrol. A second round of reforms encouraged Japanese with pay incentives to 
learn Korean. These developments relaxed two barriers—power symbols and language—to 
encourage greater interaction between Koreans and Japanese. By revising the nationality laws 
(minsekihō) the administration also hoped to make it easier for Koreans and Japanese to 
intermarry. Other measures sought to erase existing differences in the way colonized and 
colonizers were treated. 
Bureaucrats would now be paid under the same salary scale, regardless of ethnic origin. In its 
revisions of the police department, the administration announced that Japanese had eliminated 
the title of “Chōsenjin junsaho” (Korean patrol assistant) to erase Korean-Japanese distinction. 
Finally, Japanese ended the whipping of Korean prisoners, a punishment originally believed by 
the Japanese to be fitting to their cultural level (mindo); the ban would equalize Korean-Japanese 
punishment.  
 The reforms also targeted Korean education, both classroom and social. We do not see 
efforts made to integrate Koreans and Japanese. Rather, the reforms increased opportunity while 
maintaining (and even fortifying) segregation. The high enthusiasm that Koreans showed for this 
education encouraged the government-general to increase the number of elementary 
schools (from 556 to 870) as well to strengthen male and female higher education. It also vowed 
to add classes in the sciences and to upgrade English from an elective to a required class. Most 
important, the administration promised to examine the possibility of extending Korean education 
to six years, the number of years then required of Japanese children. The reforms also 
emphasized social education. The most visible change was its reforming publication legislation 
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to permit three new vernacular newspapers: the Tonga’ ilbo, the Chosŏn ilbo, and the Chungang 
ilbo. This revision ignited an active print culture that oversaw publication of numerous journals 
and magazines of various genres that lasted up into the outbreak of war in the late 1930s. The 
Japanese headed a second element of social education as ‘Facilities to promote Japanese-Korean 
harmony” (Naisen yūwa no tame no shisetsu), and listed four areas to be targeted to ‘gain 
[Japanese] acceptance (ryōkai) of Koreans, and Korean understanding of Japan’: bringing 
Korean 
teachers and public officials to Japan, introducing Korea to Japanese people through movies, 
organizing public seminars for Koreans on Japan, and promoting ways in which Japanese could 
observe Korea and Koreans. 
 
45 Saitō Makoto, “Chōsen tōchi ni tsuite” (Concerning Korean Administration), in Saitō Makoto 
monjo, vol. 2 (January 1921), 424 
46 Saitō Makoto, “Chōsen no tōchi” (Korean Administration), Chōsen (January 1921): 3–7. The 
term culture was a buzzword frequently heard in the homeland, as well. Sugimori Kōjirō 
contrasted it with militarism in his definition of the purpose of culturalism—freeing the people 
from the sufferings of narrow-minded patriotism. Sugimori Kōjirō, “Gendai keimō undō no ichi 
hyōgō” (The Slogan of the Contemporary Enlightenment Movement), which appeared in “Bunka 
seisaku no kenkyū” (The Study of Culture Lifestyle), Fujin kōron (June 1922): 33. Komagame 
Takeshi contends that bunka (culture) replaced bunmei (civilization) in textbooks with little 
apparent change in meaning in his meaning in his Shokuminchi keikoku Nihon no bunka tōchi, 
203. 
50 For the text of the reforms see “Chōsen shisei no kaizen” (Reforms in Korean Administration), 
Saitō Makoto monjo, vol. 1, 73–141.” 
 
Source B: 
Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the 
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 
47(3), 377-397. 
Excerpt taken from pp. 385-387 
“Rattled by the scale and intensity of the March First Uprising, Governors-General 
Admiral Saito Makoto (1919–1927, 1929–1931), General Yamanashi Hanzo (1927– 1929) and 
General Ugaki Kazushige (1927, 1931–1936) parcelled out limited freedoms to the Koreans in 
education, print and political organisation, hoping to undercut the militancy of a growing 
nationalist movement.27 The administrative policies known as Cultural Rule came into effect 
after the nationwide uprising. The conciliatory policy implemented in the name of Cultural Rule 
lasted until the late 1930s. The Japanese were especially disturbed by the fact that many Koreans 
educated by the Japanese under their system had masterminded the uprising. Subtle policies were 
implemented that aimed to deliberately dismantle the independence movement and thereby 
undermine any effort by the Koreans to connect to their heritage. While physically this was 
possible in the short term, the long-term goal of the Japanese colonial authorities was to utilise 
Colonial education in order to water down any intellectual movement that might critically 
evaluate the prevailing system of governance. In the end education in colonial Korea was 
rendered subservient to political expedience and symbolic displays of power.  
Amid the social and political climate born of Cultural Rule, the colonial authorities 
acknowledged the continued demands for better education by the Koreans.28 Schools existed 
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prior to colonisation, but they did not always have the integrative function characteristic of 
schools in the West. Missionaries introduced the kind of schooling that was a crucible of 
common culture in nation-states in the West prior to Japanese colonisation, and such Western-
style schooling would have fomented a popular demand eclipsing virtually all other traditional 
forms of education on the Korean peninsula. The authorities saw it as an opportunity to use 
expansion of modern schooling – symbolic of ushering in modernity on the Korean peninsula – 
as justification for the enterprise of colonial subjugation and their presence in Korea. Schools 
thus were an efficient means to convince the Koreans that it would be self-defeating to reject 
Japanese colonial rule as long as Imperial Japan stood for modernity itself.29 
In 1922 nominal equality was given by the educational ordinance, placing Korean 
ordinary and higher common schools on the same level as Japanese elementary and secondary 
schools. Thus six years of education in the common schools, five years in boys’ higher common 
schools and four years in girls’ higher common schools were provided. Also, segregated schools 
for Japanese and Koreans were restructured into a single school system from the secondary 
school level. At the same time, educational facilities in Korea were expanded. Under the slogan 
‘san-men ikko’ (one school for every three districts), the Government-General inaugurated a 
programme of expanding the public common school system, particularly in rural areas.30 
As noted earlier, prior to the March First Uprising in 1919, public schools had difficulty 
in recruiting students. The situation quickly changed by the early 1920s, judging from a 
multitude of sources. The most evident is the increased usage of the terms kyoyukyeol (education 
fever), hakkyoyeol (school fever), hyanghakyeol (fervour to study) in public documents and 
newspapers. These terms mainly reflect the sudden increase in enrolment. Noteworthy is the fact 
that in the aftermath of the March First Uprising, the enrolment rate in the common schools 
climbed sharply, from 17.7% in urban areas and 2.6% in rural areas in 1915 to 33.8% and 16.2% 
respectively by 1926.31 By 1933 there were 680,000 students enrolled in 2271 elementary 
schools, while 35,000 students attended 579 rudimentary village schools in rural areas. 
Vocational education expanded as well from 21 schools with 1872 students in 1919 to 52 schools 
with 9220 students in 1935.32 Also, in response to the indigenous movement to set up a national 
university, the Japanese established Keijo Imperial University as a state-run university in 1924.33 
The reason for the turnaround can be attributed to a couple of factors. First, in the 
aftermath of the failed March First Uprising, the Koreans felt the need to be enlightened to face 
up to the Japanese rulers. Koreans engaged in the independence movement at various levels saw 
that nationalistic fervour alone was not sufficient in the fight for independence. Koreans had to 
develop forms of social consciousness appropriate to their historical situation in which their 
culture not only served to define them as distinct from and opposed to the Japanese but also 
provided a potential basis for uniting in the struggle for independence. Schools, even under 
Japanese management, were seen as necessary for educating the general public to eventually 
become critical of the given situation and assess their position. Second, the schools became the 
conduit through which Koreans climbed up the social ladder regardless of their class origin. For 
instance, modern school education became a necessary means to becoming a civil servant, which 
was regarded as a prestigious occupation. The modern school in effect dismantled the established 
class system, opening the possibility of children of lower social strata gaining access to 
occupations formerly denied to them through education. In short, the first factor diminished the 
mental reluctance against public schools, while the second factor provided the practical 
motivation. The most fundamental alteration underlying these specific changes is the shift of the 
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central focus in social consciousness as a whole, from tenaciously clinging to Korean traditional 
and cultural values based on the old order, to one that was both more pragmatic and realistic. 
 
27 Lone and McCormack, Korea Since 1850, 50. 
28 Miyazaki Kotaro, Chosen no kyoiku [Education in Korea] (Juyutokyusha[Juyutoku Publishing 
Company], 1923). 
29 Watanabe Tohiko, Chosen tochi no shomondai [General Problems in the Governance of 
Chosun], in Bunkyo no chosen, 1933 [Educational Affairs of Chosun], 15–25. 
30 Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London and New York: Routledge, 
1994), 99. 
31 Educational administration sector of the Chosen Shotokufu. Chosenjin gakureijido no shugaku 
jokyo [The enrollment rate of school-age children in Chosun], 1934. 
32 Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, 152. 
33 Sun-Geun Baek, Ilje gangjumgi ui gyoyuk pyungga [Educational Evaluation during the 
Japanese Occupation Era] (Seoul: Kyoyook Publishing Co., 2003), 61. In reality, despite the 
expansion of education opportunities for the Koreans, the number of applicants always far 
exceeded the number of students admitted to schools at every level.”  
 
Source C: 
Devine, R. (1997). Japanese Rule in Korea after the March First Uprising. Governor General 
Hasegawa’s Recommendations. Monumenta Nipponica 52(4), 523-540. 
 
Note: The following excerpt is Richard Devine’s translation of the Governor-General Hasegawa 
Yoshimichi’s Personal Recommendations, written in 1919, found on pp. 532-540. 
 
Personal Recommendations 
 “It is a source of great shame that the recent disturbances broke out while I occupied the 
important post of governor general of Korea. The immediate cause of these riots lay in the fact 
that dissident Koreans living abroad, influenced by the upheavals occurring in the world at large 
and resurgent movements for liberation, fomented subversive activities overseas. Son Pyong-
hiui, the former head of Ch'ondogyo, took advantage of this situation to achieve his long-held 
ambitions, and rallied followers of Ch'ondogyo, Christians, and students with a call for ethnic 
self-determination. From various quarters people joined the movement, dazzled by beautiful-
sounding words such as ‘independence’ and carried along by the Korean tendency to follow the 
crowd. Yet while the riots were due in substantial measure to such factors, the main reason is to 
be found in the pent-up anger of the Koreans regarding the overly demanding and intrusive 
nature of the new [colonial] government and the social discrimination they have experienced. 
This is indeed deplorable. During the past eight years of [Japanese] rule in Korea, we have 
pursued a policy of assimilation and have not willfully adopted policies that are unfair to the 
Koreans. Nevertheless, should these troubles result in the general populace harboring the 
conviction that the new government cannot be trusted, it will be a source of grave concern for 
governance in the future. It is essential to investigate the situation and carry out reforms in 
administration so that the anxieties of the people are relieved and they are led in a positive 
direction. I here present my views for your perusal. 
 1. What we should strive to accomplish 
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 The policy of assimilation has been fixed since the time of annexation, and various measures 
have been based on it. With the rise of the independence movement and student participation 
therein, people have come to criticize this policy and call for change. But as the policy has been 
in effect for only ten years, it would be overly hasty to judge it a success or failure at this point. 
  The relationship between Korea and Japan (naichi) differs from that between the powers 
and their colonies. This situation must be considered from a political standpoint. Korea is Japan's 
base for development on the continent and the perimeter of defense for the home islands. A firm 
solidarity founded on harmonious unity is a prerequisite for the survival of the Empire. Even if 
assimilation entails many difficulties, diligent effort will obtain the goal. Such effort will 
redound to the honor of the Japanese people. Do not the accomplishments of the past nine years 
offer cause for hope? 
Obsequiousness and suspicious ingratitude are part of the traditional Korean character. If 
we allow them a measure of self-government without checking this tendency, it is sure to be a 
source of trouble for the Empire in the future. Nevertheless, they have several thousand years of 
history and ethnic tradition. Even though we, Japanese and Koreans, may be of the same race 
and culture, it is impossible to expect assimilation to be accomplished in one day even if we rely 
on the authority of the new laws [promulgated by the Government General]. Thus, while basing 
our administrative policy on the principle of assimilation, we should adopt a gradualist approach 
rather than try to eradicate forcibly [the barriers to assimilation]. Although this may seem 
abundantly clear, those people charged with the actual work of implementing assimilation are apt 
to seek hasty results. Reflection on the past record deepens my conviction about this matter. 
There are also many lessons to be learned from the recent uprising. 
I believe that as an immediate step we should (1) strengthen the economic ties linking 
Koreans and Japanese, making them indissoluble, and (2) promote schools and social education, 
further opportunities for Koreans and Japanese to study together and the spread of the Japanese 
language, encourage immigration from the home islands, and open the door to mixed marriages. 
This will lead naturally to a unification of ways of thinking. Although we have made 
considerable effort toward these objectives up to now, we have not given sufficient attention to 
the problem of social education. Similarly the matter of immigration has been left up to the 
Oriental Development Company, and the administration has not undertaken any specific action.14 
But we should not leave immigration just to the Oriental Development Company. We should 
facilitate investment in Korea by removing all barriers that may presently hinder it, encourage 
the growth of business enterprises by expanding subsidies to them, and thereby have Korea lead 
the way to the development of capitalist enterprise in the home islands. If, together with this we 
encourage immigration of people of the educated class, it is sure to have a positive effect as 
regards the policy of assimilation. Mixed marriages involve many problems, it is true, but as a 
legal code common to both Korea and the home islands has been promulgated, revision of the 
Family Registration Law should be undertaken so as to ease the conditions for such marriages. 
(This matter is under discussion.) 
 
 14 The Oriental Development Company (Toyo Takushoku Kaisha i was a semi-governmental 
agency established in 1908 with the purpose of acquiring and developingagricultural land in 




Unit 2, Lesson 3 
Objectives: 
• SWBAT explain how the post-March 1st cultural rule (bunka seiji) in Korea resulted in 
both new freedoms and continued oppression for Koreans.  
• SWBAT evaluate, synthesize, and reconcile potentially conflicting views and 
experiences. This includes both historians’ interpretations and the views of people who 
experienced the events studied.  
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
Standards: 
• MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the 
colonizers and the colonized.”  
• MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an 
examination of the credibility of each source.” 
• MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute 
positions.” 
• D2.His.4.9-12. “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives 
of people during different historical eras.” 
Lesson compelling question: Did freedom and oppression coexist under cultural rule?  
Hook (5 minutes): 
• Analogy/comparison to personal experiences (5 minutes): The teacher will ask 
students to recall a moment or period in their life in which they felt both restricted and 
free. Students may think of a time when freedom and oppression coexisted in the same 
moment or time period. Potential student responses include: ability to do more as an older 
teenager (later curfew, fewer rules, etc.) but more responsibility (pay own gas/bills), 
ability to spend more personal time as they wish during quarantine but restriction on 
overall movement, and freedom in applying to/going to college but now bound with 
responsibility of paying loans and obtaining a degree. Student responses could involve a 
broad range of experiences and topics. For all responses, though, the teacher should 
emphasize that in those moments students were not entirely oppressed nor entirely free – 
the two states coexisted. The same, in many ways, can be said for Korea under cultural 
rule. Koreans experienced many freedoms but also continued restriction and oppression.  
Body (40 minutes): 
• The teacher should assign roles for the discussion. Students will need to argue one of two 
positions. Position A is that the cultural rule period represented an overall increase in 
freedoms for Koreans which outweighed any limitations. Position B is that the cultural 
rule period was overall more oppressive than it was liberating. The teacher will assign 
one half of the room to argue position A in small groups, and the other half to argue 
position B. The teacher will then divide students into small groups of four students each; 
each group should contain two students arguing position A and two position B.  
• Individual review (5 minutes): Students will rearrange their seating, if necessary, to be 
near their group members. Before discussing, students will receive 5 minutes to silently 
review the sources and the MOTU analyses they performed for homework.  
• Response groups (20 minutes): There will be two ten-minute rounds to the response 
groups. The teacher should project a timer onto the board so students are aware of pacing. 
During the first round, two students (out of the group of four) assigned opposing 
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positions will argue their positions and debate. While two students are actively 
discussing, the other two students should take careful notes on the discussion and 
arguments. These notes should contain information about what was said, but also 
students’ perceptions about the strength of arguments presented. When the first ten 
minutes are over, the teacher should verbally announce this to the class. The teacher 
should tell the class to switch positions. Then, the two students who were observing will 
actively argue their assigned positions while the two students who already argued will 
take notes.  
• Debrief (5 minutes): In their small groups, students will discuss notes they took. 
Students should focus on arguments made as well as the strength of them. If a student 
believes that an argument was weak or strong, he or she should state specific reasons 
why. Based on this discussion, the group will come up with a position in response to the 
lesson compelling question. Students are no longer bound to their assigned positions. 
Groups’ positions can be either A or B, discussed above, or one in-between. Groups 
should be prepared to support their positions with evidence from the sources.  
• Share out (10 minutes): One spokesperson from each group will verbally share their 
group’s consensus with the class. The spokesperson should share the group’s position as 
well as evidence the group discussed in support of that position. As students share, the 
teacher should write responses on the whiteboard. Alternatively, the teacher might project 
a document on the board and type students’ responses in as they speak. Once all groups 
have shared their responses, the teacher should move on to the closure but leave the 
responses either written or projected onto the whiteboard.  
Closure (5 minutes): 
• Large group response (5 minutes): The teacher should pose the following to students: 
“Bottom line, what do you all think? Did Koreans find more freedoms than oppression 
during the cultural rule period? Does any continued oppression cancel and outweigh the 
freedoms?” Students will voluntarily share their answers. If students do not do so, the 
teacher should ask those who share to explain why they believe what they do. During the 
discussion, the teacher should emphasize the complexity of the time period and that there 
are no right answers. Students are free to take whatever position they choose on any 
issue, as long as it is supported by evidence.   
Sources: 
Source A: 
Gordon, A. (2020). Democracy and Empire Between the World Wars. In A modern history of 
Japan: From Tokugawa times to the present (4th edition). (pp. 166-187).  
Excerpt taken from pp. 183-184 
 “Partly in response to these events in China, Japanese political leaders undertook 
relatively conciliatory efforts to protect economic interest in China for much of the 1920s. In 
similar fashion, Prime Minister Hara Kei decided that simple repression was the wrong way to 
sustain colonial rule in Korea. The overall goal of Hara’s policies was to assimilate Koreans into 
Japan not as colonial subjects, but as a relatively equal people who were to be integrated with 
Japanese through shared neighborhoods, schools, and even intermarriage. In the wake of the 
March 1 protests, he appointed a new governor general, Admiral Saito Makoto, with a mission to 
restore ‘harmony between Japan and Korea.’ Saito’s new departures came to be called ‘cultural 
rule.’ The essence of his program was a strategy of divide and rule. Colonial administrators were 
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charged to support cooperative Korean leaders and organizations, while isolating and 
suppressing any sign of anti-Japanese activity. 
 ‘Cultural rule’ has often been dismissed as cosmetic reform that masked unrelenting 
authoritarian control. After Saito’s arrival, the Japanese quickly and dramatically quadrupled the 
number of police stations and substations in just one year. The police developed a huge network 
of spies and informers throughout Korea. In the name of economic development, colonial 
administrators funded improved irrigation, and production did expand, but most of the increase 
was exported to Japan. Per capita rice consumption in Korea actually declined. 
 But Governor General Saito’s reforms were slightly more than window dressing. Saito 
gradually expanded the number of public schools for Koreans. He recruited more Koreans into 
the colonial administration. He narrowed the inequality between their wages and those of the 
Japanese. Koreans were permitted to publish books, magazines, and newspapers more 
extensively than before. Colonial administrators allowed a much wider range of Korean 
organizations to carry on activities. Korean people founded thousands of new education and 
religious groups, youth groups, and organizations of farmers and laborers. A small number of 
Korean capitalists were given new economic opportunities.  
 Even if policies of cultural rule and assimilation had been widely and consistently 
implemented, it is hard to imagine they would have brought Koreans and Japanese into a happy 
state of unity. Precisely because they understood this, it would seem, the colonial rules continued 
policies of intensive censorship and surveillance. Those who challenged Japanese rule even 
slightly were jailed and tortured. Nonetheless, nationalist political activities continued, either 
openly in subtle disguise or in secret. If anything, the space opened by cultural rule offered the 
subject population a chance to improvise a Korean-inflected modernity. As in Japan (although in 
a more tightly constrained fashion), a newly diverse and energetic modern cultural life – cinema, 
radio, and literature – flourished throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s.”  
Source B: 
Chung, H. (1921). The case of Korea: A collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of 
Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement. Fleming H. Revell 
Company. 
Excerpt taken from pp. 206-208  
 “One peculiar feature of Japanese rule in Korea, which is found in no other country in the 
world, is its spy system. It is incredible from a Westerner’s point of view. It is true, none the less. 
In Korea everyone must be registered and is given a number, which is known to the police. 
Every time he leaves his village or town he must register at the police station and state fully the 
business he intends to transact and his destination. The policeman telephones to this place, and if 
the registrant’s actions are in any way at variance with his report, he is liable to arrest and 
mistreatment. A strict classification is kept on the basis of a man’s education, influence, position 
etc. As soon as a man begins to show ability or qualities of leadership, he is put in class ‘a,’ 
detectives are set on his trail, and from thenceforth he becomes a marked man hounded wherever 
he goes…Officially authorized spies are stationed in every town and village; they force their 
presence even into private household parties. Their acts are backed by the Japanese gendarmerie, 
and woe to the native who dares to resent their intrusion! He will be charged with treason as 
opposing the Government authorities! The Japanese enlist as sub-spies a large number of the 
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worst scoundrels in the country. These incorrigibles are paid good salaries, and in many cases 
given rewards for the merit of their work; not infrequently the well-to-do natives are blackmailed 
by these spies, and the Government winks at the crime. 
 Such abuse of the method might naturally be expected, but the worst feature of it all is 
that it is often used as a machine by the Government in relentlessly crushing out the spirit of 
nationalism. If a Korean is suspected of keeping alive the spirit of his forefathers, the 
Government instructs its spies to bring certain charges against him. Upon the testimony of the 
spies, he will be imprisoned, his property will be confiscated, and he will be punished in such a 
way as to e disabled for life; or he may even be executed on the charge of treason. Like the 
medieval ‘Ironwoman’ that crushed its victims without bloodshed, this spy system of the 
Japanese administration in Korea removes from the country the ablest and best educated Koreans 
without technically violating the regulations of the colonial policy of the Japanese Empire. 
Indeed, Baron Saito, the new Governor-General, admitted the cynical truth when he said recently 
to an Asahi representative that all the Koreans of sufficient intelligence or force of character to 
lead their countrymen to higher things are either in prison or in exile.” 
Source C:  
Kim, Y.J. (2013). Politics of Communication and the Colonial Public Sphere in 1920s Korea. In 
Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea (pp. 76-113). University of Washington Press.  
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 76-77 
 “The third governor-general, Saitō Makoto (1919–27), instituted a new policy of cultural 
rule (bunka seiji) in 1920 that lasted for a decade.  Cultural rule introduced a new era that 
permitted the rebirth of Korean newspapers and political magazines. Governor-General Saitō 
recognized the fact that the total absence of indigenous, political, social, and media rights in 
Korea was not so much a sign of success, but rather a major cause of the failure of former 
Governors General Terauchi and Hasegawa’s administrations. Japanese rule was, according to 
Governor-General Saitō, moving toward a stage of civilized rule owing to his own new 
benevolent decision. As a result of this decision Saitō revived the vernacular press in the early 
1920s to address key issues of colonial society. This tentative liberal policy of the colonial 
authorities, however, gradually turned more and more into a sophisticated system of 
manipulation and control by the end of the decade. 
How to interpret the give-and-take between vernacular discursive space and colonial 
repression has always been a difficult issue. Robinson (1984) argued that in the end the cultural 
nationalists were co-opted by the colonial authorities. More recently in looking at the 1930s 
Robinson and Shin have argued that Korea developed a kind of ‘colonial modernity’ that 
‘produced cosmopolitanism without political emancipation.’1 In the cracks between the official 
ideology of cultural rule and the growing vociferous demands of the colonial residents, the 
vernacular media in the 1920s could plant nationalist views on various colonial issues. In fact, 
through the contentious battle against the colonial authorities, nationalist cultural elites 
constituted at that time what could be termed a public sphere. Though vernacular newspapers 
existed throughout the period of Japanese colonial rule, the incipient public sphere of the 1920s 
should not be interpreted as part of the linear and unbroken development of modernity through 
colonialism. The severity of official censorship was heavier and more extensive not only before 
but also after the period of cultural rule. The media, thus, lost their initial critical function and 
became truly ‘colonized’ by 1926, which in turn led to the demise of the colonial public sphere. 
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1 Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, Colonial Modernity in Korea, 11.” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 81-84 
 “Saito’s cultural rule policy was a compromise measure to handle the colonial crisis and 
earn the favor or the Korean population while continuing to maintain a firm grip on Korea.13 In 
December 1919, Saito’s colonial administration decided to give permits to Koreans to publish 
vernacular newspapers, thinking that the increasing discontent of the colonial population would 
have been detected earlier if the colonial society had had the ‘safety valve’ of vernacular 
media… 
 Governor-General Saito recognized that he needed a grand plan to propagate his new 
governing doctrine and to further implement a reform agenda. 
 Some prominent Japanese, such as Yoshino Sakuzo of Tokyo Imperial University, 
blamed the military rue of former Governor-General Hasegawa for the March First 
demonstrations; even Japanese Prime Minister Hara recognized the need for a change in 
Japanese ruling methods in Korea.15 The failures of the old colonial administration were closely 
studied, and it became increasingly clear that colonial rule could not be based on force alone. 
The cultural rule proclaimed by the governor-general laid claim to civilized government, putting 
great emphasis on the equal treatment of Koreans and Japanese, the extension of Japanese rule to 
Korea, and permanent peace of the Far East. This policy, however, simply masked the ruling 
ideology that had always been premised on assimilation. The colonialists’ strategy was basically 
designed as a two level strategy. The surface level being a doctrine of cultural politics or 
‘civilized rule,’ such as suggested by the reform measures of the new governor-general. The 
hidden level, which was never officially acknowledged, was a project of building hegemony and 
co-opting Korean elites through incentives and manipulation.16 Japan’s covert project for 
building cultural hegemony has been understood and criticized by nationalist historians as a 
policy of ‘divide and rule,’ or as a policy of ‘appeasement and manipulation.’ What these 
analysts often do not notice is that this two-level policy was not a contradiction, but rather 
something that was consciously designed to make up for the weakness of the cultural rule 
doctrine. 
 Saito’s communication policy stemmed from his grand strategy to establish long-term 
colonial rule on the basis of persuasion and consent.17 First and foremost this hegemonic strategy 
was designed to establish a governing coalition that incorporated some pro-Japanese Korean 
elites. Propagation of communication either favorable to or positive of the colonial ruling 
ideology was considered to be a vitally important part of Governor-General Saito’s ruling 
strategy. Saito worked on propaganda activities by personally attending and summoning local 
magnates to offer propaganda seminars. Nationally well-known figures such as Pak Yonghyo, 
Yun Ch’iho, and Song Pyongjun were often selected as guest speakers and used as unofficial 
Korean spokesmen for the colonial government. Initial efforts to create pro-Japanese public 
opinion by holding political propaganda seminars did not show much success owing to the lack 
of the speakers’ influence on the native population.18 However, the colonial authorities continued 
to resort to similar methods in the 1920s by covertly influencing conservative local magnates.  
 The colonial government understood the importance of rural areas where the majority of 
the population remained in a traditional life style, and it tried every means available to separate 
local publics from the influence of the national anti-colonial movements. Governor-General 
Saito himself made regular ‘propaganda trips’ to the provinces. In his eight years in office, Saito 
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paid visits to the provinces thirty-five times, spending 171 days. During these visits Saito met 
and explained cultural rule to various opinion leaders of the provinces, such as landlords, literati, 
evangelists, and local magnates.20… 
 Lastly, manipulating cleavages of class and ideology was an unwritten policy of Saito’s 
colonial rule in Korea. The favored allies sought by the colonial government were reactionary, 
conservative forces: the landlord class, the literati, peddlers,23 former government officials, and 
the yangban from the last years of the Choson Dynasty. Creation of pro-Japanese groups from 
among these social allies was an essential measure on which the colonial government in Korea 
relied. As a result, these pro-Japanese elements acquired important influence in colonial society 
particularly at times of political crisis. Among the pro-Japanese groups sponsored by the colonial 
government, early key examples are the School Spirit Society (Kyop’unghoe), the National 
Society (Kungmin Hyophoe), and the Comrades of Greater East Asia (Taedong Tongjihoe). 
 
13 Kim Kyuhwan, Ilche ŭi tae-Han ŏllon, 169. Cultural politics were devised as a part of a 
defensive scheme to handle the crisis situation create by the March First movement. Hence, it is 
important to understand how the sense of colonial crisis affected Governor-General Saitō’s rule 
in the 1920s. For the 1919 crisis, see Kang Tongjin, ‘Munhwajuŭi ŭi kibon sŏngkyŏk,’ 166–67. 
 
 
15 Pak Ch’ansŭng, Han’guk kŭndae chŏngch’i sasangsa yŏn’gu, 317; Han Paeho, ‘Samil undong 
chikhue Chosŏn,’ 82–83. 
16 The covert strategy of cultural politics was a hegemony building project. An important aspect 
of hegemony is that its intellectual and moral leadership is ‘objectified in and exercised through’ 
civil society and not led directly by the state. Joseph Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 24. 
17 Those who assert the importance of the ‘divide and rule’ strategy of Governor-General Saitō 
understand some aspect of ‘hegemony building’ of Saitō’s cultural rule. But hegemony building 
is a distinct phenomenon constituted by complicated and systematic efforts to form a network of 
diverse social allies. Collaboration is one element of the grand project, but cannot be identified 
with the whole project. 
18 Kim Kyuhwan, Ilche ŭi tae-Han ŏllon, 189. 
19 Kang Tongin, Ilche ŭi Han’guk ch’imnyak, 26. 
20Ibid, 36-37. 
 
23 Itinerant peddlers (pobusang) were organized on a national basis and used by conservative 
forces from the late nineteenth century to break up ‘progressive’ political movements.” 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 84-85 
 “Although a new era for Korean nationalism had begun when the Saito administration 
allowed the publication of three vernacular newspapers in 1920: The Tonga ilbo (East Asia daily, 
the Choson ilbo (Daily), and the Sisa sinmun, there was no ‘liberal’ change of regulations and 
laws in regulating media and publication. The colonial government did, however, loosen its 
policy of banning all vernacular newspapers and political magazines. ‘Print capitalism,’ which 
Anderson (1991) identified as the chief impetus to the spread of nationalism in countries around 
the world, had developed in late nineteenth-century Korea, before being cut off by Japanese 
repression in 1910. Japan’s new policy on publication freed cultural nationalists to once again 
embark on a reformist project. Newspapers were most important for the formation of public 
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opinion because they cut across all walks of life and served to overcome or confirm misgivings 
and skepticism about the leadership of national figures.  
 The corresponding increase of social communication in the 1920s was phenomenal. 
Among the various new magazines published in the 1920’s were Kaebyok (creation) published 
by the Ch’ongdoyo church, Asong (Our voice) of the Korean Youth League, and Ch’ongch’un 
(Youth) edited by Ch’oe Namson. In the first three years of the cultural rule (1920-1923) some 
seven thousand organizations were created. Among the daily newspapers in colonial Korea, the 
most widely read was the Tonga ilbo with thirty-seven thousand subscribers. The official 
government gazette, the Maeil sinbo, had a circulation of only about twenty-three thousand. The 
circulation of the Choson ilbo and Choson chungang was about twenty-three thousand and 
fourteen thousand respectively. The total number of subscriptions to the four major newspapers 
steadily increased until 1929 when it reached one hundred thousand within the national 
population of twenty million.25 As in the period before 1910, newspapers were the heart of the 
nationalist revival in the period after 1920. 
25 Chŏng Chinsŏk, Han’guk ŏllon sa, 553.” 
 
Source D: 
Kwon, I. (1998). “The New Women’s movement” in 1920s Korea: rethinking the relationship 
between imperialism and women. Gender & History, 10(3), 381-405. 
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 3484-386  
“The birth of Korean New Women was not just a natural reaction caused by centuries of 
Confucian patriarchal oppression. The movement was a product of the complicated meeting of 
Confucian patriarchy, the expansion of women’s modern education, the spread of the ideas of 
Christianity and Western feminism and the imposition of several foreign governments’ imperial 
power.  
 Here, an important point must be made. The colonial experience of Korea was 
significantly different from that of other countries colonized directly by Western imperialists 
who brought concepts of modernity with their intrusion. Korea, from the end of the nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth century, experienced imperialism in two forms: the collapse of 
traditional feudal ideology in the face of Western imperial modernity, and the loss of land and 
independence through Japanese imperialism… 
 It is the resultant separation of, on the one hand, cultural intrusion by Western 
imperialists into Korea’s feudal social order from, on the other, direct colonization by Japan that 
distinguishes the Korean case from that of most other colonized countries. It is a separation that 
has had an important effect on the birth of the Korean New Women’s movement. The largely 
favorable view of Western religion in Korea is one product of this separation. Haseuk La 
explains this tendency: ‘In the case of Korea, Christianity is commonly viewed as being separate 
from imperialism, as Korea was occupied by Japan which was a non-Christian country. 
Therefore, Koreans could not make sense of the symbiotic relationship between Korean 
Christianity and Western imperialism; rather, they evaluated Christianity as contributing to the 
build up of Korean nationalism.’13 It was possible, consequently, for Christianity to influence 
Korean women and the women’s movement without provoking a resistance derived from their 
nationalist consciousness. 
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 At the end of the nineteenth century, when Western imperialism penetrated Korean 
society in the name of modernization, it shook the cultural foundations of Confucian patriarchy 
and its caste system, which were the two central pillars of the Korean feudal system. The 
subsequent conflict between modernity and tradition was unavoidable. In this conflict, women’s 
status was picked out by many Koreans as the divisive feature that distinguished an oppressive 
traditional culture from an emancipatory modern culture. In 1888, Younghyo Park, the 
modernizing protagonist of a failed coup against the Korean dynastic regime, insisted on the 
prohibition of early marriage and polygamy, and the abolition of the law prohibiting women to 
remarry.14 Early marriage, concubinage, and the prohibition of women’s remarriage in particular 
became targets of modernizing intellectuals’ criticism of Confucian patriarchy.15… 
 In the middle of this nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century reform movement, 
many women challenged the traditional women’s consent to male dominance and set up new 
counter-hegemonic discourses. Christianity especially influenced Korean women. Even though 
Christianity was a patriarchal religion in its Western context, some Korean women found a 
liberating discourse within it: men and women were equal under God. Korean women reformers 
found they could use this discourse to attack Confucianism’s naturalization of an unequal 
relationship between men and women… 
 Another way in which Christianity planted the early seeds in the 1920s New Women’s 
movement was by playing a leading role in the expansion of women’s education. While the first 
state-sponsored public school for girls was not opened by 1908 and only three private schools for 
girls existed in Seoul at the time, Protestants had already built 732 elementary schools, nineteen 
middle and high schools and one university around Korea. Before 1905, 174 schools for girls 
were founded by Protestants, and women students comprised 30 per cent of the total 18,000 
students attending Protestant schools in 1905.21 This notable increase in women’s schools and 
women students signified not only the success of a Protestant strategy to spread Christianity 
through education, but also the growth of the strong desire of Korean women to liberate 
themselves through the education provided by these non-Confucian religious institutions. 
13 Lee analyses the important roles missionaries played as pioneers in opening the Korean market 
to imperial interests in contrast to the way they are usually seen. He emphasises the American 
missionaries’ nationalism by discussing a US marine who was also a teacher and who hoisted the 
Stars and Stripes along with Korean flags in a missionary school. He criticises the educational 
work of missionaries because it made Koreans worship Western imperialists and Westernisation. 
See Haesuk Lee, ‘What Did American Missionaries in the Early Days Do?’, in Correcting 37 
Events of Our History, ed. the Institute of Historical Problems (Yoksa Bipyong Press, Seoul, 
1993), pp. 23–5. 
14 Haejung Cho, Korean Women and Men (Moonhak Wha Jisong Press, Seoul, 1986), p. 94. 
15 Cho, Korean Women and Men, pp. 94–5. 
 
21 Haewon Yoon, ‘Protestant Schools and Women’s Education’, in Women, Wake up!, pp.113–
19.” 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 387-388 
 “One crucial commonality of Korean New Women, especially these three prominent New 
Women, Haseuk La, Wonju Kim and Myungsoon Kim, was their studies in Japan. All three 
studied in Japan around the same time (La, 1910-13, W. Kim, 191?; M. Kim, 191?). This was a 
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time when Japan was establishing its colonial rule in Korea; but it was also a time when many 
Japanese feminists were engaged in the debate over their own construction of ‘the New Women’. 
By 1910, the Japanese were instituting a centralized, mobilizing, nationalist, oligarchic state 
which pursued rapid industrialization at the same time as it was modernizing its military. In a 
Japanese context, the ideas of the New Women seemed to have two major aspects. On the one 
hand, the term denoted a group of women who asserted their own new self-identity and 
sexuality. Hiratsuka Raicho, in 1910 the first Japanese women to identify herself as a New 
Woman, made no secret of her self-conscious absorption of ideas from Western liberal 
feminism.34 On the other hand, Japanese feminist advocates for the New Women saw them as 
offering a new ideal type of women in Japanese society. Thus, the New Women did not represent 
only one ideological tendency for the movement’s Japanese supporters. 
34 Sharon L. Sievers, Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern 
Japan (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1983), p. 175.”  
Excerpt 3, taken from p. 393 
 “Haejung Cho defines the era from 1900 to 1920 as a time when Korean liberal idealism 
strengthened progressivism, while she sees the era after the mid 1920s as a conservative era, 
when traditionalists re-emerged to oppose the products of the preceding progressive era.64 This 
change in the 1920s was related to a change in the thinking of Korea’s colonized intellectuals. 
After colonization, Japanese imperialists practiced a modernization policy in its Korean colony. 
This served to rob any Korean male intellectuals of their will for modernization, which they had 
believed to be the only way to empower Koreans. These male intellectuals searched for an 
alternative way of bringing about their intellectual nationalist restoration.65 Thus, it was in the 
1920s that many once progressive intellectuals came to believe that through deconstructing 
tradition as a national cultural root and symbol, the New Women’s challenge to Confucian 
patriarchy could weaken the Korean nation’s power to stand against Japan. 
64 Cho, Korean Women and Men, p. 96. 
65 Jongwon Lee, ‘Role Conflict for New Women’, p. 74.” 
Excerpt 4, taken from p. 395 
 “From the mid 1920s, many nationalists who had previously advocated women’s 
education as integral to Korea’s modernity began to oppose the ideology and practices of New 
Women. Only a decade earlier they had welcomed challenges to Korean patriarchy as a modern 
nation-revitalizing discourse, especially with regard to women’s matters.75 By contrast, in the 
mid 1920s, in their revised nationalist discourse aimed now against Japanese colonialism, 
tradition was reformulated and revalued. For instance, Gwangsu Lee, a famous male novelist76 
and an influential enlightenment activist during the early years of the Japanese era, after 1910, 
asserted that Koreans could have self-control only through self-enlightenment and called for the 
destruction of traditional morality. In his first novel Mu Jong (Without Love), published serially 
in Maeil Sinbo (Maeil Newspaper) during 1917, Gwangsu Lee criticized the absurdity of the 
existing marriage system and its perspective on love. He claimed that ‘the relation between wife 
and husband in Korea was a permanent illicit union’ and the old perspective of chastity was ‘a 
kind of religious supersition’.77 However, by the 1920s he had changed his opinion. He began 
now to celebrate motherhood and to criticize married women who had paid occupations.78 In his 
later novel, Huk (The Soil), published in 1932, he described a man’s conflict in choosing 
between the traditional woman, because he admired naïve women who maintained traditional 
 74 
virtue.79 Gwangsu Lee’s reaction reflected the redirection of Korean nationalists’ discourse. 
Under colonialism, male nationalists thought that the New Women’s direct denial of existing 
patriarchy and sexual morality might cause the collapse of Korean tradition and solidarity. 
75 Oho, ‘Korean Women’s Movement’, p. 146. 
76 He was a leading thinker and a novelist who published the first long novel in Korea. 
77 Jungwha Byon, ‘Short Review of Lee Gwangsu’, Chongae Moonhak, 13 (1980), p. 225. 
78 Cho, Korean Women and Men, p. 99. 
79 Gwangsu Lee, Huk (The Soil), (Bakyoung Press, Seoul, 1966).” 
 
Source E: 
Uchida, J. (2013). The public sphere in colonial life: residents’ movements in Korea under 
Japanese rule. Past & Present 22, 217-248. 
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 221-222  
 “A re-examination of political life in colonial Korea would further move us beyond such 
a dichotomy and allow us to explore the possibility that critical public spaces emerged not only 
within but between national and imperial communities. I illustrate my point by using the case of 
the citizens' movement for public electricity (denki fueika undo). Launched by urban residents 
across Korea in the late 1920s and early 1930s, this movement aimed to reduce public utility 
bills by bringing electricity under the direct management of each municipality, rather than leave 
it in the hands of a corporate monopoly.16 Pivotal to the municipalization campaign was the role 
of Korean and Japanese members of the recently installed city assemblies, who constituted a 
small but influential local bourgeoisie. Conventionally viewed by scholars of Korea as 
handmaidens of state bureaucracy, these civilian elites led the campaign with new authority and 
awareness as representatives of the 'people', as they performed an intermediary function of 
channelling public opinion to the state and putting 'the state in touch with the needs of society'.17 
In bringing the daily concerns of local residents into public and policy debates, the assemblymen 
adopted a shared language of common good to challenge the state-sanctioned corporate 
monopoly on public utilities and the authoritarian structure of governance more broadly. And, 
while the assemblymen clashed viciously over strategies to realize their vision, with each camp 
claiming to represent 
 the popular will, they shaped and spread the concept of a public and publicness (Japanese: 
kokyosei, Korean: konggongsong) in the process. 
16For a study on consumer agitation over water rates in London in the 1880s, a period of 
transition from private to public ownership, that provides a fascinating parallel with the 
municipalization campaign in Seoul, see Vanessa Taylor and Frank Trentmann, ‘Liquid Politics: 
Water and the Politics of Everyday Life in the Modern City,’ Past and Present, no. 211 (May 
2011). 
17Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 31.” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 223-224 
At the end of the 1920s Korea's political landscape was in a state of flux. Having created 
the Sin'ganhoe (New Korea Society) as a united front of nationalist activity in 1927, Korean 
moderates and radicals clashed over its leadership, its regional branches soon falling into the 
latter's control.20 As the nationalist movement gravitated towards the left, the colonial regime 
flexed its muscles, dealing a devastating blow to the communists and socialists, who were 
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detained or driven across the northern border into Manchuria and the Chinese interior. For those 
who stayed in Korea and out of jail, however, political life began to take a different turn. In 1929 
Saito Makoto, governor-general of Korea in 1919-27 and 1929-31, returned from a conference in 
Geneva to assume his short second tenure. As a fitting conclusion to his 'cultural rule', Saito 
enacted a second round of local government reforms to invest the existing advisory councils with 
legislative authority and to create new assemblies at provincial, municipal and selected town or 
village levels. City assemblies, the most important units of local governance, were now permitted 
to legislate on the general economic and educational affairs of the municipality. A fair ethnic 
representation was also ensured by the stipulation that the number of Japanese and Korean 
members could not be less than a quarter each of the overall quota.21 
As a result of these reforms, Korean interest and participation in local politics showed a 
visible increase in the 1930s. To be sure, voting qualifications remained unrevised and the 
electorate small: even in May 1935 only 4.63 per cent of the local population (Japanese: 12.3 per 
cent; Koreans: 2.4 per cent) were eligible for the city assembly elections held in fourteen cities.22 
But, when limiting our focus to those who did run for office, we find that Koreans fared rather 
well, taking much greater strides than their Japanese counterparts. Between 1930 and 1940 the 
total number of Japanese office-holders, including officials and employees of the government-
general and local assemblies, rose by 75 per cent (from 40,398 to 70,845), whereas that of their 
Korean counterparts rose by 129 per cent (from 24,675 to 56,503). In 1930, 8,637 Japanese and 
7,628 Koreans served in city and provincial assemblies and on school boards, but their numbers 
became more or less equal by 1940 (Japanese: 20,938; Koreans: 20,501).23 In ensuring a certain 
balance of power between Japanese and Korean delegates, these statistics suggest, the new 
system of legislative assemblies undercut the settlers' ability to dominate local politics. 
 
20Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1972), I, 
112. 
21
 These reforms were completed by Saito's successor, Ugaki Kazushige, who assumed office in 
1931. City assemblies (Japanese: fukai, Korean: puhoe) and town assemblies (Japanese: yukai, 
Korean: umhoe) came into operation in 1931, and provincial assemblies (Japanese: dokai, 
Korean: tonghoe) in 1933. Chosen Sotokufu, soshiki to hito [The Organization and Personnel of 
the Government-General of Korea], ed. Gakushuin Daigaku Toyo Bunka Ken, suppl. to Toyo 
Bunka Kenkyu, iv (Mar. 2002), 248 n. 16. 
22Kang Jae-ho, Shokuminchi Chosen no chiho seido [The Local Government System of Colonial 
Korea] (Tokyo, 2001), 252.  
23Namiki Masato, ‘Shokuminchiki Chosenjin no seiji sanka nit suite: kaihogoshi tono kanren ni 
oite’ [Political Participation of Koreans in the Colonial Period: Its Relationship with Post-
Liberation History], Chosenshi Kenyukai Rombunshu, xxxi (1993), 35.”  
 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 244-246 
 “Nevertheless, the cacophony of voices of the 'people' channelled by the city 
assemblymen, community heads and the media finally moved the local authorities to begin a new 
round of negotiations with Keijo Electric. After a series of protracted discussions (whose details 
were never publicly disclosed) between the governor of Kyonggi province and Keijo Electric's 
managing director, Musha Renzo, by the spring of 1932 the company executives had come to 
accept as a compromise much of what was outlined in the alternative proposal.118 The colonial 
government extended the company's franchise as planned from July 1932 to August 1935 but, in 
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accordance with the proposal, the headquarters of Keijo Electric was moved from Tokyo to 
Seoul in May 1932. As token compensation, Keijo Electric also donated a million yen to Seoul 
and a hundred thousand yen to other cities, towns and villages where the company had 
branches.119 Moreover, the company agreed to reduce gas and electricity prices as far as possible 
at each review.120 Short of achieving the goal of municipalization, the residents' movement 
managed to win significant concessions, at least from the stand point of gradualists within the 
city assembly. 
Not only did the campaign manage to exert pressure on Keijo Electric to respond to 
public opinion, it also compelled the colonial state to look at itself 'through the eyes of the 
public'.121 The advocates of municipal electricity continually enjoined the quasi-state Keijo 
Electric to focus on community (Japanese: kokyo, Korean: konggong) rather than corporate 
interests, urging greater self-awareness as a company in charge of managing utilities that affected 
the daily lives of residents. That the campaign enabled the voice of the people to be heard, as the 
chief of the Electricity Section of the government-general's Communications Bureau later 
acknowledged, served to shake up the entire industry and its supervising state authorities by 
'awakening' them to the fundamental 'mission of electricity as a public utility'.122 In arguing that 
city planning must proceed in dialogue with public opinion, the residents' campaign for 
municipalization broadly served as a referendum on the colonial state's exercise of power.123 
And, as the ultimate outcome of the campaign showed, the colonial government made significant 
concessions to the power of public opinion that problematized governing processes over which 
the state authority had hitherto exercised a near-monopoly. 
 
118 Ibid., 10 Apr. 1932; Choson ilbo, 29 Apr. 1932 
119 Son, Ilche kangjomgi tossi sahoesang yon’gu, 427-9. The one million yen was used to build a 
low-fee clinic and a residents’ hall. 
120Choson ilbo, 29 Ap. 1932. The Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry also appears to 
have responded to the residents’ campaign by requesting a reduction in price at the time of Keijo 
Electirc’s Review in May 1935, stressing ‘the urgent need’ to reduce the charges for household 
usage and small factory operations in Seoul: Keijo Shoko Kaigishio, Chosen Keizai geppo, 
ccxxxiii(1935), 95-6.  
121Bhattacharya, ‘Notes towards a Conception of the Colonial Public’, 156. 
122Chosen no denki jigyo o kataru, ed. Sasaki 200.  
123The campaign also affected the way the colonial administration managed society. New 
awareness of the need to incorporate civilians into the governing process translated into a 
‘corporatist’ approach adopted by the government-general to manage local communities in the 
1930s. Gi-Wook Shin and Do-Hyu Han, ‘Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization 








Inquiry Design Model (IDM) Blueprint™ 
Compelling 
Question 
Does war justify extreme measures?  
Standards and 
Practices 
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western 
values and direct political control.” 
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and the 
colonized.”  
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an examination of the 
credibility of each source.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, including 
multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.” 
Staging the 
Question 
Students will read a CBS News article about the ongoing controversy between Japan and South Korea over 
the issue of World War II-era Korean “comfort women.” After individually reading the news article, the 
teacher will share an image of the comfort woman memorial statue in Seoul with the students. As a large 
group, the teacher will lead the class in informal verbal MOTU analysis for each source. The main point is 
for students to understand how salient the issues stemming from this era still are to Japan and South 
Korea. 
Supporting  
Question 1  
Supporting  
Question 2  
Supporting  
Question 3  
Why and how did Japan’s Korea policy shift 
with the outbreak of the Fifteen Year War in 




How did World War II change how 
Koreans identified with the Japanese 
Empire? 
Was Japan’s wartime mobilization of 







Students will analyze 1-2 of the featured 
sources in jigsaw groups using the MOTU 
framework. After analyzing in jigsaw 
groups, one spokesperson from each group 
will peer teach the class about his or her 
group’s assigned source(s).  
Students will construct a short essay in 
response to the lesson compelling 
question. Students will then debate in 
small groups how they would have 
identified as an ethnic Korean living in 
occupied Korea. 
Students will participate in a Socratic 
seminar consisting of three ten-minute 
rounds. Each round will focus on an 
open-ended question posed by the 
teacher.  
Featured Sources Featured Sources Featured Sources 
Source A: Source A: Source A: 
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Excerpts from Gordon, A. (2020). 
Depression crisis and responses. In A 
modern history of Japan: From Tokugawa 
times to the present (4th edition) (pp. 187-
208). Oxford University Press.  
Source B: 
Excerpts from Caprio, M. (2009). Radical 
assimilation under wartime conditions. In 
Japanese assimilation policies in colonial 
Korea, 1910-1945 (pp.141-170). University 
of Washington Press. 
Source C: 
Excerpts from Kang, H. (2001). Becoming 
Japanese. In Under the black umbrella: 
voices from colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp. 
111-122). Cornell University Press. 
Source D: 
Excerpts from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). 
Assimilation and segregation of imperial 
subjects: “educating” the colonized during 
the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of 
Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 377-
397. 
Source E: 
Excerpts from Ryu, D.Y. (2016). 
Missionaries and imperial cult: politics of 
the Shinto shrine rites controversy in 





Kim, M. (2007). The aesthetics of total 
mobilisation in the visual culture of late 
colonial Korea. Totalitarian Movements 
and Political Religions, 8(3-4), 483-502.  
Source B: 
Caprio, M. (2009). Korean critiques of 
Japanese assimilation policy. In Japanese 
assimilation policies in colonial Korea, 
1910-1945 (pp. 171-187). University of 
Washington Press.  
 
Excerpts from Kang, H. (2001). The war 
effort. In Under the black umbrella: 
voices from colonial Korea, 1910-1945 
(pp. 130-138). Cornell University Press. 
Source B: 
Excerpts from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. 
(2011). Assimilation and segregation of 
imperial subjects: “educating” the 
colonized during the 1910-1945 
Japanese colonial rule of Korea. 
Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 377-397. 
Source C: 
Asian Boss. (2018, October 27). Life as 
a “comfort woman”: story of Kim Bok-





The 2nd Independent Heavy Siege 
Artillery Battalion “Regulation for the 
use of Comfort Stations” March 1938, 
Shiryoshusei, Vol. II, pp. 351-358, 
quoted in Asian Women’s Fund. (n.d.). 





Inaba Masao, ed. Okamura Yasuji 
taisho shiryo: Senjo kaiso hen, jo 
[Sources of general Okamura Yasuji: 
Recollections of the battlefield, vol. 1] 
(Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1970), pp. 302-
303, quoted in Asian Women’s Fund. 
(n.d). Who were the comfort women? – 
the establishment of comfort stations. 







Performance Task  
Argument 
Students will construct an essay of 500-700 words in length, responding to the unit 
compelling question: Does war justify extreme measures? Students should include a strong 
thesis and cite specific evidence from the featured sources in their essays.  
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Extension 
Students will write and deliver a short speech to the class that responds to the compelling 
question. As with the argument, students should include specific evidence from the featured 




Students will further research the contemporary tensions between Japan and South Korea over the 
comfort women. Based on their research and knowledge gained from the unit, students will propose a 
solution to the tensions (such as formal Japanese apology or Korean acceptance of reparation payments). 
Students will write a blog post detailing their solution, and why it is appropriate given the historical context 
of the issue. When finished, students will post this to a class blog created through a platform such as 
Wordpress. 




The unit design template is by Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014) from the C3 Teachers. 




Staging the Question 
Students will read the article linked here.  
Kwon, J. (2021, January 8). South Korean court orders Japan to pay “comfort women,” WWII 
sex slaves, reparations. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/comfort-women-korea-
japan-court-order-wwii-sex-slave-reparations/.  
 
Students will view the following image of a comfort woman memorial statue in Korea. The 
teacher should note to the class that it was placed in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in 








Ahn, E.N. (2015). A statue of a girl representing the sexual victims of the Japanese military is 
seen in front of Japanese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, on Monday [Photograph]. The Wall 
Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-and-korea-have-long-disputed-comfort-
women-1451337632.  
After viewing the article and the photo, the class as a whole will analyze both using the MOTU 
framework. This may be done informally and verbally, or written out on the board if the teacher 
wishes. The main idea is to understand that this issue remains a salient source of disagreement 




Unit 3, Lesson 1 
Objectives:  
• SWBAT evaluate Japan’s reasons for changing Korean policy beginning in 1931. 
• SWBAT understand the World War II era Japanese policies which are the basis of 
modern tensions between Korea and Japan. 
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
Standards: 
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of 
Western values and direct political control.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, 
including multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.” 
Lesson compelling question: Why and how did Japan’s Korea policy shift with the outbreak of 
the Fifteen Year War in Asia (World War II in Asia)?   
Hook (5-8 minutes): 
• Making inferences/predictions (5-8 minutes): Prior to class, the teacher will make 
the following mini-source available to students. This should be done by projecting it 
onto the whiteboard. The teacher should also make the text available to students via 
an online learning management system, such as Google Classroom. The teacher will 
tell students they will be reading a source about the outbreak of the Fifteen Year War 
in Asia, beginning with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Students will be 
given approximately 1 minute to read independently and silently. (See under “Text 
for hook” after the closure in this lesson plan.)  
• After the time is up for students to read, the teacher will pose the following questions 
to students.  
• Why did Japan invade Manchuria? 
• Based on Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and the outbreak of the Fifteen Year 
War, can you infer how Korean policy will be affected? 
• Students will voluntarily supply responses. After 4-6 responses have been shared, the 
teacher will move on to the main body of the lesson. 
Body (30 minutes): 
• Jigsaw groups (30 minutes total): 
• The teacher will begin by splitting the class into four groups. The number of groups 
will vary depending on class size, but each group should have approximately 3-5 
members. If class sizes are larger, the teacher may create additional groups and assign 
the same source(s) to two different groups. After splitting the class into groups, the 
teacher will verbally give directions. The teacher should also project directions and a 
general outline for the day on the whiteboard so students may follow along.  
• Each group will be assigned either one or two of the featured sources for the lesson. 
Group 1 will be assigned source A, group 2 source B, group 3 source C, and group 4 
sources D and E. Students will receive 15 minutes to complete MOTU analysis for 
their assigned source. Groups should choose a spokesperson and be prepared to peer 
teach/share out upon completion.  
 82 
• Peer teach/share out (15 minutes): When the 15 minutes are up, the teacher will 
verbally alert the students. Each spokesperson will share out/peer teach by standing 
near the whiteboard (or another appropriate location near the front of the room) and 
verbally sharing his or her group’s answers. The teacher should project blank MOTU 
worksheets on the whiteboard, one for each group. While the spokesperson is peer 
teaching, another student from the group should be typing in his or her peer’s 
answers. The worksheet should be projected onto the whiteboard as the student is 
typing, so it is updated in real time. Each group should receive adequate time to share 
its answers.  
Closure (10 minutes): 
• Large group debrief (5 minutes): The teacher should keep the MOTU analyses 
projected on the board. The teacher will briefly review each group’s analysis. The 
teacher will bring it into view on the whiteboard and ask students to verbally share 
what they believe is the most important takeaway from each source. After all sources 
have been reviewed, the teacher will introduce the exit ticket. 
• Exit ticket (5 minutes): The students will answer the lesson compelling question on 
an exit ticket, either by writing it on a piece of paper or typing and submitting it 
digitally via an online LMS. Answers should be 3-5 sentences. Regardless of format, 
students must be sure to submit the exit tickets to the teacher before the end of the 
class period.  Finally, the teacher will assign homework for the following day. 
Student should read lesson 2’s featured sources and analyze each using the MOTU 
framework.  
Text for hook: 
Mallory, W.H. (1932). The permanent conflict in Manchuria. Foreign Affairs 10(2), 220-230. 
“The Permanent Conflict in Manchuria  
 The industrial development of Japan is, of course, built on iron and coal. She secures an 
important share of these essentials from Manchuria. For instance, probably half of the pig iron 
imported into Japan comes from Manchuria, and imports are roughly one-fourth of local 
Japanese production. In the case of coal, Manchuria’s production is about a fourth of Japan’s. Of 
the Manchurian coal perhaps a third is exported to Japan. While the supply of these materials is 
important in peace time, in case of war Japan’s other foreign sources might be cut off; then the 
Manchurian coal and iron would be indispensable. 
 When Japan counts up her reserves of iron and coal she becomes more convinced than 
ever that her very life depends on the control of the Manchurian mines and the transportation 
facilities which will bring their output to her shores. At the present rate of consumption the iron 
ore reserves in Japan are entirely inadequate. If domestic ore alone were used to manufacture the 
iron and steel consumed annually in Japan, the estimated utilizable ore would be exhausted in 





Gordon, A. (2020). Depression crisis and responses. In A modern history of Japan: From 
Tokugawa times to the present (4th edition) (pp. 187-208). Oxford University Press.  
 
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 196: 
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 “As they developed policies for the new Manchurian state, Japan’s rulers also revised 
their strategies toward the older colonies of Korea and Taiwan. They no longer believed it 
enough to seek local stability and local profits. They redefined these colonies as places where 
human and material resources should be mobilized to support the expanding empire. In Korea 
beginning in 1931, Ugaki Kazushige took office as governor general. He launched ambitious and 
harsh economic and social policies. The colonial regime took a more aggressive stance toward 
northern Korea’s forest resources after the takeover of adjacent Manchuria. Colonial officials 
and private Japanese interests treated the rich forests on both sides of this border as a single 
region, and they harvested vast tracts of timber for processing in state-owned lumber yards as 
well as private pulp factories. Considerable deforestation resulted.14 
 Ugaki’s regime also encouraged Japanese industrialists to invest in the mining of 
strategic ore and metals, electric power generation, chemical (explosives) and fertilizer 
production, and the production of iron and steel. Some Korean entrepreneurs were able to found 
profitable industries as well. But regardless of the ownership, most industries drew on Korea’s 
inexpensive labor supply to feed products and resources to Japan’s own increasingly militarized 
economy. To mobilize human resources, Ugaki pushed forward an increasingly coercive 
program of ethnic assimilation in the schools. He expanded compulsory Japanese-language 
instruction and sharply limited the teaching of Korean language in schools. By the late 1930s, 
Korean had been banned entirely. 
14Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘The Nature of Empire: Forest Ecology, Colonialism and Survival 
Politics in Japan’s Imperial Order,’ Japanese Studies 33, no. 3 (2013): 23-237.”  
 
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 200: 
 “The military also supported several new business combines in hopes of nurturing 
sympathetic private sector allies, especially in the development of Manchuria. These were called 
the ‘new zaibatsu,’ a group of conglomerates centered in heavy and chemical industries. They 
benefited greatly from military demand, and some, such as Chisso Chemical Fertilizer and 
Showa Denko, grew to be industry leaders and survived the war. The new zaibatsu were 
particularly dominant in Korea. But they did not have their own banks; in fact, the established 
old zaibatsu constituted the major source of direct investment in Manchuria throughout the 
1930s.  
 In this fashion, industrialists old and new followed the flag and moved into business in 
Manchuria in close collaboration with the military and civilian bureaucracy. In addition to 
zaibatsu funding, development in Manchuria and Korea relied on what officials called 
‘comprehensive technology.’ The term reflected a desire to rationalize economic life through 
massive engineering projects. The Sup’ung Dam, built on the Yalu River between Korea and 
Manchuria, was the largest dam in Asia when completed in 1943. It generated electricity for the 
growing colonial chemical industry. The colonial laborers who built such dams faced not only 
grueling hours and unhygienic conditions, but also strict surveillance by management and police 
who feared subversion or resistance. The afterlives of these projects were significant: 
Bureaucrats and engineers who cut their teeth in the colonies went on to build dams in Japan and 
Southeast Asia after the war.21 The Sup’ung Dam today adorns North Korea’s national seal. 
21Aaron Stephen Moore, Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan’s 
Wartime Era, 1931-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), ch. 4.”  
 
Excerpt 3, taken from p. 201  
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 “Under Governor General Ugaki, the colonial regime in Korea implemented a similarly 
named Rural Revitalization program to identify model villages, which would take the lead in 
projects to raise output and reduce social tensions, and thereby increase the loyalty of Korean 
subjects. Some Koreans had already been organizing campaigns for ‘rural regeneration’ with a 
stress on traditional values of frugality or filial piety. The state project of Rural Revitalization 
dissolved these private efforts, but it incorporated many of their initiatives. As in Japan’s home 
islands, one finds a transwar process here. The regime of Park Chung Hee (1963-1979) 
undertook projects of rural reform with a similar focus on both economic improvements and 
‘traditional’ values.23 The combination of a traditionalist rhetoric of rural solidarity and 
modernizing strategies of better farm management was a striking feature of the drive to revitalize 
rural Japan and its Korean colony. This mix echoed social reform projects of earlier decades. As 
in the 1920s, the rural reformers offered particular hopes to women and promised them new 
roles. Women were exhorted to improve kitchen design and hygiene and to organize everyday 
life more efficiently and scientifically. These responsibilities amounted to a significant public 
role in the community. Many in Japan and some in Korea responded to the campaigns with 
enthusiasm. 
23Gi-Wook Shin and Do-Hyun Han, ‘Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 
1932-1940,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 70-96.”  
 
Source B: 
Caprio, M. (2009). Radical assimilation under wartime conditions. In Japanese assimilation 
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp.141-170). University of Washington Press. 
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 141: 
“Japan’s mounting crisis on the Asian continent initiated yet another review of its Korean 
administrative policies. Aware of the Korean Peninsula’s strategically critical geographic 
location, the Japanese government realized that success on the Asian continent could not be 
realized without Korean support and cooperation. In 1938 the government-general produced an 
extensive report that advised measures to strengthen Naisen ittai (Japan-Korea, one body). The 
report, distributed just over a year after the Japanese military’s July 1937 encounter with the 
Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge, introduced measures required for Japan to realize a ‘complete 
strengthening’ of Korean assimilation in accordance with the circumstances of the 
times.”  
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 146-148: 
 “Vice Governor General Ōno Rokuichirō headed the committee designated to draft 
policy recommendations to be included in this second document. This committee consisted of 
distinguished Japanese and Koreans in the areas of business, education, and government 
administration. The contents of the Counterplan Proposal indicated the growing crisis in northern 
China that had evolved from the Marco Polo Incident, a relatively minor confrontation between 
Japanese and Chinese troops that escalated into a prolonged battle. The strategic proximity of the 
Korean Peninsula resting between the Asian continent and the Japanese archipelago required the 
Japanese government to more closely integrate the Korean people into its empire. The 
consequences of failure would be most critical to the empire’s future. 
 The Counterplan Proposal addressed a major concern emphasized in two reports penned 
just after Sunjong’s 1926 funeral: the futility of expecting Koreans to assimilate as Japanese 
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should they be provided access to their traditional culture, including the Korean language-based 
media.18 The situation of the times no longer afforded the luxury of gradual assimilation, but 
required procedures that expedited the process. The first chapter of the Counterplan Proposal 
quoted from the 1910 Imperial Rescript on annexation. It then projected the extent to which the 
Korean people must be assimilated, before concluding by detailing how Koreans and Japanese 
would benefit from a closer relationship: 
 
 
 The roots (konpon) of [Japan’s] administration of Korea are grounded in the sacred words 
isshi dōnin (imperial benevolence) extended to our peninsula brothers. It aims to bathe 
them in the immeasurable imperial favors (kōtaku), to attain in both name and reality 
(meijitsu) their complete imperialization (teikoku kōminka). Leaving not the slightest gap, 
we will forge a Japanese-Korean unified body to confront future complications initiated 
by the circumstances of the times (jikyoku). Together we will advance the mission of 
realizing the great spirit (taiseishin) of international brotherhood (hakkō ichiū) from a 
commissary base to be established [in Korea] to assist in the Empire’s continental 
management. 
 
The Counterplan Proposal centered on three broad areas: education, participation, and 
unity. It encouraged the administration to provide the Korean people with proper ‘guidance and 
enlightenment’ (shido keihatsu). It advised ways to strengthen Korean links with Japan by 
engaging their participation in nation-building activities, specifically highlighting holidays and 
Japanese calendar use. It proposed ways for the government-general to forge ties between 
Koreans and other peoples of Japan’s continental empire, particularly with Manchurians and 
Chinese.19 
 Education facilities again provided the most important places to disseminate to Koreans 
the spirit that the present circumstances required. The Counterplan Proposal advised that this 
instruction be based on three fundamental principles: clarification (meichō) of the national polity, 
endurance (ninku) of Naisen ittai, and discipline. The instruction was to emphasize history, 
particularly the diplomatic, cultural, and blood connections that the Japanese and Korean peoples 
have shared from ancient times. It would encourage national language acquisition. And it would 
foster within Korea’s youth the ‘spirit of industry and patriotism.’20 The Counterplan Proposal 
called for an expansion of education facilities to ‘allow everyone to attend school,’ and 
suggested ways to engage Koreans further in social education activities. Museums should be 
built, movies produced, and seminars organized to educate Korean adults. This instruction aimed 
to provide means for the Korean people to ‘rationalize their lifestyles and soften (yūka) their 
[Korean] mannerisms.’… 
 A third area that the Counterplan Proposal targeted was imperial unification. Its authors 
recognized the need to establish links not just between Japanese and Koreans, but also between 
Koreans and continental Asians, devoting far greater attention to this latter concern. It advised 
that ties be established through educational and cultural exchanges between instructors at 
universities and professional schools, students and youth leagues, as well as information 
disseminated through the media and exhibitions. These suggestions depicted Koreans serving as 
living testaments of Japanese success, a display to allow the Chinese and Manchurians the 
opportunity to view their potential development should they choose to cooperate.22 
18See note 86, chap. 4. 
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18 Chosen government-general, ‘Chōsen sōtokufu jikyoku taisaku chōsakai shimon tōshinan 
shian,’ 418–23. 
20Ibid., 417, 421-42. 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid., 459-60.” 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 149-150 
 “Strengthening Japanese-Korean ties contributed to the military role that the Japanese 
envisioned the Korean Peninsula assuming. The Counterplan Proposal revealed ideas on how 
Korea’s northern provinces could serve the Japanese military. The region contained valuable 
coal mines and industrial facilities that the enemy might target for bombing. Fortifying this 
region militarily both protected this critical resource and strengthened the Japanese war-waging 
capacity on the Asian continent. The Counterplan Proposal envisioned the militarization of this 
region strengthening the Japanese capacity to ‘distribute weapons in a flash’ to troops fighting in 
China.28 
Implied, but not directly stated, was the importance of the empire gaining Korean cooperation 
and establishing military facilities on the peninsula. The Japanese could not expect to succeed on 
the Asian continent unless it tamed this region, often described as wild and uncivilized; it 
harbored many insubordinate (futei) Koreans.29 
29 See, for example, Kitakan Sanjin (probably a pseudonym), who offers this description in his 
“Chōsen no futei senjin” (Korea’s Lawless Koreans), Chōsen oyobi Manshū (November 1921): 
81–82; and Pak Sanghŭi, “Chōsen seihokujin no tokushitsu” (Unique Characteristics of the 
Northwestern Korean), in Chōsen oyobi Chōsen minzoku (Korea and the Korean Race), edited by 
Chōsen oyobi Chōsen minzoku, 112–23 (Chōsen shisō tsūshinsha, 1927). I describe these images 
in ‘Images of the North in Occupied Korea.’” 
 
Source C: 
Kang, H. (2001). Becoming Japanese. In Under the black umbrella: voices from colonial Korea, 
1910-1945 (pp. 111-122). Cornell University Press. 
Ch. 11: Becoming Japanese 
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 112 
“Kang Sang’uk [Kang Sang Wook] 
(m) b. 1935, physicist, North P’yongan Province: 
 The Japanese in almost every community set up Shinto shrines high on the hill and once a 
month they held a ceremony there. They ordered everyone, Japanese and Korean, to attend and 
bow to the gods of Shinto. The one in Kanggye city was quite large. Even though my family was 
Christian, I went along with the school group. We went during class hours and we kids trooped 
along without thinking too much about it. 
 Each village was supposed to have a shrine, but many villages were too small to bother 
with. Our ancestral village of Toktari never had Japanese people or a Shinto shrine. It was simply 
too small.  
 One Christian seminary told its people not to bow to the shrines and consequently they 
suffered continual persecution. Many others did as they were told in order to survive. As a child, 
I didn’t notice all this. Mostly I played happily, drawing airplanes, drawing maps with different 
colors.  
 What did the shrine look like? As you waked up the hill, before you got to the shrine 
itself you came to a red torii gate, just standing there. I mean, usually a gate serves as an opening 
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in a wall, but there never was a wall, just the gate. It was big – wide enough for several of us to 
walk through side by side. 
 Farther up the hill, in a clearing where all of us could stand, was a little house very much 
like a small Buddhist temple, with the doors closed. From a building next door, the priest came 
out dressed in full regalia – very impressive, great robes and scepter – and he stood in front of 
the shrine. My teacher told us that inside was a statue of one of their goddesses, Amatersau 
Omikami, the sun goddess, but I actually never saw inside. It was like the Holy of Holies, very 
sacred. The priest shouted, ‘Bow,’ and we all bent over from the waist with flat backs, and that’s 
it, that’s all. It was over. What took so long was you had to climb the hill and then walk back 
down.” 
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 113: 
“YI OKPUN, (f) b. 1914, housewife, Kyonggi Province: 
 Of course we had to go to the shrine on Namsan (South Mountain). The head of our 
neighborhood group was Japanese; that’s why we had to do everything he said. If we didn’t go, 
we didn’t get any food ration. We didn’t go alone. A whole group went – our whole 
neighborhood cell, about ten households, you know. Even with my babies, I had to take the 
streetcar, then walk all the way up the hill. It was hard. 
 We had to go up a lot, sometimes once a week, certainly two or three times a month. The 
ceremony took about, let’s see, thirty minutes. They pour some water, you clap your hands, then 
you come down and get the food ration stamps. 
 Later when we changed our name, I just followed whatever my husband said. I didn’t 
care. Just get the food ration card!”  
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 115-116 
“KANG SANG’UK [KANG SANG WOOK], 
(m) b. 1935, physicist, North P’yongan Province: 
 We lived in many different towns and I attended many different schools, but it was 
always the same. Every morning of every school day, sun, rain, or snow, we began with an 
assembly on the school grounds for attendance and announcements. Every single day the 
principal gave a homily and we all bowed east toward Tokyo and the Emperor and shouted 
‘Tenno Heika Ban Zai’ – ‘Long Live the Emperor.’ About five or six times a year, on very 
exceptional occasions, they brought out a special scroll containing the Emperor’s proclamation. 
Two such days were December 8 for the Declaration of the Second World War, and in April for 
Education Day.  
 The principal stood in front of us on a podium. The vice principal brought out the scroll 
in its lacquer box, elegantly wrapped with the chrysanthemum seal of the Japanese Emperor. He 
held the box high above his bowed head, eyes averted, wearing white gloves so his hands would 
not even touch the box. The principal, also wearing white gloves, received the scroll and read it 
reverently, then returned it to the vice principal. All of us kids were supposed to bow our heads 
and not look upon the sacred words of the Emperor, but of course we peeked.  
 Each of these special days had its own speech and we had to memorize them in civics 
class. The proclamations, of course, were totally serious. Ch’in omoni (‘We the Emperor, 
consider’) wa ga (‘our’) k’o so k’o so (‘divine imperial ancestors’).  
 But kids, you. Know, are not the least bit impressed with speeches, and we made games 
out of them. We stood facing each other with great ceremony, arms crossed over our chest, 
intoning heavily ‘Ch’in omoni,’ throwing our arms wide to embrace the universe ‘waaaaa ga’ 
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and, surprise! One kid would quickly reach over and tickle the other under his outstretched arms 
‘k’o so k’o so, k’o so k’o so.’ Gales of laughter! 
 When I was about nine and in fourth grade, we lived in Kanggye and actually had 
japanese neighbors who also had fourth- and fifth-grade children, just like us. We became good 
friends, exchanged comic books, and went to each other’s birthday parties. On rainy days we’d 
play marbles, and then we found out that in their own Japanese schools the kids also poked fun at 
the Emperor’s speeches, but they, of course, didn’t dare do it in public. They even did some 
things we hadn’t thought of.”  
Excerpt 4, taken from pp. 117-118 
“PAKSONGP’IL,  
(m) b. 1917, farmer/fisherman, South Kyongsang Province: 
 I got beaten up many times by the Japanese because I resisted changing my name to 
Japanese. Everybody around me changed theirs, but I had lost my grandfather and then my 
father, and had taken over the responsibility of eldest son. That is why I tried not to change my 
name. But I got tired of being so badly beaten. 
 Out of desperation, I wrote to my aunt in Seoul, the one who had been arrested for the 
Independence demonstration. I asked her, should I do it? By return mail, she said, ‘Do you have 
two fathers? If you have two fathers, then change your name to the name of your Japanese 
father.’ She was furious! 
 So I held out a while longer, but I couldn’t stand any more persecution. I finally changed 
my name to Otake. The O in Chinese characters is Korean Tae, the first syllable of the place 
where I was born. The take, meaning bamboo, is for the huge bamboo grove behind our house. 




Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the 
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 
377-397. 
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 391-392 
 “As the Pacific war escalated, the Japanese stepped up their efforts to obliterate the 
colonial subjects’ collective Korean identity altogether.50 Governor-General Minami Jiro, who 
took office from 1936 to 1942, imposed new rules on the Koreans such as the obligatory 
recitation of the ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ (1937), the compulsory use of Japanese language 
(1938),51 and mandatory worship at Shinto Shrines (1939). Koreans were forced to recite the 
‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’, which included such phrases as: ‘We are the subjects of the Great 
Japanese Empire’ and  ‘We are fully loyal to the Emperor’. The ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ 
had to be recited not only in schools but also in public whenever the Koreans received food 
rations or purchased train tickets. Also, the Korean colonial subjects were forced to accept 
Japanese as the national language; while Japanese language programmes expanded and 
strengthened, limited Korean language courses that had been offered as elective in the schools 
were dropped altogether from the school curriculum by 1938.52 It should also be noted that 
despite the fact that graduation from Japanese public schools was a prerequisite for economic 
advancement, Koreans continued to patronise, in large numbers, private schools run by Koreans 
or by Western missionaries.53 But near  the end of the war many such schools were forcibly 
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closed down,  and in the surviving schools  the Korean teachers were replaced by Japanese 
counterparts. 
The  most  egregious  example  of  the  assimilation  policy  is  the  ‘Name Change Order’ 
issued in February 1940 by which Koreans were forced to take Japanese names within six 
months  of  the proclamation.54 Those Koreans who retained their Korean names were not  
allowed  to enroll at  school, were refused service at government offices, and were excluded from 
the lists for food rations and other supplies. Faced with such compulsion, many Koreans ended 
up complying with the Name Change Order. Such a radical policy was deemed to be 
symbolically significant in the war effort, binding the fate of the colony with that of the empire. 
Under the General Mobilisation Order, the education sector in colonial Korea was 
transformed to meet the needs of the changing situation. The 1938 Educational Ordinance set 
forth three agendas: ‘clarifying the national polity’ (kokutai meijing), ‘Japan and Korea as one 
body’ (naisen ittai), and ‘growing stronger by overcoming hardship’ (ninku danren).55 These 
were  unequivocally expressed in the ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ that the Japanese forced 
students to memorise and recite daily in unison in all the schools.56 
 
50 Kada Tetsuji, Shokumin seisaku [Colonial Policy] (Tokyo: Daiamondo sha, 1942). Such an 
openly declared assimilation policy of the Chosen Shotokufu is displayed exhaustively in 
Tetsuji’s work. 
51 Sawayanagi Masataro, Chosen kyoiku wa Nihongo fukyu ni zenryoku o keichu subeshi 
[Korea’s Education should Concert its Efforts to Adopt Japanese], in Sawayanagi masataro 
zenshu [Sawayanagi Masataro papers series], vol. 8 (Tokyo: Kokudosha, 1976).   The 
justification by the colonial authorities for the forced use of the Japanese language in schools is 
documented in Masataro’s papers. 
52 Kamihara Noboru, Komin shinmin ikusei no genjyo [The Present State of Bringing Up 
Imperial Subjects] in Chosen (Showa, 1939), 39–48 
53 Patricia E. Tsurumi, “Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan,” in The Japanese Colonial 
Empire, 1895–1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peatti (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 275–311. An overview of the Koreans’ attitude toward the colonial 
education sector can be found in Tsurumi’s article.  
54 Naoki Mizuno, “Chosenjin no namae to shokuminchi shihai,” [Names of Koreans and 
Colonial Rule] in Seikatsu no naka no shokuminchi-shugi, [Amidst Life in the Colonial Era] ed. 
Naoki Mizuno (Kyoto:  Jimbun Shoin, 2004), 35–77.  Until the late 1930s, Koreans were not 
allowed to have Japanese names even if they chose to, as the colonial authorities preferred to be 
able to distinguish the heritage of its citizens by their names on paper. The drastic change in 
policy was intended to dismantle the traditional Korean family structure and at the same time to 
accelerate the assimilation process with the escalation of war. 
55 Chosen sotokuhu kanho, gogai [Chosun Government-General Official Gazette, Extra Edition] 
(March 4, 1938), 2. 
56 Takahashi Hamakichi, Shinkyoikurei ni yoru gakko, gakkyu, kyoka no keiei [Administration of  
School, Class, and Curriculum in Accordance with the New Education Edict] (Keijo: Chosen 
tosho shuppan kabushikigaisya, 1939).” 
 
Source E: 
Ryu, D.Y. (2016). Missionaries and imperial cult: politics of the Shinto shrine rites controversy 
in colonial Korea. Diplomatic History, 40(4), 606-634.  
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Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 608-609 
“The purpose of State Shinto was to unify the Japanese people ‘in a single cult’ with the 
emperor as head priest, and to have them worship his ancestors and the illustrious dead as 
national deities.7 All the Shinto shrines were assigned an official rank within the single hierarchy, 
with Ise Jingu (Grand Shrine), dedicated to sun-goddess Amaterasu, the mythic ancestor of the 
emperors, at the top. All the people of Japan at birth were organized to be parishioners of local 
shrines, and  each household was to install taima, or the ‘divided spirit,’ of the Ise deities in its 
house altar,  thereby becoming a branch of Ise Grand Shrine.8 State Shinto proved effective in 
instilling a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the emperor. It is natural therefore that the Japanese 
rulers erected Shinto shrines in its occupied territories both to promote loyalty to the emperor 
and symbolize the subjugation of the population. In 1925 the Japanese built a jingu, the highest 
in the shrine hierarchy, in Seoul as ‘the great source of transplanting the national manners’ and 
made it the sanctuary of Amaterasu and Emperor Meiji (Figure1).9 Under the umbrella of Chosen 
(Korea) Jingu in Seoul,  about 1,140 Shinto shrines had been erected throughout the Korean 
peninsula by the end of the colonial regime in 1945. 
 
7 Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State,1868-1988 (Princeton, NJ,1989), 33. 
8Ibid., 28-29. 
9 Letter from Hasegawa Yoshimichi to Hara Dakashi, December 16, 1918, Japan Center for 
Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan (hereafter NAJ), available online at http:// 
www.jacar.go.jp/DAS/meta/image_A01200173500, last accessed on April 23, 2015 [in 
Japanese]. 
10 Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 33, 37-39. 
11 Masao Maruyama, The Idea and Behaviour of Modern Politics (Tokyo, 1964), 32 [in 
Japanese]. Many western scholars, unlike their Japanese and Korean counterparts, are reluctant 
to use ‘fascism’ in describing Imperial Japan. For an overview of the discussion of the issue, see 
Marcus Willensky, ‘Japanese Fascism Revisited,’ Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5 
(Winter 2005): 58-77.” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 611-613 
“However, as Japan prepared to invade mainland China, Japanese militarists and 
ultranationalists had been instilling a war psychology and demanding unconditional loyalty. In 
early 1935, royalists in the Japanese government and military launched the movement for ‘the 
Clarification of the National Essence,’ an ultra-nationalist campaign to mobilize the nation under 
the emperor’s supreme authority. The ‘national essence’ (kokutai) meant the theocratic ideal that 
the emperor ‘rules eternally according to the divine oracle of the imperial ancestors.’20 They 
condemned the idea that the emperor was a constitutional entity who should exercise his 
sovereignty legally, and depicted him as a  supra-legal god-man who commanded absolute  
loyalty. In the wave of nationalistic-militarist fervor, the movement to build Shinto shrines and 
the demand to attend the Shinto rites intensified throughout Japan and its occupied territories 
(Figure2).21 
The effect of this excitement was even more keenly felt in colonies than in Japan proper. 
No wonder, then, that an unmistakable change in the Japanese colonial officials’ attitude came in 
the fall of 1935. In September1935, the Government-General ordered provincial governors to 
require all students to attend shrine exercises; governors had little choice but to comply.22This 
insistence upon attendance accompanied a change in the nature of shrine ceremonies that 
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Christian students had to attend. To this point, the ceremonies that they were urged to attend had 
been memorial services in honor of the war dead. Now, they were ordered to participate in the 
Shinto shrine rites and perform obeisance to the kami or spirits residing there. Missionaries, in 
their capacity as school principals were ordered to go to State Shinto shrines. Since all State 
Shinto shrines were branches of a single imperial cult, a refusal to do obeisance at Shinto shrines 
or any question about the appropriateness of the rites was considered lèse-majesté. Any 
unyielding Korean should expect imprisonment and brutal punishment, and any uncompromising 
missionary was likely to be deported. 
The loyalty of the occupied population was always a matter of concern, and the patriotic 
ceremonies could be used both to enhance patriotism and to ferret out any malcontents. 
Moreover, the mission schools were far more influential in Korea than in Japan.  The 
missionaries had founded dozens of middle schools, and Korean Christians, under their 
guidance, had established hundreds of primary schools, long before the Japanese took control of 
Korea. Such schools were among the earliest modern educational institutions for Koreans. In 
1923, thirteen years after the annexation, 58,017 Korean children were attending 920 church 
primary schools and 7,816 students were studying at 54 secondary mission schools.23 In 
comparison, the Japanese government had established a complete public school system in Japan 
proper; there were only a handful of Christian schools that ‘might  be  left  out  of  account.’24 
Therefore, one can understand why the colonial authorities in Korea, under pressure from 
militarists, Shinto royalists, and the nationalistic Japanese press in Korea, came to insist on 
missionary students’ obeisance to Shinto. 
The missionary schools under the auspices of the American Northern Presbyterian 
Mission, and especially those in Pyongyang, became the points of collision as the imperial cult 
intensified. There were several reasons for that confrontation. First, the Korean students were the 
main target of assimilation policy and patriotic indoctrination. The Japanese wanted to Japanize 
Korea by making the Koreans loyal Japanese, but they found it extremely difficult to change the 
mind and attitude of the adults. Thus they wanted the younger generation of Koreans to have an 
intellectual comprehension of the need for the union of the two nations and to see their 
responsibility as Japanese subjects. The worship of Japanese gods was ‘the most important 
feature’ in the assimilationist campaign.25 This meant that the worship of the imperial ancestors 
was, according to a Japanese official, ‘the basis of moral virtue’ of Japan and hence ‘must be 
inculcated in the minds of all the students.’26 Therefore, Japanese authorities made imperial 
worship a required part of the curriculum, and kept a watchful eye on the Shinto observation of 
Korean students. 
 
21 For legislative and administrative efforts to build Shinto shrines in Korea, see Society of 
Shinto Services in Korea, ed., Collection of Shinto-Related Laws and Regulations ([Seoul], 
1937), 286, 288, 336 [in Japanese]; “On the Revision of the Shinto System in Korea,” 
Maeilsinbo, August 2, 1936 [in Korean]; Seung-Tae Kim, “Shinto in Colonial Korea,” 30-31. 
22 Letter from William R. Langdon to Edwin L. Neville, December 10, 1935 (395.1163/21), 
101, EMSC, RG 59, NARA. 
23 Horace H. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea (New York, 1926), 102, 105. 
24 The citation is from the reply of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in the Government-
General to an American mission board, quoted in Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, 200. 
25 Letter from Hasegawa Yoshimichi to Hara Dakashi, December 16, 1918, NAJ. See also “Vice 
Governor-General’s Instruction at the Governors’ Meeting,” in The Complete Collection of 
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Proclamations, Instructions, and Statements, ed. Department of Official Documents (Seoul, 
1941), 137-38 [in Japanese]. 
26 “Statement of the Educational Bureau of the Government-General ,” December 30, 1935, 




Unit 3, Lesson 2 
Objectives:  
• SWBAT understand, evaluate, and synthesize the varying ways Koreans identified 
with the Japanese empire during World War II. 
• SWBAT compare, evaluate, and reconcile potentially conflicting views and 
experiences. This includes both historians’ interpretations and the views of people 
who experienced the events studied. 
Standards: 
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and 
the colonized.”  
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an 
examination of the credibility of each source.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
Lesson compelling question: How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the 
Japanese empire?  
Hook (5-10 minutes): 
• Review (5-10 minutes): The teacher will begin class by reviewing the previous 
night’s homework with students. The teacher will verbally review MOTU analysis for 
each assigned source with students. The teacher will begin with source A, and prompt 
a different student to respond with his or her answers for each category of MOTU. 
The teacher will do the same for source B. As the teacher reviews, students should 
have their completed MOTU analyses in front of them (physical or digital) to check 
their work and add notes if necessary. Once the teacher has reviewed both featured 
sources for the lesson, he or she will move on to the body.  
Body (35 minutes):  
• Writing for understanding (20 minutes): Students will receive 20 minutes to 
individually construct a short essay length response to the lesson compelling 
question: How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the Japanese 
empire? Student answers should be approximately 300-500 words. Depending on the 
classroom, students may type this in a Google or Word Document and submit it 
digitally via an online LMS. Alternatively, students may write this out by hand. The 
teacher should provide paper for students to write on if this option is chosen. In their 
responses, students should specifically address how they think Koreans identified 
before the war, and how that changed (if they think it did) during the war. Students 
should explain their reasoning and cite specific evidence from the lesson featured 
sources in their responses. When finished, the completed short essays should be 
turned into the teacher (either digitally or physically). 
• Small group simulation/analogy (15 minutes): After students complete their short 
essays, the teacher will split the class into small groups of 2-3 people. Group 
members will debate whether they would identify with the Japanese empire or with 
an independent Korea if they were ethnic Koreans living in Korea during this time 
period. Groups will receive 6 minutes for each group member to share his or her 
individual argument. Group members should cite specific evidence from the sources 
and may reference any material or concepts from previous lessons or units. Groups 
will then receive 4 minutes to decide on a consensus to share with the class. The 
teacher should verbally alert the class when each of these time stamps has passed.  
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• After the first 10 minute section of the activity is over, groups will share out with the 
class. One person from each group will share his or her group’s consensus on how 
they would identify if they were an ethnic Korean living in Korea during this time 
period. Each group should receive a chance to share. Group spokespeople should cite 
specific evidence from the lesson sources and may reference any material or concepts 
from previous lessons and units as appropriate. If they do not do so, the teacher 
should prompt students to cite evidence and explain their group’s reasoning.  
Closure (5 minutes): 
• Exit ticket: The students will complete an exit ticket, answering the lesson 
compelling question: How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the 
Japanese empire? Students may complete this either digitally through an online LMS 
or physically by writing answers on a piece of paper. Students’ answers should be 
approximately 2-3 sentences in length. 
• Assigning homework/previewing next lesson: The teacher will also assign 
homework for the following day. Students should read/view all of the featured 
sources for lesson 3. Students should analyze them using the MOTU framework and 
record their answers. The teacher will tell students that they will be participating in a 





Kim, M. (2007). The aesthetics of total mobilisation in the visual culture of late colonial Korea. 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8(3-4), 483-502.  
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 486: 
“The maturation of the Korean publishing industry took place a time when the outbreak 
of war in the mainland would have a profound impact on the Korean peninsula. In Japan, World 
War II is often called the Pacific War or the Fifteen Year War, because the hostilities began with 
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. The establishment of the puppet state 
Manchukuo in 1932 by the Japanese initially elicited a wide range of reactions from Korean 
intellectuals. While some leading Koreans from the beginning supported the Japanese military 
expansion, there was also a sense that a protracted war between Japan and China could 
eventually lead to Korean independence. Yet, as Han To-yn and Kim Chae-yong suggests, an 
important turning point in moving Korean intellectuals towards active collaboration with the 
Japanese empire may have been the collapse of key Chinese cities in late 1938.11 When Paek 
Ch’ol (1908–85), one of the most renowned literary critics of the colonial period, heard about the 
news and saw photographs of the rapid fall of Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing, 
he exclaimed, ‘My body trembled from excitement as our horizon suddenly became refreshingly 
clear’, and he argued that Korean intellectuals who were critical of this event were being far too 
shortsighted. Paek further remarked, ‘We may disregard everything else, but just the fact that the 
feudal castle gates have collapsed gives this event more than enough historical significance – 
since it’s already a  crumbling  castle  gate, the faster it falls the quicker history will  progress’.12 
This sense that Japan’s stunning successes in China signified the emergence of a new East Asian 
world order would convince many Koreans that resistance was ultimately futile. Instead of being 
critics of the colonial state, increasing numbers of colonial intellectuals became active supporters 
of 
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Japan’s effort to build a New Order in East Asia. 
 The war on the mainland would have a major impact on colonial publications starting 
with the first outbreak of hostilities in the early 1930s. Even though print production steadily 
grew throughout the 1930s, strict censorship continued to limit expression and the relatively 
liberal period of the 1920s would quickly come to an end. The second outbreak of hostilities in 
1937 further transformed the peninsula and inaugurated the total mobilisation of the colonial 
population for the war effort.13 Increasing paper shortages and wartime censorship policies 
forced the closure in 1940 of the two major privately owned vernacular language newspapers, 
the Choson ilbo and the Tonga ilbo. The considerable diversity of publications that could be 
found throughout the 1920s and 1930s would disappear all together in the early 1940s. Only a 
few vernacular journals and the Maeil sinbo newspaper, which was the official organ of the 
colonial state, would continue to publish until the end of the war in 1945. However, despite the 
contraction in the number of publications, the volume of production in the 1940s continued to be 
significant and some titles recorded circulation figures that far exceeded those that could be 
found in previous decades. 
11 Han To-yon and Kim Chae-yong, “Ch’inil munhagwa kundaesong” (Collaborator Literature 
and Modernity), in Kim et al., Ch’inilmunhakui naejok nolli (The internal logic of collaborator 
fiction) (Seoul: Yokrak, 2003), p.36 
12 Paek Ch’ol, “Sidaejok unyonui suri” (Accepting the circumstances of the age), Choson ilbo 
(2–7 December 1938), cited in Han To-yon and Kim Chae-yong, “Ch’inil munhagwa 
kundaesong” (Collaborator literature and modernity), p.37. 
13 The Japanese colonial administration began to mobilise the Korean population for its expanded 
war effort with the passage of the Kukkach’ongdongwonbop or the National General 
Mobilisation Law in 1938 and intensified the process of assimilating Koreans into the Japanese 
empire. For more on the mobilization of Koreans during the late colonial period see Carter J. 
Eckert, “Total War, Industrialisation, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea”, in Peter Duus, 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 3-39; Ch’oe Yu-ri, Ilche malgi sikminji 
chibaejongch’aegyon’gu (Research on late colonial policies of control) (Seoul: 
Kukhakcharyowon, 1997).” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 487-88 
“One frequent theme in late colonial visual culture is the appearance of maps and 
images that portray the expansion of the Japanese empire and Japan’s progress in waging the 
Pacific War. What may be particularly noteworthy is that maps of Korea and Japan often show 
the two countries as one contiguous geopolitical entity and distinguished from the rest of the 
Japanese empire. Examples include the December 1942 cover of The Light of the Peninsula that 
shows a young school-boy examining a map of East Asia and the October 1942 cover of The 
Light of Korea that shows a close-up of the northern border. In both cases, Korea and Japan are 
the same colour red and distinguished from the rest of the map.18 Such maps encouraged the idea 
that Koreans and Japanese belong to the same contiguous nation, despite the obvious disparities 
that existed between the colony and the metropole. Maps and images of Manchuria occupied an 
especially prominent position in late colonial publications, and they drew attention to the 
‘northern frontier’ as a space to be defended for the security of the peninsula as well as a site of 
economic opportunity for Koreans. The Japanese expansion into Manchuria coincided with the 
large-scale immigration of Koreans, who numbered approximately one million in 1930 and 1.5 
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million in 1945.19 Manchuria would provide a new start for displaced Koreans, especially tenant 
farmers forced off their land with the consolidation of agricultural land into large land holdings. 
18 Pandojigwang (The light of the peninsula) (December 1942); Chogwang (The light of Korea) 
(October 1942). 
19 For more on Korean migration to Manchuria see Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One Bed: 
Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2005).” 
 
Excerpt 3, taken from p. 489-492 
“The reconfiguration of the geopolitical space under Japanese rule was not the only 
change depicted in the visual culture of colonial Korea. Colonial ideologues placed considerable 
effort in reinventing the colonial subject into an individual who was fully capable of meeting the 
demands of the empire. The reshaping of colonial subjectivities and notions of beauty took place 
at the most fundamental level with new aesthetics for appreciating the body. Working men were 
often drawn shirtless and in muscular form, such as in the October 1941 edition of New Era (Fig. 
2).27 
 These images projected a sense of virility and masculinity. Perhaps more significantly, 
they portrayed the common workers as powerful individuals who had the capacity to build an 
empire. Men were also shown exercising in military drills and presented in a dynamic and 
forceful manner, such as the hundreds of prone exercising men on the August 1943 cover of The 
Light of Korea and the hundreds of shirtless men shown exercising in the photo insert of the 
same issue.28 This focus on depicting strong and healthy men was juxtaposed in the colonial 
media with the images of Korean men lined up for health inspections by the colonial 
authorities.29 In many ways,  these pictures of the Japanese colonisers measuring the health and 
determining the ‘fitness’ of their Korean subjects to serve the Japanese empire sent the message 
that Korean men must strengthen and beautify their bodies to meet the criteria of the Japanese to 
become ‘First Class  Imperial Citizens’. While Korean men were encouraged to work in factories 
and mines to 
serve the empire, the ultimate model for emulation was the military man dressed in full military 
gear. Pictures of soldiers often showed them fully equipped and standing guard ready to defend 
the nation. A common theme in the visual culture of late colonial Korea is that of a fully dressed 
soldier standing in stark contrast next to his traditionally dressed family.30 Such symbolic 
contrasts between  the generations reinforced the message that the soldier represents the New 
Man who belongs to a new generation of Koreans who had refashioned their identities to 
dedicate themselves to the wellbeing of the nation. 
 The men were not the only colonial subjects who underwent a transformation within the 
colonial media, for there were also a number of new strategies for portraying women. Korean 
women had a dual mission in the late colonial period. While women maintained their traditional 
role of homemakers, they were also encouraged to labour in the factories for the war effort. The 
traditional role of women, such as taking care of the children and the home, continued to appear 
frequently in the colonial media. In that sense, the traditional ways of appreciating the beauty 
and purity of women did not disappear. Yet the visual representations of traditional woman in 
late colonial Korea often portrayed them waving Japanese flags (Fig.  3)  or saving money for the 
war 
effort. Thus, the existing symbols of female femininity may have been retained, but a new layer 
of wartime symbols was fused into the images. The women of late colonial Korea were also 
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represented in non-traditional roles, such as factory workers and military nurses. These working 
women were presented in dynamic ways that underlined their important duties as individuals 
who could meet both the demands of the family and the state. 
27Sinsidae (New era) (October 1941). 
28Chogwang (The light of Korea) (November 1943). 
29One example is a photograph of a physical examination for naval recruiting where bodies are 
being measured for fitness in the October 1943 issue of The Light of Korea. 
30Chogwang (The light of Korea) (November 1943).”  
 
Excerpt 4, taken from pp. 494-495 
The Japanese army began to accept volunteer Koreans in 1938 soon after the outbreak of 
the Second Sino-Japanese War, and in May 1942 they announced that the conscription of Korean  
soldiers would begin in 1944.33 The start of the compulsory draft in Korea triggered numerous  
outpourings of ‘gratitude’ for allowing Koreans to enter the Japanese Army, and large public 
ceremonies were held to celebrate the event. A wide variety of visual images were utilised to 
mobilise support for the conscription of Koreans. The Maeil sinbo carried a series of 
advertisements during the summer of 1943 under the caption ‘I will accept your call’. The 
drawings depict many of the themes that were common during the late colonial period, such as a 
young Korean soldier standing next to his traditionally dressed parents on 6 August 1943 and an 
image of a marching soldier with full military gear on 4 August 1943. The photomontages that 
show large enthusiastic crowds cheering the departing troops were frequently deployed to 
mobilise 
Koreans. A two-page pictorial in the September 1943 edition of The Light of the Peninsula is 
entitled, ‘The Glorious Morning when the Army’s Gates of Honor Opened’.34 The caption raves 
about the honour that has been bestowed upon the Korean  people,  because  Korean  men  were  
now  considered  full  members  of  the Japanese military, which further implied that Koreans 
would be treated just like the Japanese once they passed through the threshold of the ‘Gates of 
Honor’.35 The portal imagery can again be found in The Light of Korea in the slogan, ‘From 
the school gates to the army gates’.36 In essence, the public spectacles thatcelebrated the opening 
of the gates to the military served as a metaphorical rite of passage that colonial subjects had to 
go through to become fully formed modern subjects in the eyes of the colonisers. 
While the mass gatherings in support of the military draft dominated the public lives of 
Koreans, the visual images of the late colonial period also portrayed the transformation of their 
individual private lives. The colonial state attempted to control the domestic realm of its subjects 
by portraying individuals who showed loyalty to the empire and welcomed the militarisation of 
colonial society. Representations of everyday life became permeated by the symbols of the 
Japanese empire, such as a baby holding a toy warplane emblazoned with a Japanese flag 
on the cover of the March 1942 issue of The Light of the Peninsula.37The invasion of the 
everyday by the symbolic reminders of the colonial state served to normalize the totalitarian 
culture of the late colonial period and urged Koreans to show patriotism for the nation, even 
though it had been absorbed into the larger Japanese empire. The children in particular became 
the objects of colonial propaganda, for one frequent theme among late colonial publications was 
that of children playing with a toy airplane juxtaposed with photographs of warplanes flying 
overhead.38 Pictures of soldiers interacting with children or farm women looking up at passing 
warplanes are yet more examples of how the symbols of the empire’s military expansion became 
portrayed as a normal  part of the daily routine of Koreans.39 Thus, the Japanese empire 
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attempted to dominate almost every aspect of the lives of its colonial subjects, and the wartime 
mobilisation of the population encouraged the reinvention of both public and private life in late 
colonial Korea. 
33 Korean volunteers began to be accepted into the Japanese army after February 22, 1938. The 
numbers enlisted remained started in the hundreds but eventually reached 6300 by 1943. Tens of 
thousands of Koreans were drafted once conscription started in September 1944. Yet few 
Koreans were actually sent to the warfront before Japan’s surrender on August 1945 because of 
the length of time required to train new recruits. Miyata Setsuko, Chosonminjunggwa 
hwangminhwa chongch’aek (The Korean people and policies to create ‘imperial citizens’), trans. 
Yi Hyong-nam (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1997), pp. 42, 154-7. 
34 Pandojigwang (The light of the peninsula) (September 1943). 
35 The institution of military conscription led to increased calls for allowing Koreans the voting 
franchise, for Koreans argued that they now paid both regular taxes and the ‘blood tax’. For more 
on the relationship between military conscription and calls for equality among Korean 
collaborators see Miyata Setsuko, Chosonminjunggwa hwangminhwa chongch’aek. A law was 
passed in April 1945 that granted the vote to Korean colonial subjects, but it was never 
implemented before the end of the war. Even had the law been instituted, the property 
restrictions would have given the vote to approximately 2.3% of Koreans. Ch’oe Yu-ri, Ilche 
malgi sikminji chibaejongch’aegyon’gu (Research on late colonial policies of control), p. 245.  
36 Chogwang (The light of Korea) (December 1943). 
37 Pandojigwang (The light of the peninsula) (March 1942). 
38 Pandojigwang (Light of the peninsula) (September 1943); Sinsidae (New Generation) 
(November 1941). 




Caprio, M. (2009). Korean critiques of Japanese assimilation policy. In Japanese assimilation 
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp. 171-187). University of Washington Press.  
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 173: 
 “The Japanese (and Koreans) recognized the 1931 Manchurian Incident as being 
instrumental in changing Korean perceptions toward Japanese rule. A number of changes 
accompanied this event. Japan’s expansion onto the Asian continent increased Korean economic 
opportunity both in Korea and in Manchuria as the government-general placed stronger emphasis 
on industry. Increased opportunity, along with stronger assimilation rhetoric, encouraged 
Koreans to consider their ethnic (Korean) identity in a broader racial (Asian or ‘yellow’) context. 
The present Korean government investigation into the ‘pro-Japanese’ actions of these Koreans 
condemns those it identifies to be ‘pro-Japanese’ Koreans for their traitorous actions to the 
Korean state and people: rather than join other Koreans in the fight for Korean liberation, these 
Koreans profited from Japanese colonial rule. Contributors to this discussion must consider the 
circumstances under which all Koreans made their life choices. With the world quickly moving 
toward war, did it make more sense for Korea to seek independence or to seek autonomy within 
the context of a greater East Asian alliance?” 
 
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 188: 
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 “From 1937, war escalation forced the government-general to once again reevaluate its 
Korean policy. The review of the Naisen ittai-strengthening document gave Koreans another 
example to critique Japanese assimilation policy. Discussion meetings held behind closed doors 
empowered the Koreans in attendance to voice their opinions rather bluntly, and many directly 
challenged Japanese policy for failing to live up to its hype. The twelve Korean participants 
selected by the government-general were among the Japanese administration’s most trusted 
Korean allies, people who had staked their future and their reputation on Japan maintaining long-
term control over the Korean Peninsula. To them, Korean independence represented the worst 
possible scenario. Rather, Korean liberation from their traditional roots, and Japanese recognition 
of Koreans as imperial subjects, constituted the scenario that would best secure their fortunes and 
dignity. Carter J. Eckert describes these Koreans as individuals who ‘had to abandon whatever 
nationalist aspirations they might once have had and were ready to embrace a new Japanese 
order that left no room for the expression of a separate Korean identity.’60 
60Eckert, Offspring of Empire, 241.” 
 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 190-191 
“Yi also redirected the assimilation problem from Korean involvement to Japanese 
recognition of Korean inclusion. The government-general’s Counterplan Proposal had focused 
on improving Korean understanding but offered little in the way of instructing the Japanese 
people on Korea’s place in the empire. The Japanese, too, needed to be better informed. Yi began 
by making the extraordinary claim that ‘there was not a single Korean who did not agree with, or 
welcome, Naisen ittai,’ before adding the conditional caveat: ‘If this means that [Koreans] will 
be at the same level as Japanese (Naichi to onaji teido) then they will not run to communism or 
nationalism.’ He continued: ‘What about the Japanese? Naturally, there are many who embrace 
Naisen ittai, but there are others who disagree with it. Some feel that it would not work, while 
others feel troubled that Koreans and Japanese were to be considered as equals.’ He explained:  
I have traveled here and there in Japan, and save for the minority of those who travel 
frequently to Korea, the majority of Japanese have not the slightest idea about what 
Korea is. Some believe that because they have been to Korea a while back they know the 
country. Some are talking about a time twenty years ago. They may know Korea of 
twenty years ago but they do not know contemporary Korea.... It is important for 
Japanese to understand Korea’s present situation, the present state of the Korean people, 
and the value of the Korean Peninsula to the Japanese Empire. 
 
He also cautioned that the Japanese have to come to accept Koreans as their ethnic 
brothers: people can go around saying Naisen ittai! Naisen ittai, but if they respond to Korean 
efforts to identify themselves as Japanese by refusing to accept them as such then people ‘will go 
about as they like’(kattei ni suru).65 
65Ibid., 365–67. See also Eckert, Offspring of Empire, 240.” 
 
Excerpt 4, taken from pp. 193-194 
 “Hyŏn Yŏngsŏp’s The Path That the Koreans Must Take represents one of the more 
comprehensive efforts by a Korean to demonstrate support for Japan’s assimilation plan. The 
book, first published in 1938, apparently enjoyed success. By 1940 it had already reached its 
twelfth printing. Hyŏn’s motivation was to delineate reasons why the Koreans must change: to 
narrow the gap separating the deprived Korean and the advanced Japanese. He then prescribed a 
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remedy: the actions that Koreans must take to become ‘complete imperial subjects.’74 Hyŏn, who 
acknowledged his thoughts to be a result of his quest for truth that led him to read widely in 
Marxist, anarchist, and nationalist thought during his school days, became attracted to Japanese 
group-centeredness (over individualism) upon arriving in Tokyo. He now described himself as 
‘one Japanese national’ (Nihon kokumin nohitori) who felt a heavy concern for the people of his 
birthplace. Since the1937 China Incident, he explained, the term Naisen ittai had injected 
optimism within the Korean population. However, optimism alone will not bring this union; 
much work needed to be done. He saw his book as his contribution toward helping Koreans 
understand their responsibilities.75 
He began his monograph by describing the historical significance of what he termed 
Korea’s ‘Meiji Restoration’—the Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula. Hyŏn’s 
summary of pre-annexation Korean history proved harsher (but just as misinformed) than that 
offered by the Japanese: Korean history before 1910 was ‘hell’: it had passed through a ‘dark 
history’ as a ‘colony’ under the Han Chinese; its culture did not even begin until the Three 
Kingdoms period; unlike Tokugawa Japan, Korea had never developed a popular culture. 
74Hyŏn, Chōsenjin no susumu beki michi, 18. 
75Ibid., 1–4.” 
 
Excerpt 5, taken from pp. 195-196 
 “This path must begin, Hyŏn explained, with Koreans coming to understand the 
Japanese. They must first realize the ‘majestic existence’ (genzen tosonzai shiteiru) of Japanese 
culture that synthesized different cultures. They must endeavor to ‘become Japanese’ (as he had). 
That is, they must ‘shed the Chinese kanbun culture and widely accept Japanese culture.’80 This 
was but the first step leading Koreans toward becoming ‘complete imperial subjects.’ Koreans 
must also recognize the ‘historic significance’ of annexation and ‘thank Japan’ for admitting 
their territory into its empire. Finally, the Korean people must recognize the ‘fate that the two 
peoples share [and] adopt a feeling of being Japanese.’ Like the Japanese, Hyŏn placed full 
responsibility on the Korean people embarking on this change. As Korea, he predicted, would 
never again return to the status of ‘independent country,’ it is Koreans’ responsibility to adopt 
the spirit of Japanese subjects (Nihon kokumin) if they wished to attain full political rights, be 
provided with compulsory education, participate in Japan’s military service, and gain freedom of 
residence. Koreans must ‘demonstrate their heightened respect and admiration for the emperor’ 
(by making pilgrimages to the homeland and to Ise and Meiji shrines), embrace the Japanese 
language as their own, and discard their more obvious signs of Korean-ness (such as Korean 
dress, cuisine, and housing).81 




Unit 3, Lesson 3 
Objectives: 
• SWBAT understand the multiple Japanese-inflicted atrocities that are the basis of 
modern tensions between the two countries. 
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and 
secondary sources. 
Standards:  
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and 
the colonized.”  
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an 
examination of the credibility of each source.” 
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.” 
Lesson compelling question: Was Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans justified? 
Hook: 
• Review (5 minutes): The teacher will verbally review the sources assigned for 
homework the previous night. As with previous lessons, the teacher will verbally 
review all components of MOTU for each source. Different students should provide 
verbal answers for each category of MOTU. The teacher may elect to randomly call 
on students. The teacher should ensure that all students have a strong comprehension 
and understanding of the sources in order to increase the chances of a fruitful Socratic 
seminar. 
Body (35 minutes): 
• Note on time: The Socratic seminar will consist of three ten-minute rounds. The extra 
five minutes is to allot for giving directions and allowing students to take notes in 
between rounds. 
• Socratic seminar (30 minutes):  
•  Students will arrange themselves in a horse-shoe/U-shaped pattern as much as 
possible. The teacher will verbally give students instructions for the activity. There 
will be three ten-minute rounds with one main question provided by the teacher for 
each round. However, if the conversation is especially fruitful in one topic, it can 
bleed over into the next round’s time. Students should have their MOTU analyses in 
front of them and the lesson sources easily accessible as well. The teacher will keep 
time, or can task a student with keeping time.  
• After directions are given and students are ready, the teacher will begin keeping time 
and pose the first question. It is: Was Japan’s wartime mobilization and use of 
Koreans a generally justified emergency measure, or should it have counted as war 
crimes? (Note: Japan was never prosecuted for any of its wartime use of Koreans. It 
was prosecuted for incidents such as the Nanking Massacre, but not the comfort 
women or forced labor of Koreans.)  
• As students provide responses, the teacher should use follow-up questions when 
necessary. The teacher should ask students to explain their reasoning, cite evidence, 
and even play devil’s advocate where appropriate.  
• After the first ten-minute round is over, the teacher will move onto the second and 
third. In between rounds, the teacher should give students a few minutes to take notes 
on the previous round. Students should note main points of the conversation as well 
as any arguments they found particularly interesting or compelling.  
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• The last two questions are as follows: 
o Should Japan formally apologize to Korea for the comfort women? Japan has 
made various statements “expressing regret” but has never issued a formal 
apology ratified by the Diet. Is this enough, or is a formal apology warranted?  
o Moreover, should Japan apologize to Korea for the entire occupation period? 
Similarly to the previous question, Japan has made statements “expressing regret” 
about this time period but never ratified a formal apology through the Diet. 
Students may draw upon knowledge from previous units for this question. Does 
the overall occupation period represent an offense serious enough to Koreans that 
such an apology is warranted? 
Closure (10 minutes):  
• Exit ticket/individual reflective writing (10 minutes): Students will receive ten 
minutes to construct a brief written response to the lesson compelling question: Was 
Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans justified? Students should cite evidence 
from the sources as well as incorporate discussion points from the Socratic seminar.  
Sources:  
Source A: 
Kang, H. (2001). The war effort. In Under the black umbrella: voices from colonial Korea, 
1910-1945 (pp. 130-138). Cornell University Press. 
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 131-132 
“SIN KWANGSONG, (m) b. 1915, farmer, North Kyongsang Province: 
 They drafted me to labor in early spring 1945. They just said, ‘You and you have to go.’ 
They sent me to work in a mine in Kyushu, Japan, but I got sick and they sent me back to my 
hometown. 
 When I regained my health, they drafted me again. This second time they sent me to a 
pipe factory in Saitama prefecture. People said, ‘Oh, it is so dangerous,’ but I found that it was 
not really so dangerous. Physically, I mean. They paid us a tiny, tiny salary. I sent it all home to 
my family. The mine where I was before had been safe, but at this Saitama factory there were 
many B-29 bombing raids. We had to quit working every time there was a raid and go into a 
bomb shelter. 
 They told us that the Americans had invented a new weapon and when the Americans 
invaded the mainland, we would all die gloriously. We made sharp bamboo spears so we could 
stab the Americans when they came.” 
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 134-135 
“KIM PONGSUK, (f) b. 1924, housewife, Kyonggi Province: 
 When I was about twenty, the local Neighborhood Association – the watchdog group, spy 
network, channel for government rules and dictates – came to verify my age and marital status.  
I had no choice but to acknowledge that I was young, single, and living at home. The next 
thing I knew, the local police came and summoned me to appear at the elementary school yard 
on a certain date. 
A lot of other girls got called also, all about the same age, and the Japanese told us that 
we would serve the Emperor and the great cause of the Japanese empire by becoming nurses and 
taking care of the Imperial Japanese soldiers. They told us that the pay would be very good and 
we would be well taken care of. Some girls were really very excited about doing this. 
We were to be sent to the front, but to do that we needed training. They gave each of us a 
wooden rifle and we had to practice. I kept thinking, I'm a woman. Why do I need this rifle? The 
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rifle had a pretend bayonet and we had to plunge it into a straw "person'' on the ground, again 
and again. 
I hated this! I didn't want to do it. My parents decided I should get married, and then I 
wouldn't have to go. So I obeyed my parents and got married, and it turned out to be a fortunate 
thing. Much later, I found out that the women who went overseas to the front were forced into 
being comfort women. Japanese called these Teishintai, meaning ''Volunteer Corps." 
I also know about them because my husband met many Korean women serving the 
soldiers in Manchuria when he was drafted into the Japanese army and sent to the front line. 
Being married helped me but it didn't help him. He was taken only a few months after our 
marriage. 
My husband, having just married me and missing me, and also seeing that these comfort 
women were Korean women of the same age as me, when his turn came to go in to them, his 
physical desire was there, but he kept thinking of me, and he didn't do it. The men lined up 
outside the barracks doors where the women were, and took their turn. The girl just lay there 
inside. Each man had a given amount of time, about seven minutes. If he wasn't out in time, the 
next man went right in and yanked him out. Each door had a long line of men waiting their turns. 
But when my husband's turn came, he just couldn't go in and do it. The woman, on the wall near 
her head, used chalk or a pencil to make a mark for each soldier she serviced. She thought she 
would be paid that way, but it turned out they were not paid anything at all. All this I heard from 
my husband in Manchuria.” 
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 137-138 
“CHIN MYONGHUI, (f) b. 1932, housewife, South Hamgyong Province: 
Things were all right until 1942, when I was in fifth grade. Our city of Wonsan was a 
harbor, so in the morning I had classes and in the afternoon for two hours, our whole school 
marched to the factory to can fish that were caught right there along the coast. The cannery was 
huge, with row upon row of building after building. They were supposed to dry the fish, but first 
the fish had to be pounded. So for two hours every afternoon, we had to go pound the fish. Kids 
carne to work from every school, boys and girls, from fifth grade up to middle school. It was hot 
and my arms ached, but we couldn't stop. In winter they couldn't dry the fish, so then, three times 
a week they sent us into the hills to collect pine tree sap. Year in and year out we did this – 1943, 
1944, 1945. When it rained, we learned how to give first aid and make bandages, and we 
practiced running to the air-raid shelter in the hill behind the school. Even the holes in the hill 
were dug by students, but not by me. I graduated from sixth grade in March 1945, and in April I 
entered a Methodist mission school. All the missionaries were gone by then, sent to prison 
camps. Here, after the morning assembly, there were no classes. We knew that the war in Europe 
was over, so just Japan was fighting-nobody could study. Again, we all trooped over to the 
factories to pound those awful fish.” 
 
Source B: 
Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the 
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 
377-397. 
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 390: 
“With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese authorities in Korea 
used the slogan ‘Japan and Korea as One Body (naisen ittai)’ as a rallying cry by which they 
accelerated and expanded the assimilation policy.47 Under the slogan, the duty of the Korean was 
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to ‘totally surrender the will to the Emperor, and serve in his name’.48 As Japan expanded the war 
throughout the Pacific, the Japanese authorities sought to control all aspects of civilian life by 
imposing the ‘wartime system’. By all accounts, the period known as Cultural Rule came to an 
end as all sectors of the colony were mobilised as part of the war effort.49 After 1937, the 
Japanese forcibly mobilised many Koreans to work in support of the war effort by promulgating 
a General Mobilisation Law and subsequently a National Conscription Ordinance in 1939. In the 
early phase of the war, large numbers of Koreans were put into menial jobs to relieve the 
Japanese men to join the army. Koreans were initially drafted into service called choyo (labour 
draft), which is essentially non-combat labour that involved assembly-line work and mining. As 
the prolonged war resulted in mounting casualties, the Japanese sought more men to fight. The 
Japanese implemented a colonial conscription system called chohei (military draft) near the end 
of the war and drafted about 200,000 young Korean men to fight alongside the Japanese. 
48 Kodawau Yusaku, Kokoku shinmin taruno chigaku no dettei suru chosen kyoikurei n gaisetsu 
yori [An Analysis of the Chosun Education Edict from the Perspective of Imperial Subjects’ 
Self-consciousness and Resistance], in Bunkyo no Chosen, March Edition (1938). 
49 Takada Kunihiko, Kodo kyoiku no genre [The Principles of Education in the Imperial Way], in 
Bunkyo no chosen, October & November Edition (1938). A good example of the changing role 
of education from colony building to wartime support can be found in Kunihiko’s article where 
he exhorts the raison d’être of education to be that which serves the immediate needs of the 
empire.” 
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 392 
“The fourth and final Educational Ordinance promulgated by the colonial authorities in 
1943 was in fact an extension of the ‘Ordinance of Wartime Emergency Measures on 
Education’.57 The emergency measures that were outlined had to do with how the school’s social 
function had evidently changed with the war. In so far as schools in the colony needed to justify 
their existence in times of total war, they were forced to become commissary bases for the war 
effort. Both individual and social activities that could not demonstrate their usefulness and 
practicality in the war effort were considered to be hindrances. In the schools, a fixed daily 
routine began with the recitation of the ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ followed by long hours of 
physical labour as part of the war effort. Such practices reduced the individual student to a cog in 
the imperial war machine. 
In fact, the Japanese forced some 4500 technical college and university students into 
uniform through a ‘student volunteer system’ implemented in 1943. They were forced to 
volunteer as ‘student soldiers’ (gakuto hei) and fight alongside regular soldiers.58 Furthermore, 
technical colleges and secondary school students were consistently mobilised as labour for all 
kinds of public work projects. Even elementary school students were mobilised in the 
construction of military facilities. In short, the schools in the colony during this period came to 
resemble a garrison and a training ground for the soldiers of the empire. 
57 Rangi Hisao, Chosen shokuminchi kyoiku no tenkai to chosen minzoku no teiko  –  chosen 
kyoikurei wo chushin toshite [The Development of Colonial Education in Chosun and the 
Resistance by the People of Chosun – With a Focus on the Chosun Education Edicts], in Sekai 
kyoikushi kenkyukai:  Sekai kyoikushi taikei 5  –  chosen kyoikushi [Society  for  Research  on 
World Education History: A Genealogy of World Education History 5 – History of Education in  
Chosun]  (Tokyo:  Kodansha,  1975).  Hisao argues that at each phase of the four education 
edicts, the Japanese colonial authorities were met by local resistance. 
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58 Ben-Ami Shillony, “Universities and Students in Wartime Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies 45, 
no. 4 (1986):  769–87.  According to Shillony, idealistic patriotism among Japanese students at 
the height of war prompted them to regard dying as soldiers as a noble duty.” 
 
Source C: 
Asian Boss. (2018, October 27). Life as a “comfort woman”: story of Kim Bok-Dong, stay 
curious #9 [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/qsT97ax_Xb0.  
 
The relevant clip is from 0:00-10:56. Please note that this video contains a living (at the time of 
the interview) comfort woman survivor sharing an oral history of her experiences. It contains 
content which may be difficult and uncomfortable for students to view. Please use discretion in 
determining how to utilize this in your classroom. Issuing a content/trigger warning and allowing 
students to opt out of viewing the video may be appropriate.  
 
Source D: 
The 2nd Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion “Regulation for the use of Comfort 
Stations” March 1938, Shiryoshusei, Vol. II, pp. 351-358, quoted in  
Asian Women’s Fund. (n.d.). The life in comfort stations. Asian Women’s Fund. 
https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts-09.html.  
 
Document originally in Japanese, English translation from Asian Women’s Fund 
“Chapter IX   Regulations for the Use of Comfort Stations 
 
Clause 59   Basic Principle 
To help to enforce military discipline by providing ways for relaxation and comfort 
Clause 60   Facilities 
Comfort stations are set up inside the south walls of Nikka Hall… 
Visiting days are appointed to each unit. 
Hoshi unit -- Sunday. 
Kuriiwa unit -- Monday and Tuesday. 
Matsumura unit -- Wednesday.and Thursday. 
Narita unit -- Saturday. 
Achiwa unit -- Friday. 
Murata unit -- Sunday 
 
Clause 61   Price and Time 
1 For non-commissioned officers and enlisted men comfort stations are open from 9:00 to 18:00 
2 Price 
Time limit is one hour for one man. 
Chinese -- 1 yen 
Korean -- 1 yen 50 sen 
Japanese -- 2 yen 
Clause 62   Examination 
Every Monday and Friday are examination days. On Friday women are examined for sexually 
transmitted disease …” 
Excerpt 2, from same page: 
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“Clause 63   Instructions 
1 Drinking in comfort stations is forbidden. 
2 Payment of fee and time keeping should be correctly done. 
3 Women should all be deemed as having venereal desease. Use of condoms is absolutely 
necessary…. 
Clause 64   Miscellany 
1 Women are forbidden to have Chinese as clients. 
… 
3 Women are forbidden to go out except to specially permitted places. 
… 
Clause 65   Responsibility of Control 
A detachment of military police assumes the responsibility of control. 
Clause 65 Supplementary points 
1 On visiting days each unit should send leading staff to see around the comfort station. 
2 Non-commissioned officers should lead men of his unit to comfort stations… 
3 Official holiday of comfort stations is the 15th of every month” 
 
Source E: 
Inaba Masao, ed. Okamura Yasuji taisho shiryo: Senjo kaiso hen, jo [Sources of general 
Okamura Yasuji: Recollections of the battlefield, vol. 1] (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1970), pp. 302-
303, quoted in Asian Women’s Fund. (n.d). Who were the comfort women? – the establishment 
of comfort stations. Asian Women’s Fund. https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts-01.html.  
 
“There were not ianfus (comfort women) in former years of military campaigns. To speak 
frankly, I am an initiator of the comfort women project. As in 1932 during the Shanghai Incident 
some acts of rape were committed by Japanese military personnel. I, Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Shanghai Expeditionary Force, following the example of the Japanese naval brigade, asked the 
governor of Nagasaki prefecture to send comfort women groups. As a result, rape crimes totally 
disappeared, which made me very happy. At present each army corps was accompanied by a 
comfort women group, as if the latter constitutes a detachment of its quarter-master corps. But 
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